11/14/12

What Are ToR Hidden Service?

gAtO tHiNkInG - anonymity serves different interest for different user groups; To a private citizen it’s privacy, to a business it’s a network security issue. A business needs to keep trade secrets or have IP (knowledge base data-centers), communicate with vendors securely and we all know that business need to keep an eye on there competition – the competition can check your stats

update -11-14-2012 -uscyberlabs.com Tor Hidden Servicehttp://otwxbdvje5ttplpv.onion gAtO built this as a test sandbox / honeypot — cool logs stats -DOWN 4 upgrade – 06-11-2013

(http://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/uscyberlabs.com) and check on how your business is doing, what keywords your using, demographics of users hitting your site—— by the way in the Tor-.onion network a web site/service cannot be monitored unless you want it…

How would a government use a ToR-network I’m asked all the time —

// if I was an (agent/business-person)state actor doing business in China (and other countries too) well I would use a ToR-.onion connection to keep my

business private from a government that is know to snoop a bit on travelers to their country. The fact is governments need anonymity for their security -think about it “What does the CIA Google for?” Maybe they us ToR??? But this is about Hidden services right.

 

What is a hidden service in ToR-.onion network?

SImply put it’s a web site/service, a place in the ToR network were we have a service like:

  • Search Engine
  • Directories
  • web / pop3 email
  • PM Private Messages
  • Drop Box’s
  • Re-mailers
  • Bulletin Boards BBS
  • Image Boards
  • Currency exchange
  • Blog
  • E-Commercce
  • Social Networks
  • Micro-Blog -

Hidden Services are called hidden, because your website’s IP in ToR is hidden- they cannot see the IP of your server — they can’t track you- if they can’t find you how are they gonna hack you???? Sorry I had to say that -((more about that later)). Now how do I keep this secret (my IP) and let you the user use my services. In the normal web if your in uscyberlabs.com your on my site,— my server -you can do a whois and get my IP and geo-location— then you can attack my website with dDoS and other IP attack vectors, you also get my location so you can physically find me- my server/my website – maybe go dumpster diving in the trash and get my company secrets— mAyBe sI – nO,

Well in the ToR-.onion network you the client ask the business website if they can use the websites service / then decide and start a handshake to a rendezvous POINT to meet  —we meet at an OR ((onion relay))-a rendezvous POINT) not at my server/ my IP — so your never ever on the business site/server when your in onionLand, you can’t do a whois and get my IP because we meet at an OR, you cannot find my geo-location…..

We have heard of the killings of Iranians and Syrian rebels being killed in todays news, when an Iranian rebel is fighting for his and his families life if they(the government) finds his IP or the IP of the website he visited // they will hunt that person down and the Iranian police/government will kill the whole family sometimes. So keeping an IP from someone is not an evil act it is an act of privacy for safety on both sides the client and the business.

you need to look at Figure 2 to explains this better:

Now let’s focus on R2 OR the yellow key. That’s the spot were you(your company’s hidden website) and your client meet — I know it’s a sneaky way of doing business but once again if they can’t get to your IP at least that is one attack vector that can’t be used to hack you or ddos you. OK they can still hack you but it’s software then. How it’s all done – the magic —the technical thingy to this is below —/this is just an outline of events of the client /hidden web/service protocol:














I goes something like this –

  • ESTABLISH RENDEZVOUS cell
  • INTRODUCE1
  • INTRODUCE2 cell
  • INTRODUCE ACK cell.
  • INTRODUCE2 cell
  • RENDEZVOUS1 cell
  • sends a RENDEZVOUS2 cell Chat
  • sends a RENDEZVOUS2 cell Blog
  • RENDEZVOUS ESTABLISHED cell

1. Whenever the rendezvous point receives a RELAY_COMMAND_RENDEZVOUS1  with the same cookie as the OR sent in the RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCTION1 cell it logs the reception and the IP address of the immediate transmitter of the cell. At the same time, the OR middle node monitors the circuits passing through it. Whenever it receives a DESTROY  cell over a circuit it checks:

1) whether the cell was received just after the rendezvous point received the RELAY_COMMAND_RENDEZVOUS1 cell;

2) if the next node of the circuit at the middle node coincides with the previous node of the circuit at the rendezvous point;

3) whether the number of forwarded cells is exactly 2 cells up the circuit and 52 cells down the circuit.

More Geek network kinda stuff::

1. Jun 03 20:50:02.100 [notice] Tor 0.2.1.0-alpha-dev (r14739) opening new log file.

2. Jun 03 20:50:11.151 [notice] We now have enough directory information to build circuits.

3. Jun 03 20:50:12.697 [info] rend_services_introduce(): Giving up on sabotage as intro point for stuptdu2qait65zm.

4. Jun 03 20:50:18.633 [info] rend_service_intro_established(): Received INTRO_ESTABLISHED cell on circuit 1560 for service stuptdu2qait65zm

5. Jun 03 20:51:18.997 [info] upload_service_descriptor(): Sending publish request for hidden service stuptdu2qait65zm

6. Jun 03 20:51:22.878 [info] connection_dir_client_reached_eof(): Uploaded rendezvous descriptor (status 200 (“Service descriptor stored”))

People ask me how can these hidden services be attacked???

It’s all the same as in the surface web you find the software the hidden service is using /// let’s say Worpress (or flatPress) if they use an old version with vulnerabilities then, that site can be hacked by traditional hacking attack vectors— gAtO can’t wait till USCyberLabs.com will have a sandbox in the .onion were we can have a honeypot for people to hack and learn from.  (we need Funding for these project donate please – we will share) gAtO has not tried Backtrack 5 on ToR-.onion network – mAyBe sI -nO – uscyberlabs.com has been hacked a few times already and is consistently fighting bot’s and spammer, it goes on and on.everywhere-.-.-.-

Here are some technologies used in the ToR-.onion network:

update -11-14-2012 -uscyberlabs.com Tor Hidden Service = http://otwxbdvje5ttplpv.onion gAtO built this as a test sandbox and it turned into a honeypot — cool logs stats

TorStatusNet – http://lotjbov3gzzf23hc.onion/   is a microblogging service. It runs the StatusNet microblogging software, version 0.9.9, available under the GNU Affero General Public License.

