01/17/15

Multiple Bitcoin wallets for a Business with Multiple Locations

gAtO wOrKiNg - on the business side, so I needed to create this Presentation to explain how my hd-wallet would work in a business.

Let’s say you have 8 Hair Salons and you wanted each store to have Bitcoin as a source of payment. Easy with my HD-wallet system you can safely deploy different Bitcoin wallets to all the stores and still maintain control of all the Bitcoins that your 8 Hair Salons take in. 

My KickStarter Project- https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/949677390/bitcoin-business-wallet

Your accountant will love the reporting of every BitcoinUserWalletTransaction – and of course the BIG question – Who do you call when your Bitcoin transaction does not work. We give you the tools to query the blockchain and get the answers to solve the problems.

Security – Privacy – Control – Management – Accountability

Simple GUI interface so anyone can use it – No Bitcoin Programing NeededEasy deployment all in your server, so you have total security. I also included Intelligent Multi-Sig Workflow to make Multi-sig wallets easy to use, approve and use by everyone.  Any input would be welcome – gAtO OuT 

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12/28/14

3 Multi-Sig wallets for the price of 1 -maybe more

3 Multi-Sig wallets for the price of 1 -maybe more

a new Multi-Sig address scheme -Maybe- let me back-up —//|| A transactions has 2 parts – the LOCKING (INPUTS) of the ownership of the coins and the UN-LOCKING (OUTPUTs) of the ownership of the coins. multi-sig or not all TX are the same in the Bitcoin protocol.

id_99

Multi-Sig Sub-Wallets give business safety, management and accountability with my HD-BIP32 Business wallet

gAtO tEsTing  - my HD-wallet system adding multi-sig wallets to the mix. One of the strange but wonderful things I found is when you create a multi-sig wallet, the order of the INPUTS creates different addressed and redeemScripts. So I test it at the BitcoinD command line just to make sure.

A Mutli-sig wallet is different because it’s created out of other sub-wallets,  but the order in INPUTS makes a difference but the strange thing is to cash the multi-sig and sign them, you can still use any other of OUTPUTs – this test shows that any combination of signed OUTPUTs will unlock all 3 different multi-sig addresses for the price of 1.

I included the example below for you to test: Science is repeatable by anyone and so is the crypto and the math of Multi-sigs-

What I did was change the order of the sub-wallet INPUTS   – _01 – _02 – _03 – and - _02 – _03 – _01  -but the biggest surprised was when I tried to cheat -_03 – _01 –  _03  –   I used the 3rd wallet twice and it generated a Multi-sig. So in affect I just created a Multi-sig that only one (1) wallet has to sign it and it counts and 2.

By all rights the – _03 – _01 –  _03   – or any double of the sub-wallets defeats the purpose of 2 out of 3 signatures but working out new smart transactions multi-sig or not. Soon we will be able to do 3 out of 15 multi-sigs and other cool transactions stuff.

The other cool thing is my HD-wallet system will be able to manage, communicate and create any combination of multi-sig 2-n-3 sub-wallets for today, but as Bitcoin and others like Litecoin, DogeCoin or even an NxT transaction systems for really smart intelligent digital contracts. Business that work in this new digital coin game need a HD-BIP32 wallet system that works with their system. Without accountability even multi-sig wallets will not solve things in business. But when you can create and manage all transactions multi-sigs or regular sub-wallets, with accounting being able to safely get reports of all sub-wallets of all Multi-sig wallets and the coins or contracts they hold.

