02/18/15

i2p sites in the Dark Web

gAtO FoUnD – these few i2p sites from my Dark Web crawlers – there is also a lot of tunneling from Tor to i2p to keep thing really secure – why not use 2 network to hide your stuff.  You can find a lot of Russian sites that do business in the Dark Web – i2p is better at security of course they use it to hide better.

The Dark Web is not only Tor but i2p as well. I hope this helps any researcher or educator play in the Dark Web better. Some of the content is nasty so be careful – gAtO oUt

I2P Links

SEARCH ENGINES:

eepsites – This search engine has been around for a long number of years. Also available on the clearnet via http://eepsite.com “This site provides a web interface to a database about files available within the anonymous I2P network. A dedicated, automated web crawler keeps the database up-to-date.” http://eepsites.i2p

eye.i2p – Supports somewhat advanced query options. http://eye.i2p

epsilon.i2p – “Epsilon Search is a search engine that indexes eepsites on I2P.” http://epsilon.i2p

IMAGEBOARDS:

Oniichan – Chan run by chisquare. Many categories, active-ish. http://oniichan.i2p

Anch  – “This site was made by anarchists and for anarchists. This site is  russian-speaking, except /int/, which is international.” http://anch.i2p

(PERSONAL) SITES AND BLOGS:

augenscheinlich – A blog in Germany about Net politics, surveillance, secret services, leaks, and so forth. Frequently updated as of this writing.

http://augenscheinlich.i2p

str4d – Home of str4d. It has guides, a blog, links, notes, and infographics. http://str4d.i2p

killyourtv.i2p – KillYourTV’s home. Including How-Tos, a blog and a description of his services.

http://killyourtv.i2p

Shadow Life – “Enjoy your stay below the radar”. Well written and lenghty posts on anonymity. Would recommend.

http://shadowlife.i2p

Cheech-Wizard – Blog of resident I2P user Cheech-Wizard, serving comics, music and thoughts.

http://cheech-wizard.i2p

Dark Like My Soul – fancycakes’ blog. Interesting and useful blogposts.

http://dlms.i2p

SIGINT – Personal site/blog of sigint.

http://sigint.i2p

dcherukhin – Personal blog and link list of a Russian man named Dmitriy Cherukhin. Appears to be an academic.

http://dcherukhin.i2p

Raegdan’s Refuge – Yet another Russian blog.

http://mcr76yyq5f2e6a3b5vvrd5v6uyseyzhgculi6leptadjd5ua7c4q.b32.i2p

The Anon Dog – Daily updated links to (news) articles on politics, security, revolts, etc. “h4364r’s Anonymous Daily on I2P”

http://theanondog.i2p

Actap’s Home page – “I’m Actap from Russia. Increasing Internet censorship level in my country brought me here.” Hosts a constantly updated list of sites banned in Russia.

http://actap.i2p

?labs – Anja’s “little corner on cipherspace”.

http://philabs.i2p

Chiron’s I2P Eepsite – Entertaining homepage of a seemingly disorganised and at times angry German I2P user with limited grasp of the English language. He has added a puzzle to his website which leads to his personal information. Confirmed to be the manliest man on I2P. Rumored to be the operator of the I2P mainframe.

http://i2p2go.i2p

sighup’s eepsite – “Homepage of sighup”. A blog, IRC logs of some irc2p channels, contact information, and some other stuff.

http://sighup.i2p

darrob.i2p – Personal site of darrob. Some Tahoe-LAFS related stuff.

http://darrob.i2p

peek-a-boo eepsite – ReturningNovice’s eepsite.

http://i2peek-a-boo.i2p

justme.i2p – Home of RandomI2PUser. Some books, music and programs available.

http://justme.i2p

Meeh’s home – One or two tutorials and a description of the services run by Meeh.

http://meeh.i2p

Home of a Japanese I2P user.

http://benkiman.i2p

lurker.i2p – “A non-organic lifeform”. Home of Frost, the operator of ZeroFiles. Has a blog and a hosts.txt file. http://lurker.i2p

Complication – A really old personal site. Interesting snippets from the beginning of I2P when there were just a handful of users. Hasn’t been updated in a couple of years.

http://complication.i2p

Man  of Perdition – “Things your goverment & church don’t want you to   know.” Do not enter without triple-layered tinfoil hat.

http://manofperdition.i2p

Freshcoffee – Plain and simple but well crafted home of cervantes. Lists some cryptographic keys.

http://freshcoffee.i2p

Schwarzwald – Quite an empty website.

http://schwarzwald.i2p

Doom – Yet another empty personal website. It lists a GPG key.

http://doom.i2p

luminosus – Lists some contact information.

http://luminosus.i2p

Cable Viewer – “A Cat’s Mirror of Wikileaks Cablegate site.”

http://leakager.i2p

main.paraZite – A mirror of the (in)famous “paraZite”

http://loinen.i2p

I2P Planet – “planet.i2p is an RSS aggregator for I2P trackers, blogs, and other feeds.”

http://planet.i2p

hashparty – “Home of hashparty, the blackhat hash cracking feast!”

http://hashparty.i2p

Cool looking site in Spanish about privacy, government control, GSM, mobile phones, privacy, security, hacks, IMSI-catcher, etc.

http://quematumovil.i2p

UC ZEON – UC 0079-0093 ZEON REMNANTS.

http://uczeon.i2p

Buråsskolan – A Swedish site (or rather, a page) about cryptoanarchy (I suppose).

http://kryptoanarki.i2p

anarchydocuments.i2p – A mirror of texfiles.com’s “Anarchy and General Mayhem” section.

http://anarchydocuments.i2p

Abusos judiciales en España – Info about abuse by courts and lawyers in Spain.

http://abusos.i2p

Info Security – A Russian blog on information systems security. Seems dead.

http://infosecurity.i2p

Anarplex – Darknets and cipherpunked agorism.

http://anarplex.i2p

Lenta.i2p – Very active news blog on Russian affairs.

http://lenta.i2p

FreeZone – A Russian blog.

http://freezone.i2p

SLS.i2p – Yet another Russian blog. Seems to cover politics.

http://sls.i2p

Antheogen – A Russian site about psychoactive funghi (I think)

http://entheogen.i2p

FILESHARING:

PaTracker 1.7 aka Postman’s I2P tracker, or simply Postman. I2P’s main torrent tracker. Has been up for years. Very active, very reliable. Lots of good stuff.

http://tracker2.postman.i2p

DifTracker – A large body of French content

http://diftracker.i2p

exotrack.i2p – Deserted but functional.

http://exotrack.i2p

Myttk – A Russian torrent site.

http://myttk.i2p

Welterde – Opentracker that has been up for a number of years.

http://tracker.welterde.i2p/stats?mode=top5

Chisquare’s opentracker announce URL

http://hvvybpef5nabnizizyy6ei57a77na4urifa4np65vpfzwq5csfra.b32.i2p/a

An opentracker run by KillYourTV

http://tracker.killyourtv.i2p

A Russian opentracker.

