10/25/12

The deep Dark Web -Book Release

gATO hApPy

AVAILABLE @ AMAZON - http://www.amazon.com/dp/B009VN40DU

AVAILABLE @SmashWords website  @http://www.smashwords.com/books/view/247146

I learned that I hate WORD: – but it’s the general format for publishing  - text boxes- get imbedded and you can’t format to EPUB or .mobi or anything – solution after going lOcO gAtO - was copy and paste into txt editor – save as RTF then copy paste back into a new WORD document and then reformat everything from scratch – and copy over the pictures – as you can tell I had fun-..-ugh mEoW F-F-F-F as much fun as a hairball but if it get’s the message out “FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN CYBERSPACE” then we done our job, anyway I hope you read it - Thank you Pierluigi a best friend a security gAtO ever had - gATO oUt

This Book covers the main aspects of the fabulous and dangerous world of -“The Deep Dark Web” . We are just two cyber specialists Pierluigi Paganini & Richard -gAtO- Amores, with one passion and two souls we wanted to explain the inner working of the deep dark web. We have had a long collaboration in this efforts to document our findings we made infiltrations into the dark places inaccessible to many to give a you the reader a clear vision on the major mystery of the dark hidden web that exist today in the Tor Onion network..

The Web, the Internet, mobile cell devices and social networking has become commonly used words that identify technological components of daily Internet user’s experience in the cyberspace. But how much do we really know about cyberspace? Very, very little, Google / Yahoo / Bing only show us 20% of the Internet the other 80% is hidden to the average user unless you know were to look.

The other 80% of the Internet is what this book is about the “Deep Dark Web”, three words with millions of interpretations, mysterious place on the web, the representation of the hell in the cyberspace but also the last opportunity to preserve freedom of expression from censorship. Authorities and corporation try to discourage the use of this untapped space because they don’t control it. We the people of the free world control this network of Tor -Onion Routers by volunteer around the world.

The Deep Dark Web seems to be full of crooks and cyber criminals, it is the hacker’s paradise, where there are no rule, no law, no identity in what is considered the reign of anonymity, but this is also the reason why many persecuted find refuge and have the opportunity to shout to the world their inconvenient truths.

The Deep Dark Web is a crowded space with no references but in reality it is a mine of information unimaginable, a labyrinth of knowledge in the book we will try to take you by the hand to avoid the traps and pitfalls hopefully illuminating your path in the dark.

Cybercrime, hacktivism, intelligence, cyber warfare are all pieces of this complex puzzle in which we will try to make order, don’t forget that the Deep Dark Web has unbelievable opportunity for business and governments, it represents the largest on-line market where it is possible to sell and acquire everything, and dear reader where there is $money$  you will find also banking, financial speculators and many other sharks.

Do you believe that making  money in Deep Web is just a criminal prerogative? Wrong, the authors show you how things works in the hidden economy and which are the future perspectives of is digital currency, the Bitcoin.

This manuscript proposes both faces of the subject, it illustrates the risks but also legitimate use of anonymizing networks such as TOR adopted by journalist to send file reports before governments agents censored his work .

Here are some question we may answers to:

How many person know about the cyber criminals and their ecosystem in the deep web? 

How many have provided information on the financial systems behind the “dirty affairs”? 

How the law enforcement and governments use Dark Web?

Let’s hold your breath and start the trip in the abyss of knowledge to find answers to the above questions. We hope that with this book you can learn something new about – The Deep Dark Web.

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10/22/12

Diary of a Professional Botmaster

gAtO -found this and had to share with you. If you want to know how a botMaster is created check this out. A simple software engineer becomes a botMaster sounds like “surreal Walter White in Breaking Bad”. First you will noticed that this was written in 2010 and it’s been a model of the botMaster persona. This is a fictional tale now add the Tor onion network to hide the c&c and mobile Android /iApple devices but it comes so close to the real edge, have fun reading -gAtO oUt

Becoming the Six-Million-Dollar Man Blackhat USA 2010 Gunter Ollmann 

 Diary of a Professional Botmaster 

June 20, 2009 

I’ve decided to restart the diary. I used to keep one many years ago, but stopped when I moved down to London and started my MSc in Computing & Security at King’s College – much use that degree ever turned out to be!