I’ll get of my soapbox -mEoW – play with the examples below – the cool thing it works, the beauty of crypto and math is you can’t cheat – it works or it doesn’t –

A new Multi-Sig address scheme – maybe -yes/no but by using multi-sig wallets the right way we Bitcoin can become safer – in my HD-BIP32 wallet you will be able to manage thousands if not millions of Multi-sig sub-wallets with 1 application - gAtO -oUt 

EXAMPLE:

———————————————————————————————–

_01 sw_key_pair_as_sec: 03a7d8fbe19c3b9aba3b21cab655253bb954702e938312ff9141ee76700a3316ea

_02 sw_key_pair_as_sec: 022bcd0edd96fffae1d59853a5139948e632968d16240ee8bbedd8e964368ace1f

_03 sw_key_pair_as_sec: 02396b913639612c603471a39c780a49afabf9a45ea62d1edfda77e2e086061685

_01 – _02 – _03

bitcoind createmultisig 2 ‘[“03a7d8fbe19c3b9aba3b21cab655253bb954702e938312ff9141ee76700a3316ea“, “022bcd0edd96fffae1d59853a5139948e632968d16240ee8bbedd8e964368ace1f”, “02396b913639612c603471a39c780a49afabf9a45ea62d1edfda77e2e086061685“]’

{

“address” : “3MbDdx56fVjgsMWW7VmZhnxas4UJxAQbgf“,

“redeemScript” : “522103a7d8fbe19c3b9aba3b21cab655253bb954702e938312ff9141ee76700a3316ea21022bcd0edd96fffae1d59853a5139948e632968d16240ee8bbedd8e964368ace1f2102396b913639612c603471a39c780a49afabf9a45ea62d1edfda77e2e08606168553ae”

}

 _02 – _03_01

bitcoind createmultisig 2 ‘[“022bcd0edd96fffae1d59853a5139948e632968d16240ee8bbedd8e964368ace1f”, “02396b913639612c603471a39c780a49afabf9a45ea62d1edfda77e2e086061685“, “03a7d8fbe19c3b9aba3b21cab655253bb954702e938312ff9141ee76700a3316ea“]’

{

“address” : “3McoaAaTQR8NX4u1y1BxHf3FrWxqjzycHj“,

“redeemScript” : “5221022bcd0edd96fffae1d59853a5139948e632968d16240ee8bbedd8e964368ace1f2102396b913639612c603471a39c780a49afabf9a45ea62d1edfda77e2e0860616852103a7d8fbe19c3b9aba3b21cab655253bb954702e938312ff9141ee76700a3316ea53ae”

}

_03_01 –  _02

bitcoind createmultisig 2 ‘[“02396b913639612c603471a39c780a49afabf9a45ea62d1edfda77e2e086061685“, “03a7d8fbe19c3b9aba3b21cab655253bb954702e938312ff9141ee76700a3316ea“, “022bcd0edd96fffae1d59853a5139948e632968d16240ee8bbedd8e964368ace1f”]’

{

“address” : “3LYZsV7NaMaGhdbtdwvBwFJcs63QiYzzeF“,

“redeemScript” : “522102396b913639612c603471a39c780a49afabf9a45ea62d1edfda77e2e0860616852103a7d8fbe19c3b9aba3b21cab655253bb954702e938312ff9141ee76700a3316ea21022bcd0edd96fffae1d59853a5139948e632968d16240ee8bbedd8e964368ace1f53ae”

}

_03 – _01 –  _03

bitcoind createmultisig 2 ‘[“02396b913639612c603471a39c780a49afabf9a45ea62d1edfda77e2e086061685“, “03a7d8fbe19c3b9aba3b21cab655253bb954702e938312ff9141ee76700a3316ea“, “02396b913639612c603471a39c780a49afabf9a45ea62d1edfda77e2e086061685“]’

{

“address” : “3FEAsZ8KDvodHmTQy2rnWKknQWKCuazdLC“,

“redeemScript” : “522102396b913639612c603471a39c780a49afabf9a45ea62d1edfda77e2e0860616852103a7d8fbe19c3b9aba3b21cab655253bb954702e938312ff9141ee76700a3316ea2102396b913639612c603471a39c780a49afabf9a45ea62d1edfda77e2e08606168553ae”

}

———————————————————————————

12/7/14

Looking for Investors in my BIP32 Business wallets.

gAtO bAcK - I am almost finished with my BIP32 Business wallet and I need investors to finish it up and make it pretty and then get it into the business community so they can also have a Bitcoin Business wallet designed for business not an individual.