http://ptt.i2p/index_eng.html

Les Hérétiques – Very well-designed collection of French literature, including detailed descriptions. Mostly (only?) EPUB files.

http://heretiques-ebooks.i2p

lib.i2p – A modest (~500) collection of Russian ebooks.

http://lib.i2p

Free Book Library – 20045 books, 410 comics, 33 magazines, 134 textbooks. Warning: Facebook Like button on page!

http://ebooks.i2p

Gusion – A modest collection of ebooks (~290). Mostly fiction. Uses the Calibre ebook management software.

http://gusion.i2p

Library  Genesis – I2P leaf of the Library Genesis project (now nearing 1 million ebooks).

http://u76v7ha6j4jmtz3k2lseaso5qy36lxs77klhovmptufwcodovatq.b32.i2p

Document Heaven – “Document Heaven wants to be an eepsite, which collects links and magnet links to scientific or otherwise interesting non-fictional papers, documents and books. This eepsite is hosted in the spirit of the Guerilla Open Access Manifesto.”

http://documentheaven.i2p

Cheech-Wizard – An index of music and comics uploaded by Cheech-Wizard to Postman.

http://cheech-wizard.i2p

amidoinitrite – Manga, music, books, Youtube.

http://amidoinitrite.i2p

lyncanthrope.i2p – French movies and music

http://lycanthrope.i2p

openmusic.i2p – An open directory with some gigabytes of music. http://openmusic.i2p

mp3arc – Fairly big open directory of “hard music”. At least 800 albums (haven’t counted them). Sorted by artist. http://mp3arc.i2p

Anonymix – “Multitracks, Acapellas, Instrumentals, and More” for download. Requires registration. http://anonymix.i2p

leecher.i2p – Some popular TV series including The Walking Dead, The Simpsons, South Park, and more. http://leecher.i2p

serien.i2p – An index of German TV series available via torrents. http://serien.i2p

FINANCIAL:

VEscudero’s Service for Buying and Selling Bitcoins – Very well established and reputable Bitcoin trader. http://bitcoiner.i2p

LTC Guild – Litecoin mining pool. http://ltcguild.i2p

Darsek – “virtual card, internet payment processor and money transfer system”. http://darsek.i2p

?x5 – “?x5 Investment Fund is an Offshore entity outside your jurisdiction, managed by veteran investment gurus.” http://pix5.i2p

PURCHASEABLES:

ChemHack’s – “Apothecary and Potions”. Currently selling homemade GHB and Suboxone http://chemhack.i2p

Darknet Products – Selling virtual machines and bootable USBs. http://darknet-products.i2p

SOCIAL:

id3nt – I2P’s main microblogging service. http://id3nt.i2p

Jisko – Another microblogging service. Hasn’t been around as long as id3nt, but has frequent and constant activity. http://jisko.i2p

Visibility – Fully functional social network. Active (read: not dead), but could do with more users. “You can add friends, upload files, share images, write blogs, create pages, add bookmarks, create polls, and more…” http://visibility.i2p

GAMING:

I2Play – “Welcome! I2Play provides anonymous gaming services over I2P. Admittedly the selection of games that can be played over I2P is reasonably small due to the requirement that they be tolerant of lag, but that doesn’t stop us trying!” OpenTTD and Tetrinet. http://i2play.i2p

I2P Chess Client – “Here you can play chess with other users and robots either in casual  play or for ranking.  Also, you can interact with the users through the  chat rooms. You don’t need to install any other program, you just need  to register using the link, enter and play!” http://chess.i2p

(FILE)HOSTING:

ZeroFiles – A file and image host with a 10mb upload limit. http://zerofiles.i2p

Gallery – Not exactly an image host pur sang, but it hosts images. About 40k of them. http://gallery.i2p

open4you – A Russian/English site offering free hosting. http://open4you.i2p

Blackhosting – A Russian hosting provider that accepts Bitcoin. http://blackhosting.i2p/en/

CODING / DEVELOPMENT / PLUGINS / I2P RELATED SOFTWARE:

ZZZ – The main developers forum of I2P. http://zzz.i2p

i2p2.i2p – I2P’s project page. Go here for the nitty gritty on how I2P works. http://www.i2p2.i2p

trac – I2P bug reporting and general ticket creation. http://trac.i2p2.i2p

stats.i2p – “The home for I2P statistics”. Has been around since forever. http://stats.i2p

BigBrother – Distributed network statistics gathering. http://bigbrother.i2p

sponge – Home of I2P for Android, Seedless, and sponge himself. http://sponge.i2p

echelon – Your #1 source for I2P plugins. http://echelon.i2p

Plugins – “An app-store for I2P plugins” http://plugins.i2p

I2P Plugins – Yet another source of plugins. http://stats.i2p/i2p/plugins

AyuDownloader – “AyuDownloader is an Plugin using the EepGet class from i2p developers to download larger files easy from Eepsites.” http://ayudownloader.i2p

Ipredia – “Home of IprediaOS”. An operating system for I2P. “IprediaOS  is a fast, powerful and stable operating system based on Linux that  provides an anonymous environment. All network traffic is automatically  and transparently encrypted and anonymized.”  http://ipredia.i2p

Projects.i2p – Projects.i2p is a community-focused projet management site for I2P  coding projects, providing optional wikis, forums, document management, bug tracking and much, much more. If you’d like to host a project here, please contact one of the site admins, either on I2P’s IRC network, or via e-mail. http://projects.i2p

Repo – “This site is a central information hub for repository hosting services around I2P.” http://repo.i2p

git.repo.i2p – A public, anonymous Git hosting site. http://git.repo.i2p

Deadman – iMule repository. http://deadman.i2p

OUTPROXIES:

ExitProxy – Run by Russians. Multiple IPs available. http://exitproxy.i2p

Meeh’s Tor outproxy – “I have a outpoxy free for use. With this you should be able to access both .i2p/.onion and clearnet sites.”

http://meeh.i2p/?p=services&sp=other

PASTEBINS:

PasteThis.i2p – Has been up for at least a year. Stable and actively used. http://pastethis.i2p

ZeroBin – “ZeroBin is a minimalist, opensource online pastebin where the server has zero knowledge of pasted data. Data is encrypted/decrypted in the browser using 256 bits AES.” http://zerobin.i2p

TUTORIALS AND INFORMATION:

Salt Wiki – The main I2P Wiki as of writing. A valuable resource with a big and broad variety of information. Also available as a Tor hidden service http://salt.i2p/wiki/index.php/Main_Page

Satori – “This is a wiki dedicated to cryptographic, anonymity, and security information.” http://satori-wiki.i2p

The Darknet Wiki – Seems underdeveloped and deserted. http://darknet-wiki.i2p

wiki.meeh.i2p – Good resource with information not found elsewhere. “This is a wiki for i2p and how to use its functions and services.” http://wiki.meeh.i2p

rus.i2p – Main Wiki for Russian I2P users. http://rus.i2p

??????????? – Another Russian Wiki. This one seems oriented towards more technical subjects. http://progromore.i2p