FlatPress is a blogging engine like -Wordpress blog http://flatpress.org/home/   – http://utup22qsb6ebeejs.onion/ -

Snapp BBS works fine in OnionLand - http://4eiruntyxxbgfv7o.onion/ -

PHP BBS – http://65bgvta7yos3sce5.onion/

Nginx is a free, open-source, high-performance HTTP server and reverse proxy, as well as an IMAP/POP3 proxy server.  – http://ay5kwknh6znfmcbb.onion/torbook/

Anyway I hope this open up the mystery of a hidden service in ToR – it’s just a website, you go to a rendezvous point and do your business — your IP and the business IP are totally secure. No digital breadcrumbs. Now a word to the wise in the ToR-.onion network you have some very tech savvy people and some are very stupid be a critical-cyber user always -gAtO oUt.

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10/22/12

Diary of a Professional Botmaster

gAtO -found this and had to share with you. If you want to know how a botMaster is created check this out. A simple software engineer becomes a botMaster sounds like “surreal Walter White in Breaking Bad”. First you will noticed that this was written in 2010 and it’s been a model of the botMaster persona. This is a fictional tale now add the Tor onion network to hide the c&c and mobile Android /iApple devices but it comes so close to the real edge, have fun reading -gAtO oUt

Becoming the Six-Million-Dollar Man Blackhat USA 2010 Gunter Ollmann 

 Diary of a Professional Botmaster 

June 20, 2009 

I’ve decided to restart the diary. I used to keep one many years ago, but stopped when I moved down to London and started my MSc in Computing & Security at King’s College – much use that degree ever turned out to be!

I found out yesterday that me and most of the team are going to be made redundant at the end of the month. It appears that the company doesn’t need so many developers after they decided to sell off the Private Banking division to some German brokerage and they ditched those annoying trader guys up on the 18th floor a couple of months back.

Anyhow, I’d better start looking for a new job. The markets pretty tight at the moment. It seems that all the banks are laying off folks and the developers are the first to go. Not surprising really. I’ve been thinking about setting up my own business for a while though. Perhaps it’s time to bite the bullet and just do it. Take that redundancy cheque and invest it in myself?

June 22, 2009 

Was down at the pub for most of the afternoon with Bill & Ted. We were tossing around ideas of businesses I could start – in particular, businesses that could make me a millionaire in a year’s time. Granted, most of the ideas were completely off the wall and would be destined to fail or end in my bankruptcy within weeks of starting them (or would likely land me in prison within short order) but some of the grey areas look like they could be pretty exciting.

Ted was going on about botnets and how they’re not really illegal. Sounds like rubbish to me, but I’ll check it out anyway.

Last year when we had that worm go around the office and the Ops guys spent a couple of weeks chasing it down and cleaning up systems – that was pretty cool, and I can see how the authors of that worm could make quite a bit of money from it with a little banking knowledge. I don’t think they ever got caught either. Ted told me that James – the lardy guy over in second-level helpdesk – said that they were still having outbreaks of that very same worm and uncovering other infected computers almost every day (after an entire year). How cool is that!

June 25, 2009

I’ve been reading up on botnets. The Internet is full of great information about them. YouTube even has tutorials on how to create the malware, deliver the bot agents, manage the Command and Control (CnC) and turn the stolen data into real money.

I did some digging on these hacker forums too. They’re pretty cool. Most are well organized and there are bundles of tutorials, guides and discussion threads on all aspects of the botnet business. There’s even entire forums dedicated to matching buyers with sellers – Craigslist style! Becoming the Six-Million-Dollar Man Blackhat USA 2010 Gunter Ollmann 

June 26, 2009

Had a great session with Demitri over IRC today. He’s been running a handful of botnets over the last couple of years and seems to know what he’s talking about. Came across his advertisement on one of the boards and was offering a free 2-hour test-drive of his botnet CnC console – so I got to play with a couple hundred computers. Some of the functionality was grayed out, but I got a chance to DDoS the companies’ website – from the comfort of my desk ?

I spoke with a couple of the company Internet ops guys afterwards – being careful in what I said of course – to see if they noticed. Apparently they did. It didn’t bring down the site, but they were alerted from their IPS. Supposedly this is a common enough occurrence and happens most weeks. I guess I’m a little disappointed with that. I wonder how many bots I’d need to take down the webserver?

Dimitri said that he normally uses about 5,000 bots to take down big websites – but 200 is more than enough to wipe out corporate VPN appliances. Handy to know!

June 27, 2009

Sat down with Jim the lawyer this afternoon. I wanted to go over the details of setting up my own contracting business. Since I haven’t had much luck on the replacement job front looking for permanent roles, I figured I’d just go down the contracting route – since there are more opportunities going for temporary software engineering positions.

There’s not much to creating your own business. Jim helped me with all the forms – so I just need to mail them off tomorrow, and I’ll be on the way to creating my first business. He also explained some of the nuances to setting up a company in some other countries and the possibilities of “offshore accounts” and tax havens. I took plenty of notes. You never know when that’ll come in useful.

June 28, 2009 

Spent all day harvesting hacker boards for tools and playing with them on a couple of old laptops. This stuff really is easy.

I even came across this guy(?) on one of the chat forums (who can’t have been more than 14 years old) who was selling a botnet of 2,000 computers for $400. The funny part though was when the flame war stated about how overpriced that was. Apparently you can pick up 2,000 computers for as low as a $50 Walmart giftcard.

June 29, 2009

I woke up this morning with an epiphany (or was it just a delayed hangover?). I’m going to start my own botnet – but not just any botnet, I’m going to do it properly and make a business from it! I’ll still pursue any legit consulting roles that crop up – still got to eat and pay the bills – but it’ll make a convenient front while I’m building botnets.

Why the botnet business? Because it’s cool! Well, actually, it’s more than that. I don’t want to work forever in a dull office job and, from what I can tell, botnet building seems to be pretty profitable – and not many people get caught. And, if they do get caught, they basically only get a slap on the wrist. Becoming the Six-Million-Dollar Man Blackhat USA 2010 Gunter Ollmann 

Having read quite a few of the news articles about the folks that got caught, it looks to me that they got caught because they did something stupid and/or they clearly crossed the criminal line – and the police were forced to do something about them.

I’m pretty sure that I’m smarter than that. Didn’t any of these guys ever consider building a business plan first? Plan it all out – have a strategy and stick to it!

I’ve left the computer downloading a few tool collections I found on one of the Argentinean malware blog sites. 4Gb of tools, kits and exploits. Awesome! And it’s all free!!

June 30, 2009

Final pay date from the “old job”, and I’m now officially free of the company. Ended up with a little over £35k after taxes too – so that’ll tide me over the next few months as I pull together my new business(es).

Last night’s download worked out pretty good. There are hundreds of botnet kits in there – complete with CnC interfaces, exploit packs, phishing templates, malware creators and obfuscators. Supposedly there’s a high likelihood that many of them are backdoored, but who cares – it’s time to play! I’m going to try a couple of them out on the corporate laptop before I have to hand it back – preferably one with a good rootkit. I wonder if they’ll ever notice?