If you want to see a video of the wallet demo just come on over and check out my Wallet Demohttp://youtu.be/gOPdFPHNByk If you have any comment or suggestions please contact me. - gAtO oUt

07/30/14

Tor Traffic Confirmation Attack

Tor Traffic Confirmation Attack -Roger Dingledine Report
SUMMARY:
  On July 4 2014 we found a group of relays that we assume were trying
  to deanonymize users. They appear to have been targeting people who
  operate or access Tor hidden services. The attack involved modifying
  Tor protocol headers to do traffic confirmation attacks.gato_signal_02

  The attacking relays joined the network on January 30 2014, and we
  removed them from the network on July 4. While we don't know when they
  started doing the attack, users who operated or accessed hidden services
  from early February through July 4 should assume they were affected.

  Unfortunately, it's still unclear what "affected" includes. We know
  the attack looked for users who fetched hidden service descriptors,
  but the attackers likely were not able to see any application-level
  traffic (e.g. what pages were loaded or even whether users visited
  the hidden service they looked up). The attack probably also tried to
  learn who published hidden service descriptors, which would allow the
  attackers to learn the location of that hidden service. In theory the
  attack could also be used to link users to their destinations on normal
  Tor circuits too, but we found no evidence that the attackers operated
  any exit relays, making this attack less likely. And finally, we don't
  know how much data the attackers kept, and due to the way the attack
  was deployed (more details below), their protocol header modifications
  might have aided other attackers in deanonymizing users too.

  Relays should upgrade to a recent Tor release (0.2.4.23 or
  0.2.5.6-alpha), to close the particular protocol vulnerability the
  attackers used -- but remember that preventing traffic confirmation in
  general remains an open research problem. Clients that upgrade (once
  new Tor Browser releases are ready) will take another step towards
  limiting the number of entry guards that are in a position to see
  their traffic, thus reducing the damage from future attacks like this
  one. Hidden service operators should consider changing the location of
  their hidden service.

THE TECHNICAL DETAILS:
  We believe they used a combination of two classes of attacks: a traffic
  confirmation attack and a Sybil attack.

  A traffic confirmation attack is possible when the attacker controls
  or observes the relays on both ends of a Tor circuit and then compares
  traffic timing, volume, or other characteristics to conclude that the
  two relays are indeed on the same circuit. If the first relay in the
  circuit (called the "entry guard") knows the IP address of the user,
  and the last relay in the circuit knows the resource or destination
  she is accessing, then together they can deanonymize her. You can read
  more about traffic confirmation attacks, including pointers to many
  research papers, at this blog post from 2009:
  https://blog.torproject.org/blog/one-cell-enough

  The particular confirmation attack they used was an active attack where
  the relay on one end injects a signal into the Tor protocol headers,
  and then the relay on the other end reads the signal. These attacking
  relays were stable enough to get the HSDir ("suitable for hidden
  service directory") and Guard ("suitable for being an entry guard")
  consensus flags:
  https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/blob/HEAD:/dir-spec.txt#l1775
  Then they injected the signal whenever they were used as a hidden
  service directory, and looked for an injected signal whenever they
  were used as an entry guard.

  The way they injected the signal was by sending sequences of "relay"
  vs "relay early" commands down the circuit, to encode the message they
  want to send. For background, Tor has two types of cells: link cells,
  which are intended for the adjacent relay in the circuit, and relay
  cells, which are passed to the other end of the circuit.
  https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/blob/HEAD:/tor-spec.txt#l364
  In 2008 we added a new kind of relay cell, called a "relay early"
  cell, which is used to prevent people from building very long paths
  in the Tor network (very long paths can be used to induce congestion
  and aid in breaking anonymity):
  http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#congestion-longpaths
  https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/blob/HEAD:/proposals/110-avoid-infinite-circuits.txt
  But the fix for infinite-length paths introduced a problem with
  accessing hidden services:
  https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/1038
  and one of the side effects of our fix for bug 1038 was that while
  we limit the number of outbound (away from the client) "relay early"
  cells on a circuit, we don't limit the number of inbound (towards the
  client) relay early cells:
  https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-commits/2009-July/014679.html