WikiI2p-ES – A wiki for latinos. http://lawiki.i2p/wiki-es

I2P Tutorials – Tutorials in German. http://tutorials.i2p

I2P/Tor Workshop Notes – “By the less than anonymous Adrian Crenshaw”. http://irongeeks.i2p

PrivacyHawk – A useful resource for tutorials on a variety of topics. “Welcome to PrivacyHawk’s Growing List of  Tutorials”. http://privacyhawk.i2p

ADDRESSBOOK SERVICES:

stats.i2p – The oldest and most popular addressbook service of I2P. Curated. http://stats.i2p

I2P Name Registery – Second most popular addressbook service. “Domain name registrations will not be rejected based on content.” http://inr.i2p

I2Host- Yet another jumper service. http://i2host.i2p

COMMUNICATION SERVICES:

Postman’s mail service aka mail.i2p. Has been online since 2004 with no breaks. Solid email provider. http://hq.postman.i2p

Mumble server by TronDev. Voice chat for the darknet. http://salt.i2p/wiki/index.php/TronDev_Mumble_Server

i2p-bote – Distributed secure email – http://i2pbote.i2p or http://plugins.i2p/i2pbote

Inscrutable XMPP – Also available as a Tor hidden service. Includes information on connecting to Inscrutable XMPP with various clients. http://inscrutable.i2p

Salt XMPP – See the wiki for a tutorial, configuration, client list, etc. Also available as a Tor hidden service. http://salt.i2p/xmpp.html + http://salt.i2p/wiki/index.php/Salt_xmpp

Inscrutable and Salt have S2S (between one another) and multi-user chat.

Haste XMPP – Also available as a Tor hidden service and on the clearnet http://haste.i2p

I2P Chat – A web chat run by who.i2p. Almost only Russians in here. http://who.i2p/chat/

Salt NNTP – Text only NNTP server. Also available as a Tor hidden service. http://salt.i2p/nntp.html + http://salt.i2p/wiki/index.php/Salt_nntp (tutorial)

UPTIME CHECKERS AND LINK LISTS:

Marcadores – A link list by a Latino user – http://marcadores.i2p

Null – Link list (and blog) by 77@0x7@0x01. Nice retro design. http://null.i2p

The Anon Dog – Excellent link list with descriptions. http://theanondog.i2p/cgi-bin/eepsites.py

Who is up? – Uptime checker by a Russian. http://who.i2p

Perv – One of the older uptime checkers. http://perv.i2p

identiguy aka eepstatus – Stable. http://identiguy.i2p

FORUMS:

forum.i2p – I2P’s oldest forum. The most active forum in the I2P anglosphere. http://forum.i2p

forum.salt.i2p – Salt’s forum. http://forum.salt.i2p

forum.rus.i2p – Main forum for Russian I2P users. Very active. http://forum.rus.i2p

The Holocaust Forum – “Open and civilized debate on the Holocaust”. http://holocaust.i2p

COLLABORATIVE DOCUMENT EDITING:

Salty Pad – An I2P Etherpad instance. http://oniichan.i2p/ep/pad/

Infinote – For use with an Infinote client. Might be better than Etherpad. No Javascript required. http://str4d.i2p/services/infinote/

KEY SERVERS:

KillYourTV’s SKS OpenPGP Keyserver http://killyourtv.i2p/sks

Inscrutable’s SKS OpenPGP Public Key Server http://keys.inscrutable.i2p

Echelon’s I2P OpenPGP Public Key Server. http://keys.echelon.i2p

VARIOUS/OTHER:

Tabak – 1 page of information on.. tabacco. In Russian. An i2p-bote address is listed too. http://tabak.i2p

Anonet2 – The Anonet darknet. http://anonet2.i2p

q.i2p – “The I2P URL-Shortener” http://q.i2p

INTUIT.ru – A mirror of intuit.ru, which is.. something. In Russian. http://intuit.i2p

A hit counter for your eepsite. http://who.i2p/counter.html

BitTot – Yeah.. don’t tell Putin about this. http://bitot.i2p

La lique des trolles – I don’t have a clue what this is about. Some French closed forum. http://dumpteam.i2p

zzzot – See for yourself. http://encryptedphreak.i2p

MPAA NOTICE. http://mpaa.i2p

Does what it says on the tin. http://nyancat.i2p

SYNDIE (An open source system for operating distributed forums):

syndie-project.i2p – Syndie project website http://www.syndie.i2p

Syndie Documentation Project – A project to revive Syndie’s documentation and make the software easier to use. http://fomjl7cori4juycw55kdlczpgzzhme6nox6zykokuiov6t5lxhvq.b32.i2p

syndie.darrob.i2p

syndie.echelon.i2p

syndie.inscrutable.i2p

syndie.killyourtv.i2p

syndie.meeh.i2p

syndie.welterde.i2p

A table of known Syndie archives. http://wiki.meeh.i2p

Syndie Gateway. http://mosfet.i2p

IRC:

The I2P IRC network aka irc2p – The biggest, most well known, most active IRC network in I2P. It works out of the box. Simply start I2P and point your IRC client to irc://127.0.0.1:6668

Nameless – An IRC network with some interesting anonymity enhancing features. Servers: irc.stream.i2p, irc.puredev.i2p, irc.philabs.i2p, irc.dlms.i2p

Single server networks belonging to particular users:

irc.killyourtv.i2p

irc.welterde.i2p

irc.meeh.i2p

02/15/15

Dark Web and Bitcoin Intelligence Project

Dark Web Intelligence- The Digital Undergound

Project Athena

Executive Summary

I have over 400,00 of Dark Web URL and Web-content plus 2-3 million URL and content of historical data from a few years back – available today.  

Project Athena will offer customers the ability to monitor Dark Web activities and provided alerts and warnings when credit cards or banking account information (or any other keyword you choose) is posted for sale or dumped in the Tor and i2p network dark marketplaces. We also offer the optional service for attainment of compromised data from dark web sellers, this is optional and customers are encouraged to seek legal advice before requesting this service.

We follow the money in the Dark Web, Project Athena will also track Bitcoin usage in the dark web. Since it is the prime source of all dark web transactions, this data combine with our Bitcoin Blockchain tools will give you the data and insight into any cyber investigation.

We use cyber sock puppets in the dark web marketplaces to gather intelligence and target data. These persona’s called cyber sock puppets play a role and team up to gather information. We can also provide you with training and manuals on setting up a Deep Web Investigation Environment with all our tools and how to social-engineering with sock puppets to gather cyber intelligence.

These are all passive methods of investigations, but we can also perform active probes into dark web websites which are very different in the code below and how what network protocol allows.

The Artemis Search engine does 2-two things, one is search of the data from the crawlers and the web crawlers that are basicly BotNets that you send out to gather intelligence in the networks. We gather network data, metadata and website content and extract the URL, Email, Bitcon Addresses, ip2 Addresses and many other type of data, but we can do custom keyword for any investigation subject matter that you may need to use.