July 1, 2009

Woke up this morning having dreamed about what kind of botnet business I want to build. Also figured out a few “rules” that I want to work towards – maybe more of a “guiding principles” perspective really.

1. DON’T GET CAUGHT – which means I’m going to be damned careful in setting up everything and making sure that nothing can be traced back to me personally. Sure, there’ll be layers to the onion, but I’m not going to allow myself to be let down by poor tradecraft and bad habits. Those hackers in France and Spain got caught because they didn’t have enough layers of deniability and mixed the use of their personal systems and their botnet infrastructure.

2. DON’T DO CRIMINAL HARM – While I’m pretty far removed from planning on being a Robin Hood, I’m not going to get mixed in with the Mob or other organized crime. Similarly, I’m not going to get involved with any political or religious drivel. I also don’t want to cause any physical harm – as that’s a sure way of getting the interest of the police – and, besides, it’s not who I really am. The more legit I can make this business, the easier it’ll be to bow out after I’ve made my money.

3. RESILIENCE AND SCALABILITY ARE MY FRIENDS – Since this is going to be a business, based upon the lessons I learned from the Private Banking firm and all I’ve been reading over the last couple of weeks, it should be possible to build pretty big botnets really fast – if I plan it well.

Resilience will be even more important though. Getting back to the “don’t get caught” principle and the layers of deniability (and abstraction), if I plan for making the CnC and distribution systems robust, I’ll endeavor to split things over Becoming the Six-Million-Dollar Man Blackhat USA 2010 Gunter Ollmann 

several hosting providers and geographic regions.

Also spent some time on the hacker portals and responding to some of the threads. Some of the more interesting forums are currently closed to me because I haven’t developed a site reputation – which can be gained by posting 20, 50 and 100 messages. This’ll be pretty easy though. Lots of questions about coding problems which I can answer without too much thought.

July 3, 2009

I think I’ve managed to plan out a few more CnC infrastructure ideas. I found a few more tutorials online – and also some good message threads on domain registration tactics, Dynamic DNS operators and folks that’ll distribute malware for a few cents. It appears that a good rate at the moment is around $100 for 2,000 guaranteed installs. A little pricey if I was buying, but it sounds like good money if I was to become a seller ?

I also realized that I forgot a rather important principle for inclusion – my zero’th principle…

0. I WANT TO BE RICH – but, more to the point I want to retire rich, not be the richest bloke in jail.

Which all means that I need to do some more investigation on how to secure the money. I don’t want the money to be directly traceable to me – nor to the consulting company I’ve just created – but I’m going to need ways to pay for stuff and ways to accept payments. All deniable of course.

Made a few new connections on the hacker forums. Now that I’m posting to some threads I’m getting direct messages from some of the folks there. A couple of the guys that reached out were trying to pimp out their services – both of them malware dropper services. Someone else asked if I was with the FBI.

The USA perspective was interesting. I hadn’t realized that the guys on the forums can see/track my IP address and from there work out where I’m located. I’ll have to do some experimenting with anonymous proxies and TOR networks. I ran across a few video tutorials on the topic yesterday. That’ll be my homework for this evening – getting something setup and hiding my IP address forever more…

July 4, 2009 

Surprise in the snail mail – company papers just came back. I’m now the CEO of Thrull Networks! Cool company name huh! I wonder if anyone will ever figure it out – thought it was apt at the time. Maybe it’s a little too close to the mark. 5% on the dumbness scale I guess. Will have to be smarter in the future. I’m going to keep it though. Even saw that some related .com and .net domain names are available for registering.

Earlier this morning I went out and bought a couple of new laptops. Nothing special, just some small(ish) $800 laptops that I’m dedicating to my botnet business – and will never taint them with the Thrull Networks consulting business. Although I will be claiming them as tax deductable expenditures. Becoming the Six-Million-Dollar Man Blackhat USA 2010 Gunter Ollmann 

Also spent most of today coming up with the rules I’m going to work under for achieving principles (1) and (3)… and maybe a little of (0) too.

So, the new rules…

A) Separate systems for work/pleasure/personal and botnets. The two new laptops are JUST for the botnet business. I’ve already installed a full disk encryption scheme and come up with a 44 character password. I doubt that anyone’ll be breaking that mother anytime soon.

B) Never connect to the botnet CnC or do any botnet-related business from my home network. Given the general availability of free WiFi at Starbucks and McDonald, etc., I’ll use those. A couple of additional rules there though – don’t frequent them in a regular pattern (sounds like a Tom Clancy spy novel), and don’t use stores that have CCTV setups. I was tempted to use some of the unsecured WiFi networks in the neighborhood – but that may be a little too close for comfort. Besides, the coffee will be better than what I have at home.

C) Change the MAC on the laptops regularly. I’ve already downloaded and installed a cool piece of software that does precisely that. I’ve also installed a bundle of different Web browsers – but have deliberately not installed any plug-ins etc. I was reading recently a couple of online projects that showed how they could query your Web browser through JavaScript and the DOM to build a signature of the browser – and how “unique” that became once you started installing plug-ins and how regularly you kept them patched. So I’m planning on keeping the laptops as simple and “dumb” as possible.

D) Never connect directly to the botnet infrastructure. Lesson learned yesterday. TOR and anonymous proxies are now default on all my computers – especially the two new laptops!

E) While encryption is my friend. Asymmetric crypto is going to be my live-in lover. Thanks Bruce for the tips!

July 9, 2009

Been playing around all week with the DIY kits I downloaded a couple of weeks back. The Zeus kit is pretty impressive with its polymorphic malware generator. I was running its output past some of the free online antivirus scanning portals and noting which (if any) antivirus tools detected the samples. On average, only a couple of the AV tools detected anything – and if they did, it was only some kind of generic signature such as w32.suspicious etc.

I was originally using www.virustotal.com, but when I tried to find other AV portals that might have more AV products in them I stumbled over a couple of cool threads that explained why I shouldn’t use that site (and a few others) because they share the malware samples with the AV vendors. Therefore the AV vendors will have detection signatures for the malware out within a few days. That sucks – because I probably just wasted a few dozen cool pieces of Zeus malware. Luckily there were plenty of alternative AV testing portals being recommended and (yet more) tutorials on how to set up your own malware QA testing regimes. Becoming the Six-Million-Dollar Man Blackhat USA 2010 Gunter Ollmann 

I’ve settled on www.virtest.com now. They charge a few dollars for the privilege of testing the malware I submit, but they allow me to upload multiple malware samples simultaneously in bulk format. They also have some other services for checking out the malware delivery websites too – so you can check to see if the exploit packs used by the Zeus kit (and others) are correctly installed and whether the other AV components (e.g. HIPS) detect the infection. Their VIP account is $50 per month. I’ll have to figure out a good way to pay for the service. Something that can’t be traced back to me personally…

July 10, 2009 

I spent the entire morning down at the Starbucks down by the park using their “free” WiFi. Cost me about $26 in coffee for the 4 hours.