  So in summary, when Tor clients contacted an attacking
  relay in its role as a Hidden Service Directory to publish
  or retrieve a hidden service descriptor (steps 2 and 3 on
  https://www.torproject.org/docs/hidden-services), that relay would
  send the hidden service name (encoded as a pattern of relay and
  relay-early cells) back down the circuit. Other attacking relays,
  when they get chosen for the first hop of a circuit, would look for
  inbound relay-early cells (since nobody else sends them) and would
  thus learn which clients requested information about a hidden service.

  There are three important points about this attack:

  A) The attacker encoded the name of the hidden service in the injected
  signal (as opposed to, say, sending a random number and keeping a local
  list mapping random number to hidden service name). The encoded signal
  is encrypted as it is sent over the TLS channel between relays. However,
  this signal would be easy to read and interpret by anybody who runs
  a relay and receives the encoded traffic. And we might also worry
  about a global adversary (e.g. a large intelligence agency) that
  records Internet traffic at the entry guards and then tries to break
  Tor's link encryption. The way this attack was performed weakens Tor's
  anonymity against these other potential attackers too -- either while
  it was happening or after the fact if they have traffic logs. So if
  the attack was a research project (i.e. not intentionally malicious),
  it was deployed in an irresponsible way because it puts users at risk
  indefinitely into the future.

  (This concern is in addition to the general issue that it's probably
  unwise from a legal perspective for researchers to attack real users
  by modifying their traffic on one end and wiretapping it on the
  other. Tools like Shadow are great for testing Tor research ideas out
  in the lab: http://shadow.github.io/ )

  B) This protocol header signal injection attack is actually pretty neat
  from a research perspective, in that it's a bit different from previous
  tagging attacks which targeted the application-level payload. Previous
  tagging attacks modified the payload at the entry guard, and then
  looked for a modified payload at the exit relay (which can see the
  decrypted payload). Those attacks don't work in the other direction
  (from the exit relay back towards the client), because the payload
  is still encrypted at the entry guard. But because this new approach
  modifies ("tags") the cell headers rather than the payload, every
  relay in the path can see the tag.

  C) We should remind readers that while this particular variant of
  the traffic confirmation attack allows high-confidence and efficient
  correlation, the general class of passive (statistical) traffic
  confirmation attacks remains unsolved and would likely have worked
  just fine here. So the good news is traffic confirmation attacks
  aren't new or surprising, but the bad news is that they still work. See
  https://blog.torproject.org/blog/one-cell-enough for more discussion.

  Then the second class of attack they used, in conjunction with their
  traffic confirmation attack, was a standard Sybil attack -- they
  signed up around 115 fast non-exit relays, all running on 50.7.0.0/16
  or 204.45.0.0/16. Together these relays summed to about 6.4% of the
  Guard capacity in the network. Then, in part because of our current
  guard rotation parameters:
  https://blog.torproject.org/blog/improving-tors-anonymity-changing-guard-parameters
  these relays became entry guards for a significant chunk of users over
  their five months of operation.

  We actually noticed these relays when they joined the network, since
  the DocTor scanner reported them:
  https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-consensus-health/2014-January/004134.html
  https://gitweb.torproject.org/doctor.git
  We considered the set of new relays at the time, and made a decision
  that it wasn't that large a fraction of the network. It's clear there's
  room for improvement in terms of how to let the Tor network grow while
  also ensuring we maintain social connections with the operators of all
  large groups of relays. (In general having a widely diverse set of relay
  locations and relay operators, yet not allowing any bad relays in,
  seems like a hard problem; on the other hand our detection scripts did
  notice them in this case, so there's hope for a better solution here.)