I found out yesterday that me and most of the team are going to be made redundant at the end of the month. It appears that the company doesn’t need so many developers after they decided to sell off the Private Banking division to some German brokerage and they ditched those annoying trader guys up on the 18th floor a couple of months back.

Anyhow, I’d better start looking for a new job. The markets pretty tight at the moment. It seems that all the banks are laying off folks and the developers are the first to go. Not surprising really. I’ve been thinking about setting up my own business for a while though. Perhaps it’s time to bite the bullet and just do it. Take that redundancy cheque and invest it in myself?

June 22, 2009 

Was down at the pub for most of the afternoon with Bill & Ted. We were tossing around ideas of businesses I could start – in particular, businesses that could make me a millionaire in a year’s time. Granted, most of the ideas were completely off the wall and would be destined to fail or end in my bankruptcy within weeks of starting them (or would likely land me in prison within short order) but some of the grey areas look like they could be pretty exciting.

Ted was going on about botnets and how they’re not really illegal. Sounds like rubbish to me, but I’ll check it out anyway.

Last year when we had that worm go around the office and the Ops guys spent a couple of weeks chasing it down and cleaning up systems – that was pretty cool, and I can see how the authors of that worm could make quite a bit of money from it with a little banking knowledge. I don’t think they ever got caught either. Ted told me that James – the lardy guy over in second-level helpdesk – said that they were still having outbreaks of that very same worm and uncovering other infected computers almost every day (after an entire year). How cool is that!

June 25, 2009

I’ve been reading up on botnets. The Internet is full of great information about them. YouTube even has tutorials on how to create the malware, deliver the bot agents, manage the Command and Control (CnC) and turn the stolen data into real money.

I did some digging on these hacker forums too. They’re pretty cool. Most are well organized and there are bundles of tutorials, guides and discussion threads on all aspects of the botnet business. There’s even entire forums dedicated to matching buyers with sellers – Craigslist style! Becoming the Six-Million-Dollar Man Blackhat USA 2010 Gunter Ollmann 

June 26, 2009

Had a great session with Demitri over IRC today. He’s been running a handful of botnets over the last couple of years and seems to know what he’s talking about. Came across his advertisement on one of the boards and was offering a free 2-hour test-drive of his botnet CnC console – so I got to play with a couple hundred computers. Some of the functionality was grayed out, but I got a chance to DDoS the companies’ website – from the comfort of my desk ?

I spoke with a couple of the company Internet ops guys afterwards – being careful in what I said of course – to see if they noticed. Apparently they did. It didn’t bring down the site, but they were alerted from their IPS. Supposedly this is a common enough occurrence and happens most weeks. I guess I’m a little disappointed with that. I wonder how many bots I’d need to take down the webserver?

Dimitri said that he normally uses about 5,000 bots to take down big websites – but 200 is more than enough to wipe out corporate VPN appliances. Handy to know!

June 27, 2009

Sat down with Jim the lawyer this afternoon. I wanted to go over the details of setting up my own contracting business. Since I haven’t had much luck on the replacement job front looking for permanent roles, I figured I’d just go down the contracting route – since there are more opportunities going for temporary software engineering positions.

There’s not much to creating your own business. Jim helped me with all the forms – so I just need to mail them off tomorrow, and I’ll be on the way to creating my first business. He also explained some of the nuances to setting up a company in some other countries and the possibilities of “offshore accounts” and tax havens. I took plenty of notes. You never know when that’ll come in useful.

June 28, 2009 

Spent all day harvesting hacker boards for tools and playing with them on a couple of old laptops. This stuff really is easy.