Anyway, I set up a handful of free webmail accounts. A couple of Gmail accounts, a couple of Hotmail accounts and a couple of Yahoo accounts. I entered in garbage “personal” information, but gave them all the same password – “Lucky4Me*Unlucky4U”. They’re disposable accounts for trialing out a few new concepts and learning what works.

Next, I created a couple of websites to host the Zeus CnC console pages. I had originally been worried about how I was going to have to pay for the web hosting – but a quick search for “free web hosting” revealed plenty of services – including portals that provide detailed reviews of all the providers. Woohoo.

It took me about an hour to create the sites on 0000free.com. It’s the first website I’ve ever built – and I had to learn some PHP while doing it all. On the job training if you like. The index page is just a copy/paste job from some car-parts website – and the Zeus CnC configuration and bot registration pages are off in a subfolder. They’re accessible if you know the URL, but they’re intentionally not linked to from anywhere. I don’t really want some search engine crawling the sites and flagging the Zeus CnC.

I’ll be spending some time later tonight generating some malware samples that’ll use the two new CnC URLs. That’ll be hard work – should take me all of 10 seconds ?

July 11, 2009 

A botnet is born. I’m a father!

So, this morning I headed off to the Starbucks over by the athletics center to play with my newly minted malware and the CnC services.

I originally set up a VMWare session on the laptop and infected it with the new malware bot agent and watched it reach out to the CnC server. Meanwhile I browsed to the website, logged in to the CnC console, and saw the test victim register itself – so I spent a good half hour testing out all the features of the bot agent. It’s pretty slick. Ugly, but slick. The toughest part of all this was setting up the TOR agent to provide the anonymous web access in reaching the CnC console.

To get the bot malware into play I decided to upload the samples to the Newsgroups – since they don’t require me to host the files directly and also provide anonymous Becoming the Six-Million-Dollar Man Blackhat USA 2010 Gunter Ollmann 

uploading. One file I named “Windows7KeygenCrack.exe” and the other “iTunesDRMRemover.exe”, and included some BS text about how good the tools are. They were both uploaded to a handful of different alt.binaries. groups using different email accounts and source IP addresses.

I hung around Starbuck for another hour, but didn’t see any victims appear on the Zeus console – so paid a visit to Bill & Ted and grabbed lunch with them in town. Ted’s already gotten a new job at some Scottish bank. Chose not to tell them about my botnet research. The ideas may have come from them originally, but I’m not about to share this secret.

Anyhow, I popped in to the McDonalds by the railway station at about 4pm and connected to the Internet to see how my “botnet” was coming along. Surprise, surprise, I had three new members to my botnet. How cool is that! I was well chuffed with that small success and subsequently spent an entire hour connecting to each computer and checking out what I could access on their systems. Just as I was about to pack things up and head off home a fourth computer joined my botnet.

I couldn’t stop smiling on my way home from McDonalds. I think I may have even said “I’ve just fathered my first botnet” somewhere on the walk up the hill. Haha.

Guess where I’ll be tomorrow morning…

July 12, 2009 

Got to Starbucks early this morning and was online with my baby botnet by at least 9:30am. It had swollen over night and the counter had reached 18 computers – but I could only contact 6 of them. The others must have been turned off or something.

For the next hour (and second cup of Java) I created a couple dozen new malware bot agents and configured them to point to the same two Zeus CnC servers I’d set up yesterday. I then went on to use the same Newsgroup tactics – but picking a few other juicy social engineering file names (and descriptions) – e.g. “AcrobatProfessionalKeygen.exe”, “RossettaStoneLanguagePackUnlocker.exe”, etc.

By the time I left the coffee shop the botnet had grown to 23 computers – mostly in the US and the Netherlands, but a couple from Australia and Taiwan.

Went home afterwards to do some more studying and recon, and found some good information on how to automatically pull back account and identity information from Zeus malware clients. There are a number of scripts that you could run automatically on each botnet computer to extract their webmail credentials, anything they’ve told their IE or Firefox web browsers to remember, etc.

I also found some plug-ins for the Zeus CnC console that help to manage the data that comes back from the keylogger and other info-stealer components – which I installed on the web servers later on my return trip to Starbucks – and left CnC commands for the botnet malware to automatically start collecting and uploading the identity information. Becoming the Six-Million-Dollar Man Blackhat USA 2010 Gunter Ollmann 

By 7:30pm my botnet had reached 200 members. It’s no longer a “family unit”; it’s a small village and I’m Pastor of the flock.

July 14, 2009

Had a couple of contract interviews yesterday, and hadn’t managed to check on how my baby was coming along for a couple of days. So, it was with a rather pleasant surprise I noted that the botnet had reached 3,320 computers.

Actually, I’m not so sure about the number and whether it’s a good number to rely upon. The number of computers “active” were about 450 – and I tested that I could control them OK. As for the rest, well, they were “offline” – but I did have files from all 3,000+ computers sitting on the CnC server – so I guess they were successfully compromised with my botnet agent.

I moved all the files off the two CnC servers and copied them to the laptop. When I got home I started doing some analysis.

Brief stats (for posterity)…

942 Facebook accounts

766 Twitter accounts

322 Gmail accounts

318 Hotmail accounts

193 Yahoo accounts

76 Paypal accounts

… and lots of sub-50 accounts – many for services/websites I’ve never heard of before. All told, about 5,500 different accounts.

BTW I’m not sure I like using Starbucks – I’m spending too much money on coffee there ?

July 15, 2009

The botnet’s now reached 4,000 computers.

There was an email from 0000free.com waiting for me from yesterday. Apparently I should be upgrading to a paid account because of all the traffic/hits the site has been receiving. Just as well I moved off all the identity information and files – I was almost over the file quota too!

July 16, 2009

4,300. What’s the population have to be before a village can be called a town?

Created another couple of dozen malware for release on the Newsgroups since the botnet growth appeared to be slowing down.

July 17, 2009 

I think I’m the Mayor of a small town now. I visited the Starbucks down by the strip mall this afternoon and logged in to the botnet. 11,435 computers!