  In response, we've taken the following short-term steps:

  1) Removed the attacking relays from the network.
  2) Put out a software update for relays to prevent "relay early" cells
     from being used this way.
  3) Put out a software update that will (once enough clients have
     upgraded) let us tell clients to move to using one entry guard
     rather than three, to reduce exposure to relays over time.
  4) Clients can tell whether they've received a relay or relay-cell.
     For expert users, the new Tor version warns you in your logs if
     a relay on your path injects any relay-early cells: look for the
     phrase "Received an inbound RELAY_EARLY cell".

  The following longer-term research areas remain:

  5) Further growing the Tor network and diversity of relay operators,
     which will reduce the impact from an adversary of a given size.
  6) Exploring better mechanisms, e.g. social connections, to limit the
     impact from a malicious set of relays. We've also formed a group to
     pay more attention to suspicious relays in the network:
     https://blog.torproject.org/blog/how-report-bad-relays
  7) Further reducing exposure to guards over time, perhaps by extending
     the guard rotation lifetime:
     https://blog.torproject.org/blog/lifecycle-of-a-new-relay
     https://blog.torproject.org/blog/improving-tors-anonymity-changing-guard-parameters
  8) Better understanding statistical traffic correlation attacks and
     whether padding or other approaches can mitigate them.
  9) Improving the hidden service design, including making it harder
     for relays serving as hidden service directory points to learn what
     hidden service address they're handling:
     https://blog.torproject.org/blog/hidden-services-need-some-love

OPEN QUESTIONS:
  Q1) Was this the Black Hat 2014 talk that got canceled recently?
  Q2) Did we find all the malicious relays?
  Q3) Did the malicious relays inject the signal at any points besides
      the HSDir position?
  Q4) What data did the attackers keep, and are they going to destroy it?
      How have they protected the data (if any) while storing it?

  Great questions. We spent several months trying to extract information
  from the researchers who were going to give the Black Hat talk, and
  eventually we did get some hints from them about how "relay early"
  cells could be used for traffic confirmation attacks, which is how
  we started looking for the attacks in the wild. They haven't answered
  our emails lately, so we don't know for sure, but it seems likely that
  the answer to Q1 is "yes". In fact, we hope they *were* the ones doing
  the attacks, since otherwise it means somebody else was. We don't yet
  know the answers to Q2, Q3, or Q4.
07/20/14

DELL, NEW YORK STATE AND BLOOMBERG ON BITCOIN AND VIRTUAL CURRENCIES

DELL, NEW YORK STATE AND BLOOMBERG ON BITCOIN AND VIRTUAL CURRENCIES

 

  • Last week, New York State released a proposed regulatory framework for virtual currencies and Benjamin Lawsky, Superintendent of Financial Services said: “We have sought to strike an appropriate balance that helps protect consumers and root out illegal activity – without stifling beneficial innovation. Setting up common sense rules of the road is vital to the long-term future of the virtual currency industry, as well as the safety and soundness of customer assets.” Note: “Virtual currencies” include bitcoin and other digital currencies, but excludes online gaming platforms and customer affinity or rewards programs such as airline miles. The review and comment period is open for 45-days.
  • In addition, Dell said it is starting a pilot test to support bitcoin as a purchase option on Dell.com for consumer and small business shoppers in the U.S. According to Adam White, of payment processor Coinbase, there will be no processing fees for Dell on the first $1 million in sales and a 1% flat fee for sales above that level.
  • Finally, a Bloomberg survey of 562 of its subscribers found that 55% said the price of bitcoin was unsustainable, 14% said it was on the verge of a bubble, 5% said a bubble was not forming and 25% were unsure.
05/17/14

Bitcoin 2.0 and the Segway Bike

Bitcoin 2.0 and the Segway Bike

gAtO Imagine – some of the business side applications we can build with future triggered events being executed by Autonomous Cyber Robots. All build on the basic Bitcoin 1.0 code but not using the coins but the blockchain – there be treasure in that blockchain but it’s all math ugh!!!.

segway_bike_Bitcoin

Ok first what is Bitcoin 2.0? Basically it’s a new way to have a cyber robot or a cyber drone that can do what you instruct them to do. It is a timestamp triggered event and you can now just add business rules to it that will work in cyberspace.