Project Athena web crawlers tool -Artemis- scrape the Dark Web (Tor-i2p Network) for metadata and content information of any website we find. This data is stored in Databases so it can be used as a front end to any analytical software to extract the dark web players and websites or any data point you are looking for. It can also provide a simple dark web search engine for investigation into dark web activities.

Since the Tor and i2p network hide websites and information, we must be creative in using our crawlers with keywords to find active websites that are part of the target investigation and then dig deep into them extracting every cyber breadcrumb they have. This is all passive crawlers so no violations are committed.

Bad Guys Methods: Some sites only go up for a few hours every day, some sites use graphics only so our search crawlers can not pick them up their web content, they even imbed content in the graphics so even if you have the graphics without the right password you cannot decode the graphics. Some other sites are Login only sites, getting into those sites is by recommendation only so establishing cyber sock puppets and having them be accepted is the only way to get into these private stolen goods websites. We also do active operations with sock puppets to find new websites by social-engineering methods.

We design and develop cyber dark web sock puppets as aliases and define roles for them to play. These active sock-puppets can be your best way to gathering intelligence to real sites that are selling goods and services or known wire transfer for terroist organizations. In the dark web websites are called hidden services, so finding them without active sock puppets operations is almost inpossible.

The Dark Web is tied to Bitcoin as a monetery value transfer network and one of our new cyber financial data point we will focus on. With our new Bitcoin BlockChain tools working with our Artemis crawlers we can map Bitcoin transactions sometimes down to an IP address.

Bitcoin mapped to the Dark Web

Bitcoin mapped to the Dark Web

Business Case:

The business purpose is to offer a service to banks, financial intuitions, and private persons to monitor activity on the Dark Web to provide alerts and warnings when credit cards and banking accounts are compromised and posted for sale.

Granted, some clients, and potential clients, initially, may not want “the service” to be involved in buying compromised cards back, but they might at some point in the business relationship. BitCoin tracking is important, as you well recognize, to develop the human side of the investigation and would involve creating Sock Puppets and employment of other anti-fraud investigation techniques.

But, for initial marketing efforts, being able to “get a meeting” with a bank executive by letting he or she know that there are indications that bank accounts and credit information is being sold is a first step. Then the pitch would be,

“Let us monitor the Dark Web for you, to provide alerts and warnings so you can respond appropriately, and in a timely manner!”

 

Table of Contents

Dark Web Intelligence……….. 1

Project Athena……….. 1

Executive Summary – Project Athena:……. 6

Business Case:……. 7

Bitcoin – Financial Side of the Dark Web :……. 8

A Private http://blockexplorer.com type blockchain to DB tool…… 8

Bitcoin Account Types:….. 8

Dine and Ditch Wallet:….. 9

Store-Hold Wallet:….. 9

Web-Wallet….. 9

Step by Step list – Dark Web Intelligence focus……. 9

Technology Required – Dark Web Tools……. 10

  • Tor….. 10
  • 2 private Tor-Relays – entry and exit….. 10
  • Artemis – Tor Search Engine -w/ Privoxy and Popili Proxies….. 10
  • BlockChain 2 DB tool – to keep all Block-Chain queries PRIVATE….. 10
  • IRC – OnionCat – BitMessenger….. 10
  • Bitcoin….. 10
  • VPN….. 10
  • i2p….. 10
  • secure email….. 10
  • PGP key for encryption….. 10
  • 3-5 Dark Web Sock Puppets – Buyer/Hacker/wingMan – Roles….. 10

Phase I……. 10

Phase II……. 10

Phase III……. 10

Active Buy….. 11

Extract CC Data….. 11

Dark Web data Collection -Tor- Bitcoin – E-Mails & I2P -……. 11

Understanding the Block Chain……….. 12

The Value of Decentralized Consensus……. 12

Decentralized Applications: The Next Big Thing……. 13

DARK WEB SOCK PUPPETS 101:……….. 15

Sock Puppet  – Gaining Anonymous Access into the Dark Web – ??……. 15

Create Your Own User Names….. 15

Setting-Up Your Sock Puppet Environment….. 15

Best Usage Practices of Sock Puppet Identities….. 15

Setting-Up Onion Mail:….. 15

Create Your Own User Names?….. 15

Motivation – WHY do you need a Dark Web Sock Puppet (SP):……. 15

Dark Web Methods:……. 16

Dark Web Communication:……. 16

IRC – Private Message – BitMessenger -……. 16

Sock Puppet -> Start Here: ?……. 17

STEP 1: Research Intelligence Exchange:….. 17

STEP 2: Setup an email account for your sock poppet using onion mail:….. 17

STEP 3: Copy and paste site information about PGP public:….. 17

STEP 4: Setup PGP:….. 17

STEP 5: Transfer file:….. 17

STEP 6: Establish Your Presence on a Private Message Board:….. 17

STEP 7: Set-Up a secure public Jabber/XMPP federated server on hyperboria using rows.io….. 17

Best Usage Practices of Sock Puppet Identities ?Protecting Your Sock Puppet:….. 18

Completing Your Research- Operation:….. 18

Setting-Up Onion Mail:……. 19

[1.0] What’s Onion Mail:….. 19

[1.1] Why should I use Onion Mail?….. 19

[2.0] Sending emails….. 19

[2.1] Special addresses:?….. 20

[3.0] Communicating with the server:….. 20

[3.1] Spam List:….. 21

[4.0] Dealing with unwanted messages with X-Notice headers:….. 21

[5.0] Create your OnionMail address:….. 22

[6.0] Use PGP messages:….. 22

[7.0] Virtual M.A.T. Protocol and simple mail addresses:….. 22

[8.0] Virtual M.A.T. in Tor network:….. 23

[9.0] User configuration:….. 23

[10.0] Mailing lists:….. 23

[11.0] How to know the user limits:….. 24

[12.0] iam.onion addresses and server address:….. 24

[13.0] Special Mail RULEZ files:….. 24

[14.0] Rulez files as newsletter:….. 25

Dark Web Sock Puppet Setup……….. 26

Sock Puppet  -Insertion into the Dark Web -……. 26

Sock Puppet Information….. 26

Start inserting your Sock Puppet into this webSite :….. 26

email setup in the Dark Web –Onion Mail:….. 26

Dark Web Communication:……. 26

Paste Site:….. 26

Reason-:….. 27

PGP setup:……. 27

Reason-:….. 27

File transfer:……. 27

Reason:….. 27

Private Message Board:……. 27

Reason:….. 27

Jabber:……. 27

Reason:….. 27

Sock Puppet ways & methods:……. 28

Project Athena mission is to collect all Dark Web metadata & financial information and map it out………… 29