At first I thought it may have been a mistake since the size jump was so large. Introducing a couple new malware downloads didn’t get that much of a leap last time. But I figured it out after about 20 minutes of probing and searching. It would seem that the new file “MichaelJacksonDeath-OfficialAutopsyReport.exe” was more successful. It also managed to make its way on to some Torrent server and plenty of people are downloading it.

New lessons learnt from yesterday’s efforts: Becoming the Six-Million-Dollar Man Blackhat USA 2010 Gunter Ollmann 

1) Tying social engineering to media and entertainment current events results yields more additions to a botnet.

2) Torrent networks can make the botnet malware reach more people faster.

July 18, 2009

Just as well I downloaded all those new files yesterday, because the botnet is dead. I’m no longer the Mayor.

This morning I popped on over at the Library for a bit of their WiFi access and tried to connect to my CnC servers. Nothing – well, more than nothing, the Zeus CnC pages had been deleted and my webserver account had been disabled. There were instructions to phone the helpdesk to discuss reactivation.

Waiting in the inbox of the webmail account I used to register the free websites was an email telling me that my site may have been hacked and was being used for malicious purposes.

A quick Google revealed that both CnC URL’s and configuration files were listed up on ZeusTracker.abuse.ch.

Bugger!

July 19, 2009 

All is not lost. I’ve still got all those identity/account detail files from all my botnet computers. The total – adding the first batch with the batch from the 17th – comes to a little shy of 19,000 unique sets of credentials. I can still access any (if not all) of those stolen accounts anytime in the future.

Better yet – there’s absolutely nothing that can be tracked back to me. Sure, the botnet is now out of my control (and computers are still being compromised with the malware which is still in circulation in the Newsgroups and Torrents), but I’m safe and have learnt a few new lessons.

That said though, it’s about time I started to focus on bringing in the money from the botnets. I’m not going to get that Porsche building botnets for botnets sake. I could easily enough find buyers for the stolen information – the hacker forums are overflowing with buyers and agents. That’s not a problem. The problem lies in converting “Internet money” into cash – and laundering those transactions sufficiently.

With that in mind, I spent all afternoon researching offshore banking and the creation of anonymous accounts. Disappointingly those infamous Swiss Numbered Accounts don’t exist anymore – at least not like they do in the movies.

I managed to narrow it down to three banking accounts and, as my finances grow, I’ll start to bring them on line. I’ve found agents that will allow me to set up Swiss banking accounts online. They require proof of address, but they provide a level of guarantee that personal information will not be supplied to anyone outside of Switzerland. The Cayman Island accounts are easier to set up – and don’t require an agent – but require a higher deposit. They’re a little too rich for my tastes at the moment – but I’ll probably add an account once I break the $100k per month revenue stream (if ever?). Becoming the Six-Million-Dollar Man Blackhat USA 2010 Gunter Ollmann 

No, the account I created online this evening was for a Panama Bearer Share Corporation account. As of an hour ago I’m now CEO of a second company – “Net Wizards LLC.”. I deposited $5,000 into the account. Not only does it provide an anonymous business front and full international banking facilities, but it comes with 4% interest and the credit cards issued against the account should be arriving in 10 days time.

July 20, 2009

I’m back in the botnet business!

I was keeping a couple of my hacker forum accounts live by responding to a few message threads and I stumbled across a couple of reputable botmasters that were in the process of selling off sections of their botnets. They were offering batches of 100 bots with dedicated CnC hosted servers for $200 each.

Most significantly though – there were alternatives to the $200 in Webmoney or PayPal funds – they’d accept hacked webmail accounts, Facebook accounts and Twitter accounts.

After a little back and forth, we agreed on the trade and exchange mode (had to use an agent that was pre-vetted on the forum – one of the administrators – who charges 10% for his time/effort). From X4cker I picked up 600 bots and two CnC servers (in the Ukraine no less) for 3,000 Gmail accounts and 1,000 Hotmail accounts. From Dankar007 I managed to procure 500 bots for the princely sum of 500 PayPal accounts. The site administrator/agent didn’t do too badly out of the deal either. I’m sure that he (or she?) now has his own copies of all those accounts.

After some quick verification and having tested the access to the two botnets, I created a new Zeus botnet agent and pushed it down to all 1,100 bots – and changed the admin credentials on the CnC servers.

Not only am I back in “business” with a brand new botnet, but I’ve still got all those account details from the previous botnet that I can continue trading/reselling to other operators.

– I just realized that this diary is now precisely one month old. In that month I lost my job, founded two companies, become a CEO, built a botnet, lost a botnet, established a reputation in the hacker communities, opened an international banking account, and just purchased my second botnet.

Time to start pulling together the business plan for constructing a profitable money-making botnet! The “march to a million” sounds like a great idea, but I’d prefer to aim for Steve Austin’s The Six Million Dollar Man. I’m pretty confident that I can reach that target over the next 11 months! What would mom say?

Original BlackHat PDF file -

http://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-10/whitepapers/Ollmann/BlackHat-USA-2010-Ollmann-6millionDollarMan-wp.pdf

ZeuS Tracker Statistics – https://zeustracker.abuse.ch/statistic.php

Note: This is a fictitious (and subtly macabre, but hopefully humorous) diary account loosely based upon real investigations of professional botnet operators and the criminal enterprises they created to monetize the data and systems under their control. It does not represent a single botnet operator, rather it represents a concatenation of notable business models, decisions and discussions from a spectrum of criminal operators. Names and places have been deliberately altered. No animals were harmed in the making of this diary.

 

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07/25/12

Profiling a Corporation -metadata attack vector

gAtO sEe - that in todays world getting a corporate profile for an attack plan has become easy thanks due to their own fault. This leads down the road to ruin corporate reputation, stolen IP-Intellectual property, competitive advantage and loss of data. Of course for social activist, criminals, competitor and national governments who use the technology against them to make available unhidden access to your networks. How? 

Metadata Information leaks by the corporation and their employees. According to retrieve information and the metadata in company documents 71% of Forbes 2000 companies may be using vulnerable and out of date version of Microsoft Office and Adobe software that allows hackers to Identify —>

Usernames – emails addresses network details and vulnerable software versions to implement a Advance Persistant Threat (APT).

Metadata in documents that your company distributes constitute information leaks and it can provide all kinds of information to any attacker. The high tech sector publishes more documents across websites than any other industry. Something else your employee on LinkedIn give all kinds of information about your company and your plans, even employment adds can help a potential hacker know what you are doing and maybe design the APT geared towards that subject.