I even came across this guy(?) on one of the chat forums (who can’t have been more than 14 years old) who was selling a botnet of 2,000 computers for $400. The funny part though was when the flame war stated about how overpriced that was. Apparently you can pick up 2,000 computers for as low as a $50 Walmart giftcard.

June 29, 2009

I woke up this morning with an epiphany (or was it just a delayed hangover?). I’m going to start my own botnet – but not just any botnet, I’m going to do it properly and make a business from it! I’ll still pursue any legit consulting roles that crop up – still got to eat and pay the bills – but it’ll make a convenient front while I’m building botnets.

Why the botnet business? Because it’s cool! Well, actually, it’s more than that. I don’t want to work forever in a dull office job and, from what I can tell, botnet building seems to be pretty profitable – and not many people get caught. And, if they do get caught, they basically only get a slap on the wrist. Becoming the Six-Million-Dollar Man Blackhat USA 2010 Gunter Ollmann 

Having read quite a few of the news articles about the folks that got caught, it looks to me that they got caught because they did something stupid and/or they clearly crossed the criminal line – and the police were forced to do something about them.

I’m pretty sure that I’m smarter than that. Didn’t any of these guys ever consider building a business plan first? Plan it all out – have a strategy and stick to it!

I’ve left the computer downloading a few tool collections I found on one of the Argentinean malware blog sites. 4Gb of tools, kits and exploits. Awesome! And it’s all free!!

June 30, 2009

Final pay date from the “old job”, and I’m now officially free of the company. Ended up with a little over £35k after taxes too – so that’ll tide me over the next few months as I pull together my new business(es).

Last night’s download worked out pretty good. There are hundreds of botnet kits in there – complete with CnC interfaces, exploit packs, phishing templates, malware creators and obfuscators. Supposedly there’s a high likelihood that many of them are backdoored, but who cares – it’s time to play! I’m going to try a couple of them out on the corporate laptop before I have to hand it back – preferably one with a good rootkit. I wonder if they’ll ever notice?

July 1, 2009

Woke up this morning having dreamed about what kind of botnet business I want to build. Also figured out a few “rules” that I want to work towards – maybe more of a “guiding principles” perspective really.

1. DON’T GET CAUGHT – which means I’m going to be damned careful in setting up everything and making sure that nothing can be traced back to me personally. Sure, there’ll be layers to the onion, but I’m not going to allow myself to be let down by poor tradecraft and bad habits. Those hackers in France and Spain got caught because they didn’t have enough layers of deniability and mixed the use of their personal systems and their botnet infrastructure.

2. DON’T DO CRIMINAL HARM – While I’m pretty far removed from planning on being a Robin Hood, I’m not going to get mixed in with the Mob or other organized crime. Similarly, I’m not going to get involved with any political or religious drivel. I also don’t want to cause any physical harm – as that’s a sure way of getting the interest of the police – and, besides, it’s not who I really am. The more legit I can make this business, the easier it’ll be to bow out after I’ve made my money.

3. RESILIENCE AND SCALABILITY ARE MY FRIENDS – Since this is going to be a business, based upon the lessons I learned from the Private Banking firm and all I’ve been reading over the last couple of weeks, it should be possible to build pretty big botnets really fast – if I plan it well.

Resilience will be even more important though. Getting back to the “don’t get caught” principle and the layers of deniability (and abstraction), if I plan for making the CnC and distribution systems robust, I’ll endeavor to split things over Becoming the Six-Million-Dollar Man Blackhat USA 2010 Gunter Ollmann 

several hosting providers and geographic regions.

Also spent some time on the hacker portals and responding to some of the threads. Some of the more interesting forums are currently closed to me because I haven’t developed a site reputation – which can be gained by posting 20, 50 and 100 messages. This’ll be pretty easy though. Lots of questions about coding problems which I can answer without too much thought.