Dark Web Stats Pre-Crawl Feb 4, 2015:….. 29

Bitcoin Big Winner in the Dark Web….. 29

USSOCOM Monitoring Bitcoin in the clear web NOT the Dark Web:….. 29

Your secret ownership is encrypted:….. 30

Tax Problem:….. 31

The POWER of the Block-Chain:….. 31

Why we need Dark Web Bitcoin Data:….. 31

Dark Web Tool Setup……….. 33

Overview of Tool Setup for Dark Web Collection project……. 33

Technology Required -……. 33

  • Tor….. 33
  • 2 private Tor-Relays – entry and exit….. 33
  • Artemis – Tor Search Engine -w/ Privoxy and Popili Proxies….. 33
  • BlockChain 2 DB tool – to keep all Block-Chain queries PRIVATE….. 33
  • IRC….. 33
  • Bitcoin….. 33
  • VPN….. 33
  • i2p….. 33
  • secure email….. 33
  • PGP key for encryption….. 33
  • 3-5 Dark Web Sock Puppets – Buyer/Hacker/wingMan – Roles….. 33

Why use Amazon VPS service for my crawlers:….. 33

notes for setting everything up for Dark Web crawlers and Artemus search engine…….. 34

YOUTUBE – Video……. 35

torrc configuration file:….. 36

artemis is installed….. 37

sudo apt-get install tor….. 39

To run TOR as a different USER….. 39

checking if Tor is working….. 40

curl information for the crawlers:….. 41

How to use SOCKS proxy….. 44

tor tor-geoipdb privoxy:….. 44

Proxy setup Tor….. 46

CookieAuthentication 1….. 51

info httpproxy:….. 51

setup Privoxy port:….. 54

Onion00 and torStatus – PRIVATE Tor Public Node list for research….. 59

OnionOO setup……. 59

  1. Installing the metrics database….. 60

1.1. Preparing the operating system….. 60

Make Sun’s Java the default…… 62

1.2. Configuring the database….. 62

1.3. Importing relay descriptor tarballs….. 64

1.4. Importing relay descriptors from a local Tor data directory….. 65

1.5. Importing GeoIP information….. 65

1.6. Pre-calculating relay statistics….. 66

1.7. Generating network status information….. 66

1.8. Importing sanitized bridge descriptors….. 67

1.9. Importing Torperf performance data….. 67

1.10. Importing GetTor statistics….. 68

1.11. Migrating from an earlier metrics database schema….. 68

1.11.1. Migrating from metrics-web 0.0.1….. 69

  1. Installing the graphing engine….. 70
  2. Installing the metrics website….. 71

3.1. Configuring Apache HTTP Server….. 72

3.2. Configuring Apache Tomcat….. 73

999……….. 75

 

02/12/15

Visualization of Bitcoins in the Dark Web

gAtO is – working on a new toy for my Artemis Tor Search engine. I found these cool open source tools -CirCos data visualization- to map out my data visually and creating some cool points for any research.

Bitcoin mapped to the Dark Web

Bitcoin mapped to the Dark Web

Follow the money -> so a Bitcoin map of all the Tor websites I find may be cool, but we can also map it with email and PGP keys and Litecoin and other currencies. Anything we collect from the crawlers which is metadata and content we will be able to map it out on as many data points(keywords) and you want. Bitcoin and the Dark Web – Oh yeah I wrote a book–> – gAtO was right and WROTE the book 1 ½ years ago – Bitcoin in the Dark Web. – Now were going to add sock puppets and some social engineering to find the really good data in the Dark Web – Oh yeah DARPA MEMEX nice try I even have historical Dark Web data and my tools work today-  Were also collecting i2p data so it should be good for any cyber hunter – gAtO oUt.

01/17/15

Multiple Bitcoin wallets for a Business with Multiple Locations

gAtO wOrKiNg - on the business side, so I needed to create this Presentation to explain how my hd-wallet would work in a business.

Let’s say you have 8 Hair Salons and you wanted each store to have Bitcoin as a source of payment. Easy with my HD-wallet system you can safely deploy different Bitcoin wallets to all the stores and still maintain control of all the Bitcoins that your 8 Hair Salons take in. 

My KickStarter Project- https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/949677390/bitcoin-business-wallet

Your accountant will love the reporting of every BitcoinUserWalletTransaction – and of course the BIG question – Who do you call when your Bitcoin transaction does not work. We give you the tools to query the blockchain and get the answers to solve the problems.

Security – Privacy – Control – Management – Accountability

Simple GUI interface so anyone can use it – No Bitcoin Programing NeededEasy deployment all in your server, so you have total security. I also included Intelligent Multi-Sig Workflow to make Multi-sig wallets easy to use, approve and use by everyone.  Any input would be welcome – gAtO OuT 

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12/28/14

3 Multi-Sig wallets for the price of 1 -maybe more

3 Multi-Sig wallets for the price of 1 -maybe more

a new Multi-Sig address scheme -Maybe- let me back-up —//|| A transactions has 2 parts – the LOCKING (INPUTS) of the ownership of the coins and the UN-LOCKING (OUTPUTs) of the ownership of the coins. multi-sig or not all TX are the same in the Bitcoin protocol.

id_99

Multi-Sig Sub-Wallets give business safety, management and accountability with my HD-BIP32 Business wallet

gAtO tEsTing  - my HD-wallet system adding multi-sig wallets to the mix. One of the strange but wonderful things I found is when you create a multi-sig wallet, the order of the INPUTS creates different addressed and redeemScripts. So I test it at the BitcoinD command line just to make sure.

A Mutli-sig wallet is different because it’s created out of other sub-wallets,  but the order in INPUTS makes a difference but the strange thing is to cash the multi-sig and sign them, you can still use any other of OUTPUTs – this test shows that any combination of signed OUTPUTs will unlock all 3 different multi-sig addresses for the price of 1.

I included the example below for you to test: Science is repeatable by anyone and so is the crypto and the math of Multi-sigs-

What I did was change the order of the sub-wallet INPUTS   – _01 – _02 – _03 – and - _02 – _03 – _01  -but the biggest surprised was when I tried to cheat -_03 – _01 –  _03  –   I used the 3rd wallet twice and it generated a Multi-sig. So in affect I just created a Multi-sig that only one (1) wallet has to sign it and it counts and 2.

By all rights the – _03 – _01 –  _03   – or any double of the sub-wallets defeats the purpose of 2 out of 3 signatures but working out new smart transactions multi-sig or not. Soon we will be able to do 3 out of 15 multi-sigs and other cool transactions stuff.

The other cool thing is my HD-wallet system will be able to manage, communicate and create any combination of multi-sig 2-n-3 sub-wallets for today, but as Bitcoin and others like Litecoin, DogeCoin or even an NxT transaction systems for really smart intelligent digital contracts. Business that work in this new digital coin game need a HD-BIP32 wallet system that works with their system. Without accountability even multi-sig wallets will not solve things in business. But when you can create and manage all transactions multi-sigs or regular sub-wallets, with accounting being able to safely get reports of all sub-wallets of all Multi-sig wallets and the coins or contracts they hold.