What do you do online today?

  • Shop for things and have them delivered
  • Online banking
  • Buy and sell stocks and bonds
  • Send donations to Charities or political organizations

So now you can build cyber-business rules to be execute on the web and put them into one of these cyber robot or a cyber drone. I use these 2 terms because when people hear drones they think attacks and such and yes you can now build digital FINANCIAL  warriors that can execute based on events, millions of them and they can be used for good and evil.

timeStamp- or -blockchain-trigger event – robots with business rules- example//

  • Send 100 Bitcoins to my family every 6 months after I die.
  • Buy or sell stocks ambiguously  – Digital Business Contracts – or Personalities
  • Any transaction that can be performed on the web!
  • Set up a corporation by an Ethereum digital actors
  • Any Business rule that can executed digitally 

gAtO lOvE Ethereum //= it is a platform and a programming language that makes it possible for any developer to build and publish next-generation distributed applications. https://www.ethereum.org/  Next Generation Smart Contracts and a Decentralize Application Platform. Non-geek cyber-business rules OK…

GAtO used to lug around an Osborne luggable computer… 1.0 laptops – but gAtO was cool aligning 10MB (yes 10 Mega Bytes) hard rives the size of a large home freezer. The good old computers days… Out of hardware back to Biz -mEoW

MasterCoin – The Master Protocol facilitates the creation and trading of smart properties and user currencies as well as other types of smart contracts. Mastercoins serve as the binding between bitcoins (BTC), smart properties and smart contracts created on top of the Mastercoin Protocol. Non-geek cyber-business rules OK…

Similar Alt-coins but both the same (going after the business side) in a way but these seem to be a new wave of Bitcoin 1.0 off shoots. Now NameCoin and Trusted coin are on a different course, since they are more into the digital Notary service that can be done with any blockchain type Bitcoin off shoot. And LiteCoin 84 Million -versus- 21 Million in Bitcoins another fight but of a different financial play on this alt-coin. LiteCoin is around $10 bucks Per so we have to keep an I on them too.

Once again these another development are being built on the shoulder of the great Satoshi Nakamoto work. GaTo as a technologist love all these new and exciting toys to play with. Then I think about the Segway Bike I alway wanted one but then again really, I’m I really ready to give up walking? Back in 2001 it was so cool, it was the evolution of the bicycle or was it???

13 years later this evolution the revolution of the bicycle is seem by most as the Mall Police ride by. Ok maybe in Seattle or San Francisco I can see that but really. Now Bicycle Cops are everywhere but real cops on a Serway Bike – you know maybe I don’t really want one anymore. But I wonder if I can buy one with Bitcoins? ummm

DogE-Coin is hot with the young bloods as a NEW digital currency that’s taking Reddit and other places by storm- I know gAtOCoin, maybe I’ll start one of my own, there only about 500 Alt-Coins around and growing all built on the Bitcoin core code. Bitcoin is only 5 Years Old -Wow- Imagine in another 3-5 years // world wide currencies all over doing different things creating the NEW Cyber-System D-(system) that no government can controls, of the people and by the people. Double -Wow

gAtO’s bet is on Bitcoin, simple it has payed it’s dues, from an underground play toy to International financial deals like flying to the Moon on Virgin Air, I wonder if I can buy that with Litecoins- you listening Richard Branson I’m mining Namecoin too Richard.

The new Bitcoin business Investors and Incubators are hopping with new Bitcoin 2.0 ideas, but is it different if it’s control by the users, not the sole players like the bankers and older financial players. But truth be told these will bring newer workable solutions that will trickle down to the normal person. We must be careful because these new worldwide cyber solution will have little government controls so the game is changing and the ability to jump on this but NOT to give up privacy with government toys like TPM – Trusted Computer Platform – yes July 2015 all Windows 8 devices will have TPM 2.0 in control of your devices. The US solution cyber Kill Switch.

AT least Apple has not added TPM into it’s hardware but they banned against Bitcoin -Steve told you to Innovate Apple- But that’s another battle.