Remember todays cyber attacker have support from lot’s of eye’s and ears, like hacktivist they have many people that can scan your website and look for information that can help the attack. You have 3 different attack vectors to worry about today:

  • IP based attacks
  • Web-Software attacks
  • Information Attacks

Corporate American take care of your metadata or it will bite you hard -gAtO oUt

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07/5/12

The Deep Dark Web -Book

gAtO sAy -mEoW you all- we have a new book coming out soon “The Deep Dark Web” and just wanted to write this as the foreword for the book, I thought it was interesting …//looking for peer review of book…write us

This book is to inform you about “The Deep Dark Web”. We hear that it’s a bad place full of crooks and hackers, but it is more a place were you have total anonymity as an online-user and yes there are ugly places in the dark web but it’s a small part of it. What it really is all about it’s freedom of expression, freedom of speech worldwide, supported by “us/we” the users of the network. It’s not controlled by any government, but blocked by a few like Syria, Iran, Ethiopia, China to name a few governments that want to deny their own people free access to information, to speak freely about their grievances and unite to tear down there walls of oppression.

Pierluigi and I (gAtO) share a passion for cyber security we write different blogs Pierluigi has http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/ and my site is uscyberlabs.com . We also write at other blogs and print media. We did’nt know it at the time but, we were writing cyber history as the 2011- 2012 cyber explosion took off we were at ground zero writing about Stuxnet, HBGrays, the LulzPirates, Anonymous but the Arab Spring was an awaking :

The recent revolution in Egypt that ended the autocratic presidency of Hosni Mubarak was a modern example of successful nonviolent resistance. Social Media technologies provided a useful tool for the young activist to orchestrate this revolution. However the repressive Mubarak regime prosecuted many activists and censored a number of websites. This made their activities precarious, making it necessary for activists to hide their identity on the Internet. The anonymity software Tor was a tool used by some bloggers, journalists and online activists to protect their identity and to practice free speech.

Today we have lot’s of anonymity communication tools I2P, Freenet, Gnunet and Tor to name a few. Why did the TorProject.org Tor-.onion network become the facto application to get free, private, anonymized Internet access. My conclusion is it’s humble beginnings with “Naval Research Project & DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Project Agency) ” sponsored, maybe you heard of DARPA they kinda created the Internet a long time ago. The government wanted to have a communication secure media that would piggy-bak on the establish Internet. From my point of view when they saw how good this worked the government used it to allow it’s agents to quietly use the network for CIA covert operations (just to name a few alphabet soup government agencies that use it). For example a branch of the U.S. Navy uses Tor for open source intelligence gathering, and one of its teams used Tor while deployed in the Middle East recently. Law enforcement uses Tor for visiting or surveilling web sites without leaving government IP addresses in their web logs, and for security during sting operations.

Journalist got a hold of this tool and they too were able to file reports before governments agents censored their interviews and film footage. The EFF (Electronic Frontier Foundation) got a hold of the Tor-networks and promoted it to maintaining civil liberties online. When the common business executive visited a foreign country (like China know to monitor foreigners Internet access) they now had a way to securely connect to their corporate HQ data-center without being monitored and giving away IP (Intellectual Properties). The Tor-Network became to good and the bad guy’s moved in to keep their illegal business safer from the law. The Internet Cyber-criminal has used the claer-web since the start so of course they went over to the Tor-.onion network because it works if you use it right and keeps you anonymous online.

With all this happening and the “Year of the Hack 2011” you can see why security geeks like Pierluigi and I became intrigued with this subject and we teamed up to write this manuscript hoping to answer some of the questions our friends, and peers were asking us about this mysterious hidden world call the deep dark web. We outlined a table of content and started to write about it in our blogs and the story unfolds from here to you. We hope to educate you on how this network works without too much geek talk (ok just a little). We cover the cyber criminals and their ecosystem we cover the financial currency (bitCoins) that is replacing fiat currencies all over the world during this unstable financial times. We tried to cover all the good , the bad and the ugly of the .onion network. We hope it will answer some of your questions but I am sure that more question will come up so feel free to come to our websites and give us a shout and ask your questions about the deep dark web…. - gAtO oUT 

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05/30/12

Hide SCADA in the ToR network – ..-hiding in plain site..

Hide SCADA in the ToR network – ..FREE-hiding in plain site..

any internet connection 2-ToR

gAtO cAn -now provide your company a FREE .onion network – reliable 24/7 secure / encrypted / untraceable communication between your SCADA systems talking to each other and the main office giving you real-time data from any remote SCADA  site. As an example from Scheider Electric white paper on – Video Surveillance Integrated with SCADA – White Paper  – we can now take that physical video security of all your remote video assets and transmit them securely, encrypted and untraceable to anyplace in the world to your datacenter. When going in and out of the invisible .onion network, you can control the entry and exit relays so picking safe verified relays to use is easy, or you can use your own relays, the more relays the better the system becomes at making you more invisible. The more people that use it the more untraceable and unmonitored it becomes. This kind of SCADA  communication in the ToR- onion network redefines geo-political digital boundaries. Since it rides on any Internet connection it can be used anywhere.

in the ToR-.onion network merchants can’t spy on you and they can’t steal your information

Not if but when —business take over the ToR- .onion network it will change the landscape and give it more order but it will still give the user anonymity thats the key to this network your signal, your voice cannot be found but you can still communicate. The ToR- .onion network rides not on top or the bottom of the digital super-highway but thru it.

Let’s keep in mind that access to the ToR-.onion network is FREE to anyone and your company’s use of the network makes it safer for everyone since the more people use it the more unreachable-undetectable you become. But in business you also have to deal with hostile governments and protecting your people and assets thru a ToR .onion network becomes even more critical. You can still operate but be safe and secure in your business communications.

The ToRProject.org is something that is making an impact on the very lives of people that want to have a free safe secure voice. Just look at Mr Chen a dissident from China he was jailed because he spoke up about the disable in China. The ToRProject.com helps people like Mr. Chen speak and to remain in anonymity. But by adding real business -reays into the ToR- .onion network we will give these people and the business more transparency, it makes you more invisible on the internet. You can donate to the ToR project and it’s a 501(c), so it’s deductible. Look at the donors list and see who support this invisible network. U.S Naval Research, National Science Foundation- DARPA – National Christian Foundation are some of the people supporting the ToR Project, it’s not so bad if they use it— see lab Notes below -

How you gonna hack what you can’t find, can’t see and can’t trace to you?