I’ll get of my soapbox -mEoW – play with the examples below – the cool thing it works, the beauty of crypto and math is you can’t cheat – it works or it doesn’t –

A new Multi-Sig address scheme – maybe -yes/no but by using multi-sig wallets the right way we Bitcoin can become safer – in my HD-BIP32 wallet you will be able to manage thousands if not millions of Multi-sig sub-wallets with 1 application - gAtO -oUt 

EXAMPLE:

———————————————————————————————–

_01 sw_key_pair_as_sec: 03a7d8fbe19c3b9aba3b21cab655253bb954702e938312ff9141ee76700a3316ea

_02 sw_key_pair_as_sec: 022bcd0edd96fffae1d59853a5139948e632968d16240ee8bbedd8e964368ace1f

_03 sw_key_pair_as_sec: 02396b913639612c603471a39c780a49afabf9a45ea62d1edfda77e2e086061685

_01 – _02 – _03

bitcoind createmultisig 2 ‘[“03a7d8fbe19c3b9aba3b21cab655253bb954702e938312ff9141ee76700a3316ea“, “022bcd0edd96fffae1d59853a5139948e632968d16240ee8bbedd8e964368ace1f”, “02396b913639612c603471a39c780a49afabf9a45ea62d1edfda77e2e086061685“]’

{

“address” : “3MbDdx56fVjgsMWW7VmZhnxas4UJxAQbgf“,

“redeemScript” : “522103a7d8fbe19c3b9aba3b21cab655253bb954702e938312ff9141ee76700a3316ea21022bcd0edd96fffae1d59853a5139948e632968d16240ee8bbedd8e964368ace1f2102396b913639612c603471a39c780a49afabf9a45ea62d1edfda77e2e08606168553ae”

}

 _02 – _03_01

bitcoind createmultisig 2 ‘[“022bcd0edd96fffae1d59853a5139948e632968d16240ee8bbedd8e964368ace1f”, “02396b913639612c603471a39c780a49afabf9a45ea62d1edfda77e2e086061685“, “03a7d8fbe19c3b9aba3b21cab655253bb954702e938312ff9141ee76700a3316ea“]’

{

“address” : “3McoaAaTQR8NX4u1y1BxHf3FrWxqjzycHj“,

“redeemScript” : “5221022bcd0edd96fffae1d59853a5139948e632968d16240ee8bbedd8e964368ace1f2102396b913639612c603471a39c780a49afabf9a45ea62d1edfda77e2e0860616852103a7d8fbe19c3b9aba3b21cab655253bb954702e938312ff9141ee76700a3316ea53ae”

}

_03_01 –  _02

bitcoind createmultisig 2 ‘[“02396b913639612c603471a39c780a49afabf9a45ea62d1edfda77e2e086061685“, “03a7d8fbe19c3b9aba3b21cab655253bb954702e938312ff9141ee76700a3316ea“, “022bcd0edd96fffae1d59853a5139948e632968d16240ee8bbedd8e964368ace1f”]’

{

“address” : “3LYZsV7NaMaGhdbtdwvBwFJcs63QiYzzeF“,

“redeemScript” : “522102396b913639612c603471a39c780a49afabf9a45ea62d1edfda77e2e0860616852103a7d8fbe19c3b9aba3b21cab655253bb954702e938312ff9141ee76700a3316ea21022bcd0edd96fffae1d59853a5139948e632968d16240ee8bbedd8e964368ace1f53ae”

}

_03 – _01 –  _03

bitcoind createmultisig 2 ‘[“02396b913639612c603471a39c780a49afabf9a45ea62d1edfda77e2e086061685“, “03a7d8fbe19c3b9aba3b21cab655253bb954702e938312ff9141ee76700a3316ea“, “02396b913639612c603471a39c780a49afabf9a45ea62d1edfda77e2e086061685“]’

{

“address” : “3FEAsZ8KDvodHmTQy2rnWKknQWKCuazdLC“,

“redeemScript” : “522102396b913639612c603471a39c780a49afabf9a45ea62d1edfda77e2e0860616852103a7d8fbe19c3b9aba3b21cab655253bb954702e938312ff9141ee76700a3316ea2102396b913639612c603471a39c780a49afabf9a45ea62d1edfda77e2e08606168553ae”

}

———————————————————————————

12/7/14

Looking for Investors in my BIP32 Business wallets.

gAtO bAcK - I am almost finished with my BIP32 Business wallet and I need investors to finish it up and make it pretty and then get it into the business community so they can also have a Bitcoin Business wallet designed for business not an individual.

If you want to see a video of the wallet demo just come on over and check out my Wallet Demohttp://youtu.be/gOPdFPHNByk If you have any comment or suggestions please contact me. - gAtO oUt

07/30/14

Tor Traffic Confirmation Attack

Tor Traffic Confirmation Attack -Roger Dingledine Report
SUMMARY:
  On July 4 2014 we found a group of relays that we assume were trying
  to deanonymize users. They appear to have been targeting people who
  operate or access Tor hidden services. The attack involved modifying
  Tor protocol headers to do traffic confirmation attacks.gato_signal_02

  The attacking relays joined the network on January 30 2014, and we
  removed them from the network on July 4. While we don't know when they
  started doing the attack, users who operated or accessed hidden services
  from early February through July 4 should assume they were affected.

  Unfortunately, it's still unclear what "affected" includes. We know
  the attack looked for users who fetched hidden service descriptors,
  but the attackers likely were not able to see any application-level
  traffic (e.g. what pages were loaded or even whether users visited
  the hidden service they looked up). The attack probably also tried to
  learn who published hidden service descriptors, which would allow the
  attackers to learn the location of that hidden service. In theory the
  attack could also be used to link users to their destinations on normal
  Tor circuits too, but we found no evidence that the attackers operated
  any exit relays, making this attack less likely. And finally, we don't
  know how much data the attackers kept, and due to the way the attack
  was deployed (more details below), their protocol header modifications
  might have aided other attackers in deanonymizing users too.

  Relays should upgrade to a recent Tor release (0.2.4.23 or
  0.2.5.6-alpha), to close the particular protocol vulnerability the
  attackers used -- but remember that preventing traffic confirmation in
  general remains an open research problem. Clients that upgrade (once
  new Tor Browser releases are ready) will take another step towards
  limiting the number of entry guards that are in a position to see
  their traffic, thus reducing the damage from future attacks like this
  one. Hidden service operators should consider changing the location of
  their hidden service.

THE TECHNICAL DETAILS:
  We believe they used a combination of two classes of attacks: a traffic
  confirmation attack and a Sybil attack.

  A traffic confirmation attack is possible when the attacker controls
  or observes the relays on both ends of a Tor circuit and then compares
  traffic timing, volume, or other characteristics to conclude that the
  two relays are indeed on the same circuit. If the first relay in the
  circuit (called the "entry guard") knows the IP address of the user,
  and the last relay in the circuit knows the resource or destination
  she is accessing, then together they can deanonymize her. You can read
  more about traffic confirmation attacks, including pointers to many
  research papers, at this blog post from 2009:
  https://blog.torproject.org/blog/one-cell-enough

  The particular confirmation attack they used was an active attack where
  the relay on one end injects a signal into the Tor protocol headers,
  and then the relay on the other end reads the signal. These attacking
  relays were stable enough to get the HSDir ("suitable for hidden
  service directory") and Guard ("suitable for being an entry guard")
  consensus flags:
  https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/blob/HEAD:/dir-spec.txt#l1775
  Then they injected the signal whenever they were used as a hidden
  service directory, and looked for an injected signal whenever they
  were used as an entry guard.