You can trust your government spying on you IF you have nothing to hide RIGHT!!! - gAtO oUt

Digital System D-

System D is a slang phrase pirated from French-speaking Africa and the Caribbean. The French have a word that they often use to describe particularly effective and motivated people. They call them débrouillards. To say a man is a débrouillard is to tell people how resourceful and ingenious he is. The former French colonies have sculpted this word to their own social and economic reality. They say that inventive, self-starting, entrepreneurial merchants who are doing business on their own, without registering or being regulated by the bureaucracy and, for the most part, without paying taxes, are part of “l’economie de la débrouillardise.” Or, sweetened for street use, “Systeme D.” This essentially translates as the ingenuity economy, the economy of improvisation and self-reliance, the do-it-yourself, or DIY, economy.

 

02/23/14

Hydrogen Bonding and Bitcoin

Hydrogen Bonding and the Bitcoin War Apple -vs- Microsoft

How the world works:

gAtO sEe- Apple – Microsoft battle begins anew and Google and Yahoo are setting up sides and it’s all about Bitcoins. First we have Apple throwing all Bitcoins Apps from it’s App store. Then they turn around and are now accepting DogEcoins – the kids version of Bitcoin. Yes Bogecoins is a joke a Bitcoin off-shoot for this guys Doggie. So DogECoins was born… it’s not doing to bad in Rediit but that’s another article.bing-bitcoins-png

Then a few days after Apple announces the Dogecoins -(Microsoft) -Bing search engine changed it’s search on Bitcoins to include all kinds of new information. BTY Google and Yahoo and trying to see how to work Bitcoins into their checkout’s.   So this is how the Bitcoin war begins. Amazon and other players will soon adopt but I think the Microsoft and Apple fight will be something to sit back and watch. But in the end Bitcoin will win.

Back in the day when Microsoft -vs- Apple world war 1 it was about hardware and software and users and it really mattered, but todays war is about Bitcoins and why Apple the front leader in new leading edge technology choose to drop all Bitcoins apps is a big question. Is Apple planning it’s own Coins??? Steve Jobs is rolling over in his grave on this one. People are shooting their iPhones, the users are fighting back on this one and for Apple I think they will loose this fight. I already found a way around Apple App Store for my Bitcoin Wallet and people that want to use Bitcoins will find a way around this too.

gAtO disclaimer – I hate Microsoft, I use a Mac and Android because it has Unix under the hood, but this blow is the stupidest move Apple has ever made and in the end they will loose. Bitcoin is here to stay and today the big companies fight mean shit, the users will decide what payment system and what coins to use to pay for their goods and services and if they choose Bitcoins and that merchant does not support it, the user will go to another site and still use Bitcoins- Big technology company wars don’t work the same anymore because now the consumer has choices and will decide Bitcoins or Dog-e-Coins not Apple or MicroSoft - gAtO oUt

10/11/13

Tor Wacky Times and the NSA

gAtO rEaD – that Tor (The Deep Dark Web) is now all messed up by the NSA, FBI and LEO so all you bad guys using the Tor network better watch out, or should they???fed_links_01

Aug 5 the FBI snakes in Freedom Hosting and put a number of websites out of business in the Dark Web. They let the flames go out that they caught a bunch of Pedophile sites with that bust, but it does not seem so.

The Attack on the Dark Net Took Down a Lot More Than Child Porn – http://gawker.com/the-attack-on-the-dark-net-took-down-a-lot-more-than-ch-1081274609 – gAtO contribute to this article–

fed_usCitizenship_01Aug 19 – Millions of Tor Clients start to go up in numbers. What’s this all about, we get a bunch of Tor clients just hanging around doing nothing in Tor. Some say it’s a Bot-net or something like that. Then it growns 4, 5  million Tor users and the last week or so it starts to go down again. So what is all this about all these Tor Clients and the Tor- Botnet?fed_rent_a_hacker01