Just think mr. bankers a free secret untraceable encrypted-communication place were you can do your banking deals -in secret- and nobody but you and your closes friends know it even exist, not the government, not your spouse and harder for criminals to find your valuable data. It hides you in an Internet bubble of packets were nobody knows who you are or how to find you. Try can’t even tell it’s a ToR- .onion network it hides it’s signal to blend into the bit’s and bytes of the landscape in the digital noise.

Technically it pretty cheap get the free software as many copies as you need FREE!!! No volume pricing no updates FREE!!! Once your computer that talks to the internet hooks up to a ToR- Relays it’s in the matrix. If you add your own ToR-Relays you can use trusted Relays as entry and exit nodes into the ToR-.onion network so you can let the program use it randomness or choose a path into a FREE invisible communication media accessible from any Internet connection. -

The ToRProject.org is currently still fighting censorship and monitoring in China, Iran, Syria and others were people are being killed and sent home in small boxes to their relatives. Because that person could not use a ToR-network access to his gmail account that was monitored they showed him his emails and his guilt and killed him. That’s how brutal it can become if you cannot have a safe secure access to a basic email to communicate with the world. Government will kill you for what you say. Donate to the ToRProject.org

It’s easy -if all else fails call the gAtO I can help your business become invisible in/on the Internet- gATO oUt.

We use the ToR network for all communication in SCADA systems.  Here are a few SCADA White papers try them with ToR- .onion Networks.

 

lab Notes— gAtO 5/29/12

Tor: Sponsors

The Tor Project’s diversity of users means we have a diversity of funding sources too — and we’re eager to diversify even further! Our sponsorships are divided into levels based on total funding received:

Magnoliophyta (over $1 million)

Liliopsida (up to $750k)

Asparagales (up to $500k)

Alliaceae (up to $200k)

  • You or your organization?

Allium (up to $100k)

Allium cepa (up to $50k)

Past sponsors

We greatly appreciate the support provided by our past sponsors in keeping the pre-501(c)(3) Tor Project progressing through our ambitious goals:

WiKi-Pedia

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SCADA

SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition) generally refers to industrial control systems (ICS): computer systems that monitor and control industrial, infrastructure, or facility-based processes, as described below:

  • Industrial processes include those of manufacturing, production, power generation, fabrication, and refining, and may run in continuous, batch, repetitive, or discrete modes.
  • Infrastructure processes may be public or private, and include water treatment and distribution, wastewater collection and treatment, oil and gas pipelines, electrical power transmission and distribution, wind farms, civil defense siren systems, and large communication systems.
  • Facility processes occur both in public facilities and private ones, including buildings, airports, ships, and space stations. They monitor and control HVAC, access, and energy consumption.

A SCADA system usually consists of the following subsystems:

  • A human–machine interface or HMI is the apparatus or device which presents process data to a human operator, and through this, the human operator monitors and controls the process.
  • A supervisory (computer) system, gathering (acquiring) data on the process and sending commands (control) to the process.
  • Remote terminal units (RTUs) connecting to sensors in the process, converting sensor signals to digital data and sending digital data to the supervisory system.
  • Programmable logic controller (PLCs) used as field devices because they are more economical, versatile, flexible, and configurable than special-purpose RTUs.
  • Communication infrastructure connecting the supervisory system to the remote terminal units.
  • Various process and analytical instrumentation

 

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04/14/12

Cyber threats the joker and the thief

gAtO FoUnD- the continued threat of vulnerabilities within Web applications, mobile applications, and outlines specific vulnerabilities with cloud-based implications.  Also an alarming trend for security professionals, in the form of continued prevalence of critical application layer vulnerabilities, such as Cross Site Scripting (XSS) and SQL Injection. Though there are existing fixes for these well-known vulnerabilities, these flaws continued to dominate with XSS climbing to a staggering 38 percent of total Web vulnerabilities, increasing slightly from the second half of 2010. SQL Injection accounted for 15 percent of the total number of Web vulnerabilities.

Web vulnerabilities –  In the first two months of 2012, 59 percent of all reported security

vulnerabilities were Web vulnerabilities

–  In 2011, Cross Site Scripting (XSS) accounted for 38 percent of total

Web vulnerabilities

“As businesses worry about the next big security threat, they fail to realize the threats that are right in front of them,” said John Weinschenk, CEO of Cenzic. “From an industry-wide perspective, the fact that the amount well-known vulnerabilities continue to persist is a signal that education, diligence, and proper coding during the development phase are a necessity in today’s cyber world. Real change can only happen by adhering to these principles.”

Mobile vulnerabilities –  A total of 89 mobile vulnerabilities were made public in 2011 and so

far in 2012 (Jan-Feb) 11 mobile vulnerabilities have been made public.

–  Sensitive Information Disclosure (28 percent) and Session

Authentication and Authorization (28 percent) make up the bulk of the

vulnerabilities.

In recent report it is also details the vulnerabilities related to cloud and mobile device usage, noting a total of 89 mobile vulnerabilities were made public in 2011, while out of a set of 1201 publically reported vulnerabilities 855 had cloud-based security implications. As mobile devices continue to be used to access online cloud computing platforms, emerging hybrid vulnerabilities haved developed as well.

Cloud vulnerabilities –  In 2011, out of a set of 1201 publically reported vulnerabilities 855

had cloud based security implications

–  Specific security vulnerabilities were found in cloud-based

applications including EyeOS, OrangeHRM, The Parallels Plesk Panel,

Oracle Fusion Middleware, Batavi E Commerce, deV!ls ClanPortal, and

more.

The growing demand for cloud applications and mobile devices that access them is creating a unique problem. Each has its own set of security issues, but when used in tandem, they can produce hybrid vulnerabilities that compound threats and increase the complexity of secure coding. By exploiting vulnerabilities in a mobile application a hacker can open up an attack vector to a preexisting vulnerability on the cloud based application -gAtO oUt

 

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12/16/11

Stuxnet / Duqu Cyber Weapons Diagram

Notes for Diagram W32.Duqu threat

These files must be installed by another executable (the installer) which has not yet been recovered.

1. the installer get’s in and installed the all and register the files to 

gather enumeration information and encrypts it.

 

Highly Targeted towards a limited number of organizations for their specific assets.