  The way they injected the signal was by sending sequences of "relay"
  vs "relay early" commands down the circuit, to encode the message they
  want to send. For background, Tor has two types of cells: link cells,
  which are intended for the adjacent relay in the circuit, and relay
  cells, which are passed to the other end of the circuit.
  https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/blob/HEAD:/tor-spec.txt#l364
  In 2008 we added a new kind of relay cell, called a "relay early"
  cell, which is used to prevent people from building very long paths
  in the Tor network (very long paths can be used to induce congestion
  and aid in breaking anonymity):
  http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#congestion-longpaths
  https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/blob/HEAD:/proposals/110-avoid-infinite-circuits.txt
  But the fix for infinite-length paths introduced a problem with
  accessing hidden services:
  https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/1038
  and one of the side effects of our fix for bug 1038 was that while
  we limit the number of outbound (away from the client) "relay early"
  cells on a circuit, we don't limit the number of inbound (towards the
  client) relay early cells:
  https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-commits/2009-July/014679.html

  So in summary, when Tor clients contacted an attacking
  relay in its role as a Hidden Service Directory to publish
  or retrieve a hidden service descriptor (steps 2 and 3 on
  https://www.torproject.org/docs/hidden-services), that relay would
  send the hidden service name (encoded as a pattern of relay and
  relay-early cells) back down the circuit. Other attacking relays,
  when they get chosen for the first hop of a circuit, would look for
  inbound relay-early cells (since nobody else sends them) and would
  thus learn which clients requested information about a hidden service.

  There are three important points about this attack:

  A) The attacker encoded the name of the hidden service in the injected
  signal (as opposed to, say, sending a random number and keeping a local
  list mapping random number to hidden service name). The encoded signal
  is encrypted as it is sent over the TLS channel between relays. However,
  this signal would be easy to read and interpret by anybody who runs
  a relay and receives the encoded traffic. And we might also worry
  about a global adversary (e.g. a large intelligence agency) that
  records Internet traffic at the entry guards and then tries to break
  Tor's link encryption. The way this attack was performed weakens Tor's
  anonymity against these other potential attackers too -- either while
  it was happening or after the fact if they have traffic logs. So if
  the attack was a research project (i.e. not intentionally malicious),
  it was deployed in an irresponsible way because it puts users at risk
  indefinitely into the future.

  (This concern is in addition to the general issue that it's probably
  unwise from a legal perspective for researchers to attack real users
  by modifying their traffic on one end and wiretapping it on the
  other. Tools like Shadow are great for testing Tor research ideas out
  in the lab: http://shadow.github.io/ )

  B) This protocol header signal injection attack is actually pretty neat
  from a research perspective, in that it's a bit different from previous
  tagging attacks which targeted the application-level payload. Previous
  tagging attacks modified the payload at the entry guard, and then
  looked for a modified payload at the exit relay (which can see the
  decrypted payload). Those attacks don't work in the other direction
  (from the exit relay back towards the client), because the payload
  is still encrypted at the entry guard. But because this new approach
  modifies ("tags") the cell headers rather than the payload, every
  relay in the path can see the tag.

  C) We should remind readers that while this particular variant of
  the traffic confirmation attack allows high-confidence and efficient
  correlation, the general class of passive (statistical) traffic
  confirmation attacks remains unsolved and would likely have worked
  just fine here. So the good news is traffic confirmation attacks
  aren't new or surprising, but the bad news is that they still work. See
  https://blog.torproject.org/blog/one-cell-enough for more discussion.

  Then the second class of attack they used, in conjunction with their
  traffic confirmation attack, was a standard Sybil attack -- they
  signed up around 115 fast non-exit relays, all running on 50.7.0.0/16
  or 204.45.0.0/16. Together these relays summed to about 6.4% of the
  Guard capacity in the network. Then, in part because of our current
  guard rotation parameters:
  https://blog.torproject.org/blog/improving-tors-anonymity-changing-guard-parameters
  these relays became entry guards for a significant chunk of users over
  their five months of operation.

  We actually noticed these relays when they joined the network, since
  the DocTor scanner reported them:
  https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-consensus-health/2014-January/004134.html
  https://gitweb.torproject.org/doctor.git
  We considered the set of new relays at the time, and made a decision
  that it wasn't that large a fraction of the network. It's clear there's
  room for improvement in terms of how to let the Tor network grow while
  also ensuring we maintain social connections with the operators of all
  large groups of relays. (In general having a widely diverse set of relay
  locations and relay operators, yet not allowing any bad relays in,
  seems like a hard problem; on the other hand our detection scripts did
  notice them in this case, so there's hope for a better solution here.)

  In response, we've taken the following short-term steps:

  1) Removed the attacking relays from the network.
  2) Put out a software update for relays to prevent "relay early" cells
     from being used this way.
  3) Put out a software update that will (once enough clients have
     upgraded) let us tell clients to move to using one entry guard
     rather than three, to reduce exposure to relays over time.
  4) Clients can tell whether they've received a relay or relay-cell.
     For expert users, the new Tor version warns you in your logs if
     a relay on your path injects any relay-early cells: look for the
     phrase "Received an inbound RELAY_EARLY cell".

  The following longer-term research areas remain:

  5) Further growing the Tor network and diversity of relay operators,
     which will reduce the impact from an adversary of a given size.
  6) Exploring better mechanisms, e.g. social connections, to limit the
     impact from a malicious set of relays. We've also formed a group to
     pay more attention to suspicious relays in the network:
     https://blog.torproject.org/blog/how-report-bad-relays
  7) Further reducing exposure to guards over time, perhaps by extending
     the guard rotation lifetime:
     https://blog.torproject.org/blog/lifecycle-of-a-new-relay
     https://blog.torproject.org/blog/improving-tors-anonymity-changing-guard-parameters
  8) Better understanding statistical traffic correlation attacks and
     whether padding or other approaches can mitigate them.
  9) Improving the hidden service design, including making it harder
     for relays serving as hidden service directory points to learn what
     hidden service address they're handling:
     https://blog.torproject.org/blog/hidden-services-need-some-love

OPEN QUESTIONS:
  Q1) Was this the Black Hat 2014 talk that got canceled recently?
  Q2) Did we find all the malicious relays?
  Q3) Did the malicious relays inject the signal at any points besides
      the HSDir position?
  Q4) What data did the attackers keep, and are they going to destroy it?
      How have they protected the data (if any) while storing it?