Oct 3– Silk Road get’s taken down, Oh the FBI had a copy of the Silk Road servers back in June just before the AUG 5 take down of FH by the FBI. So the Feds had Silk Road all this time and this is all they can do, can’t even get a few Bitcoin wallets- what a cluster fˆ%k—//fed_cc-paypal_01

Now you got NSA saying that Tor is cracked and the bad guys cannot use it. They claim that they can hack Tor anytime and anywhere with documents that a summer student left on how to hack the Tor network back in 2006. By the Way – most of these hacks do not work in Tor, maybe on a regular network but not on the Tor network.fed_hit_man_01

So now gAtO goes in search of Tor sites and a lot of sites went down by hook or crook —BUT someone has started to replace these Tor Hidden Websites in the Tor Network – But something is FuNnY – all these sites us the same web templates –

So now you can take a walk down memory lane and see all the older Tor-Websites have gone away and new ones have magicly re-appear.

fed_apple4bitcoin_01Now if this was the only place were this has happens OK sure, but at other Tor- Wiki Tor Link sites you will see the same thing – Commercial sites are all FuNnY and all the non-commercial Tor-websites are Tango Down.

So now Tor goes round and round but nobody knows what the heck is going on- In the Tor network – The Deep Dark Web run by Criminals or the FBI – you can answer these questions yourself by visiting the site –trust but Verify– ((not me))– gAtO oUt

fed_counterfiet_euro_50 fed_counterfiet_usd_01 fed_links_01 fed_mobile_steal_store_01 fed_uk_guns_01

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

10/5/13

SilkRoad Seized BitCoins Addresses are identified

Silkroad Seized Coins Addresses are identifiers which you use to send bitcoins to another person.

gAtO fOuNd – the Bitcoins Silk Road MASTER Wallet – number #####

Address 1F1tAaz5x1HUXrCNLbtMDqcw6o5GNn4xqX

bitcoin-gollum

Checkout the blockchain link – https://blockchain.info/address/1F1tAaz5x1HUXrCNLbtMDqcw6o5GNn4xqX

that were captured by the FBI – So WHY is it being trickle  down all over the world 25, 50, 100, 500 BTC at a time. Next check out –
Taint Analysis
 – Related Tags – Unspent Outputs  –

Taint Analysis:

https://blockchain.info/taint/1F1tAaz5x1HUXrCNLbtMDqcw6o5GNn4xqX

Taint Analysis 1F1tAaz5x1HUXrCNLbtMDqcw6o5GNn4xqX 
Taint is the % of funds received by an address that can be traced back to another address.

This pages shows the addresses which have sent bitcoins to 1F1tAaz5x1HUXrCNLbtMDqcw6o5GNn4xqX. The data can be used to evaluate the anonymity provided by a mixing service. For example Send Coins from Address A to a Mixing service then withdraw to address B. If you can find Address A on the taint list of Address B then the mixing service has not sufficiently severed the link between your addresses. The more “taint” the stronger the link that remains.

 Related Tags:

https://blockchain.info/related_tags?active=1F1tAaz5x1HUXrCNLbtMDqcw6o5GNn4xqX

Find Related Tags
This tool can help find known addresses which could be used to reveal the identity of a number of target addresses.

Target Addresses
1F1tAaz5x1HUXrCNLbtMDqcw6o5GNn4xqX,

 Unspent Outputs

https://blockchain.info/unspent?active=1F1tAaz5x1HUXrCNLbtMDqcw6o5GNn4xqX&format=html

This wallet contains a very large number of unspent outputs. Please consolidate some outputs

So the question becomes who is taking Bitcoins from Silk Road Master Bitcoin Wallet – click on the transaction  and find the geo-location of money going out of SR BTC wallet every 20 seconds at a time, 5, 10 little numbers of BTC add up when you spread them out –

Block Chain gives you all kinds of ways to look at all this Bitcoin Data from Silk Road – With every Address of the user wallets, and all kinds of transactions informations, gAtO can find some of these SR-vendors geo-location and so can LE…we can do all kind of things with this data — have fun-gAtO oUt