Enumerating the Network – Recording Keystrokes – Gathering System Information -

uses HTTP and HTTPS to communicate with a command-and-control

general remote access capabilities

gather intelligence from a private entity to aid future attacks on a third party

  • The DLL offers nine main routines:
    • 65h: List of running processes, account details, and domain information
  • • 66h: Drive names and information, including those of shared drives
    • 68h: Take a screenshot
    • 69h: Network information (interfaces, routing tables, shares list, etc.)
    • 67h: Keylogger
    • 6Ah: Window enumeration
    • 6Bh: Share enumeration
    • 6Dh: File exploration on all drives, including removable drives
    • 6Eh: Enumerate computers on the domain through NetServerEnum 
  • The log file contains records with the following fields:
    • Type
    • Size
    • Flags
    • Timestamp
  • • Data

Key points:

•    Executables using the Stuxnet source code have been discovered. They appear to have been developed since the last Stuxnet file was recovered.
•    The executables are designed to capture information such as keystrokes and system information.
•    Current analysis shows no code related to industrial control systems, exploits, or self-replication.
•    The executables have been found in a limited number of organizations, including those involved in the manufacturing of industrial control systems.
•    The exfiltrated data may be used to enable a future Stuxnet-like attack.

The threat uses a custom C&C protocol, primarily downloading or uploading what appear to be JPG files. However, in addition to transferring dummy JPG files, additional data for exfiltration is encrypted and sent, and likewise received. Finally, the threat is configured to run for 36 days. After 36 days, the threat will automatically remove itself from the system.

 

Text of Diagram:

Stuxnet / Duqu

Architecture

Installation

Injection Procedure

USB Drives

Infection Routine Flow

Windows Computers

Stuxnet Updates Itself

Command and Control Server Communication

Internet Connection

Internal Networks

Remote Control

C&C Server

Compromised Computer -Client

GET

200 OK

GET index.php?data=[DATA]

DATA

OS Version

Machine Name

Workgroup Name

Exec RPC code

Responce Type 1:

200 OK execute RPC routine

Decrypt & exec.code

Responce Type 2:

200 OK encryption binary code

C&C Control

Check Internet Connection

Send system information to C&C

C&C response to execute to execute encrypted binary code

C&C reponse to execute RPC routine

Security Issues -Mitigation Techniques

Security Information

Event Management

Intrusion monitoring system intergrated with SIEM

Implement Extrusion Detection

Implement passive vulnerability scanners (PVS)

Control System

o

Secure Facility No Internet

Installation

Injection Procedure

USB Drives

Infection Routine Flow

Windows Computers

NO – Stuxnet Updates Itself

PLC Controllers

Industrial Motors

Command and Control Server Communication

Internet Connection

Internal Networks

Remote Control

PLC Controllers

Industrial Motors

PLC- Programmable logic controller

Duqu

Duqu – this capability to gather intelligence from a private entity to aid future attacks

Duqu – creators of Duqu had access to the source code of Stuxnet

Duqu – payload has been replaced with general remote access capabilities

Duqu – automatically remove itself from the system.

Duqu -  threat is configured to run for 36 days

Duqu – C&C – primarily downloading or uploading what appear to be JPG files

Duqu – information is logged to a lightly encrypted and compressed local file

Duqu -gathering system information

Duqu – enumerating the network

DUQU – download additional executables

Duqu -HTTP and HTTPS to communicate

Duqu – signed with a valid digital certificate

Duqu – record keystrokes

DATA:

Lists of running processes, account details, and domain information

Drive names and other information, including those of shared drives

Screenshots

Network information (interfaces, routing tables, shares list, etc.)

Key Presses – Key Logger

Open Windows Names

File Exploration on all Drives, including removable Drives

Enumeration of computers in the Domain through NetServerEnum

SCADA

Process automation protocols  DF-1 FOUNDATION fieldbus – H1 & HSE Profibus – by PROFIBUS International. PROFINET IO CC-Link Industrial Networks – Supported by the CLPA CIP (Common Industrial Protocol) – Can be treated as application layer common to DeviceNet, CompoNet, ControlNet and EtherNet/IP Controller Area Network utilised in many network implementations, including CANopen and DeviceNet ControlNet – an implementation of CIP, originally by Allen-Bradley DeviceNet – an implementation of CIP, originally by Allen-Bradley DirectNet – Koyo / Automation Direct proprietary, yet documented PLC interface EtherNet/IP – IP stands for “Industrial Protocol”. An implementation of CIP, originally created by Rockwell Automation Ethernet Powerlink – an open protocol managed by the Ethernet POWERLINK Standardization Group (EPSG). EtherCAT Interbus, Phoenix Contact’s protocol for communication over serial links, now part of PROFINET IO HART Protocol Modbus RTU or ASCII or TCP Modbus Plus Modbus PEMEX Ethernet Global Data (EGD) – GE Fanuc PLCs (see also SRTP) FINS, Omron’s protocol for communication over several networks, including ethernet. HostLink Protocol, Omron’s protocol for communication over serial links. MECHATROLINK – open protocol originally developed by Yaskawa. MelsecNet, supported by Mitsubishi Electric. Optomux – Serial (RS-422/485) network protocol originally developed by Opto 22 in 1982. The protocol was openly documented and over time used for industrial automation applications. Honeywell SDS – Smart Distributed System – Originally developed by Honeywell. Currently supported by Holjeron. SERCOS interface, Open Protocol for hard real-time control of motion and I/O SERCOS III, Ethernet-based version of SERCOS real-time interface standard GE SRTP – GE Fanuc PLCs Sinec H1 – Siemens SynqNet – Danaher TTEthernet – TTTech PieP – An Open Fieldbus Protocol BSAP – Bristol Standard Asynchronous Protocol, developed by Bristol Babcock Inc. RAPIEnet[1], Real-time Automation Protocols for Industrial Ethernet

Company Management

Internet

Local Control Offshore Platform

o

PLC-DCS -  distributed control system (

PLC-RTU – Remote Terminal Unit

Valve Station

Stress Breach Station

Terminals

Internet

PLC Programmable Logic Controller

Stuxnet Seeks Specific Models S7-300 S7-400

Read Input of Device

Execute Program

Diagnostics & Communications

Update Output

PLC Scans

Communication Media

Sattelite

TelCom

Internet

SONET / SDH

Cellular Networks

SCADA Master

Internet

HMI

MTU

Web Server

Internet

Duqu – Duqu’s purpose is to gather intelligence data and assets from entities, such as industrial control system manufacturers, in order to more easily conduct a future attack against another third party. The attackers are looking for information such as design documents that could help them mount a future attack on an industrial control facility.

Duqu -Geographics

France, Netherland, Switzerland, Ukraine

India

Iran

Sudan

Vietnam

Duqu – Compile Time Wed Jun 01, 03:25:18 2011 Mon Oct 17 17:07:47 2011 Mon Oct 17 16:26:09 2011 Tue Aug 09 21:37:39 2011 Purpose Stealing information Reconnaissance module Lifespan extender Stealing information

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