  Great questions. We spent several months trying to extract information
  from the researchers who were going to give the Black Hat talk, and
  eventually we did get some hints from them about how "relay early"
  cells could be used for traffic confirmation attacks, which is how
  we started looking for the attacks in the wild. They haven't answered
  our emails lately, so we don't know for sure, but it seems likely that
  the answer to Q1 is "yes". In fact, we hope they *were* the ones doing
  the attacks, since otherwise it means somebody else was. We don't yet
  know the answers to Q2, Q3, or Q4.
07/20/14

DELL, NEW YORK STATE AND BLOOMBERG ON BITCOIN AND VIRTUAL CURRENCIES

DELL, NEW YORK STATE AND BLOOMBERG ON BITCOIN AND VIRTUAL CURRENCIES

 

  • Last week, New York State released a proposed regulatory framework for virtual currencies and Benjamin Lawsky, Superintendent of Financial Services said: “We have sought to strike an appropriate balance that helps protect consumers and root out illegal activity – without stifling beneficial innovation. Setting up common sense rules of the road is vital to the long-term future of the virtual currency industry, as well as the safety and soundness of customer assets.” Note: “Virtual currencies” include bitcoin and other digital currencies, but excludes online gaming platforms and customer affinity or rewards programs such as airline miles. The review and comment period is open for 45-days.
  • In addition, Dell said it is starting a pilot test to support bitcoin as a purchase option on Dell.com for consumer and small business shoppers in the U.S. According to Adam White, of payment processor Coinbase, there will be no processing fees for Dell on the first $1 million in sales and a 1% flat fee for sales above that level.
  • Finally, a Bloomberg survey of 562 of its subscribers found that 55% said the price of bitcoin was unsustainable, 14% said it was on the verge of a bubble, 5% said a bubble was not forming and 25% were unsure.
05/17/14

Bitcoin 2.0 and the Segway Bike

Bitcoin 2.0 and the Segway Bike

gAtO Imagine – some of the business side applications we can build with future triggered events being executed by Autonomous Cyber Robots. All build on the basic Bitcoin 1.0 code but not using the coins but the blockchain – there be treasure in that blockchain but it’s all math ugh!!!.

segway_bike_Bitcoin

Ok first what is Bitcoin 2.0? Basically it’s a new way to have a cyber robot or a cyber drone that can do what you instruct them to do. It is a timestamp triggered event and you can now just add business rules to it that will work in cyberspace.

What do you do online today?

  • Shop for things and have them delivered
  • Online banking
  • Buy and sell stocks and bonds
  • Send donations to Charities or political organizations

So now you can build cyber-business rules to be execute on the web and put them into one of these cyber robot or a cyber drone. I use these 2 terms because when people hear drones they think attacks and such and yes you can now build digital FINANCIAL  warriors that can execute based on events, millions of them and they can be used for good and evil.

timeStamp- or -blockchain-trigger event – robots with business rules- example//

  • Send 100 Bitcoins to my family every 6 months after I die.
  • Buy or sell stocks ambiguously  – Digital Business Contracts – or Personalities
  • Any transaction that can be performed on the web!
  • Set up a corporation by an Ethereum digital actors
  • Any Business rule that can executed digitally 

gAtO lOvE Ethereum //= it is a platform and a programming language that makes it possible for any developer to build and publish next-generation distributed applications. https://www.ethereum.org/  Next Generation Smart Contracts and a Decentralize Application Platform. Non-geek cyber-business rules OK…

GAtO used to lug around an Osborne luggable computer… 1.0 laptops – but gAtO was cool aligning 10MB (yes 10 Mega Bytes) hard rives the size of a large home freezer. The good old computers days… Out of hardware back to Biz -mEoW

MasterCoin – The Master Protocol facilitates the creation and trading of smart properties and user currencies as well as other types of smart contracts. Mastercoins serve as the binding between bitcoins (BTC), smart properties and smart contracts created on top of the Mastercoin Protocol. Non-geek cyber-business rules OK…

Similar Alt-coins but both the same (going after the business side) in a way but these seem to be a new wave of Bitcoin 1.0 off shoots. Now NameCoin and Trusted coin are on a different course, since they are more into the digital Notary service that can be done with any blockchain type Bitcoin off shoot. And LiteCoin 84 Million -versus- 21 Million in Bitcoins another fight but of a different financial play on this alt-coin. LiteCoin is around $10 bucks Per so we have to keep an I on them too.

Once again these another development are being built on the shoulder of the great Satoshi Nakamoto work. GaTo as a technologist love all these new and exciting toys to play with. Then I think about the Segway Bike I alway wanted one but then again really, I’m I really ready to give up walking? Back in 2001 it was so cool, it was the evolution of the bicycle or was it???

13 years later this evolution the revolution of the bicycle is seem by most as the Mall Police ride by. Ok maybe in Seattle or San Francisco I can see that but really. Now Bicycle Cops are everywhere but real cops on a Serway Bike – you know maybe I don’t really want one anymore. But I wonder if I can buy one with Bitcoins? ummm

DogE-Coin is hot with the young bloods as a NEW digital currency that’s taking Reddit and other places by storm- I know gAtOCoin, maybe I’ll start one of my own, there only about 500 Alt-Coins around and growing all built on the Bitcoin core code. Bitcoin is only 5 Years Old -Wow- Imagine in another 3-5 years // world wide currencies all over doing different things creating the NEW Cyber-System D-(system) that no government can controls, of the people and by the people. Double -Wow

gAtO’s bet is on Bitcoin, simple it has payed it’s dues, from an underground play toy to International financial deals like flying to the Moon on Virgin Air, I wonder if I can buy that with Litecoins- you listening Richard Branson I’m mining Namecoin too Richard.

The new Bitcoin business Investors and Incubators are hopping with new Bitcoin 2.0 ideas, but is it different if it’s control by the users, not the sole players like the bankers and older financial players. But truth be told these will bring newer workable solutions that will trickle down to the normal person. We must be careful because these new worldwide cyber solution will have little government controls so the game is changing and the ability to jump on this but NOT to give up privacy with government toys like TPM – Trusted Computer Platform – yes July 2015 all Windows 8 devices will have TPM 2.0 in control of your devices. The US solution cyber Kill Switch.

AT least Apple has not added TPM into it’s hardware but they banned against Bitcoin -Steve told you to Innovate Apple- But that’s another battle.

You can trust your government spying on you IF you have nothing to hide RIGHT!!! - gAtO oUt

Digital System D-

System D is a slang phrase pirated from French-speaking Africa and the Caribbean. The French have a word that they often use to describe particularly effective and motivated people. They call them débrouillards. To say a man is a débrouillard is to tell people how resourceful and ingenious he is. The former French colonies have sculpted this word to their own social and economic reality. They say that inventive, self-starting, entrepreneurial merchants who are doing business on their own, without registering or being regulated by the bureaucracy and, for the most part, without paying taxes, are part of “l’economie de la débrouillardise.” Or, sweetened for street use, “Systeme D.” This essentially translates as the ingenuity economy, the economy of improvisation and self-reliance, the do-it-yourself, or DIY, economy.