July 3, 2009

I think I’ve managed to plan out a few more CnC infrastructure ideas. I found a few more tutorials online – and also some good message threads on domain registration tactics, Dynamic DNS operators and folks that’ll distribute malware for a few cents. It appears that a good rate at the moment is around $100 for 2,000 guaranteed installs. A little pricey if I was buying, but it sounds like good money if I was to become a seller ?

I also realized that I forgot a rather important principle for inclusion – my zero’th principle…

0. I WANT TO BE RICH – but, more to the point I want to retire rich, not be the richest bloke in jail.

Which all means that I need to do some more investigation on how to secure the money. I don’t want the money to be directly traceable to me – nor to the consulting company I’ve just created – but I’m going to need ways to pay for stuff and ways to accept payments. All deniable of course.

Made a few new connections on the hacker forums. Now that I’m posting to some threads I’m getting direct messages from some of the folks there. A couple of the guys that reached out were trying to pimp out their services – both of them malware dropper services. Someone else asked if I was with the FBI.

The USA perspective was interesting. I hadn’t realized that the guys on the forums can see/track my IP address and from there work out where I’m located. I’ll have to do some experimenting with anonymous proxies and TOR networks. I ran across a few video tutorials on the topic yesterday. That’ll be my homework for this evening – getting something setup and hiding my IP address forever more…

July 4, 2009 

Surprise in the snail mail – company papers just came back. I’m now the CEO of Thrull Networks! Cool company name huh! I wonder if anyone will ever figure it out – thought it was apt at the time. Maybe it’s a little too close to the mark. 5% on the dumbness scale I guess. Will have to be smarter in the future. I’m going to keep it though. Even saw that some related .com and .net domain names are available for registering.

Earlier this morning I went out and bought a couple of new laptops. Nothing special, just some small(ish) $800 laptops that I’m dedicating to my botnet business – and will never taint them with the Thrull Networks consulting business. Although I will be claiming them as tax deductable expenditures. Becoming the Six-Million-Dollar Man Blackhat USA 2010 Gunter Ollmann 

Also spent most of today coming up with the rules I’m going to work under for achieving principles (1) and (3)… and maybe a little of (0) too.

So, the new rules…

A) Separate systems for work/pleasure/personal and botnets. The two new laptops are JUST for the botnet business. I’ve already installed a full disk encryption scheme and come up with a 44 character password. I doubt that anyone’ll be breaking that mother anytime soon.

B) Never connect to the botnet CnC or do any botnet-related business from my home network. Given the general availability of free WiFi at Starbucks and McDonald, etc., I’ll use those. A couple of additional rules there though – don’t frequent them in a regular pattern (sounds like a Tom Clancy spy novel), and don’t use stores that have CCTV setups. I was tempted to use some of the unsecured WiFi networks in the neighborhood – but that may be a little too close for comfort. Besides, the coffee will be better than what I have at home.

C) Change the MAC on the laptops regularly. I’ve already downloaded and installed a cool piece of software that does precisely that. I’ve also installed a bundle of different Web browsers – but have deliberately not installed any plug-ins etc. I was reading recently a couple of online projects that showed how they could query your Web browser through JavaScript and the DOM to build a signature of the browser – and how “unique” that became once you started installing plug-ins and how regularly you kept them patched. So I’m planning on keeping the laptops as simple and “dumb” as possible.

D) Never connect directly to the botnet infrastructure. Lesson learned yesterday. TOR and anonymous proxies are now default on all my computers – especially the two new laptops!

E) While encryption is my friend. Asymmetric crypto is going to be my live-in lover. Thanks Bruce for the tips!

July 9, 2009

Been playing around all week with the DIY kits I downloaded a couple of weeks back. The Zeus kit is pretty impressive with its polymorphic malware generator. I was running its output past some of the free online antivirus scanning portals and noting which (if any) antivirus tools detected the samples. On average, only a couple of the AV tools detected anything – and if they did, it was only some kind of generic signature such as w32.suspicious etc.

I was originally using www.virustotal.com, but when I tried to find other AV portals that might have more AV products in them I stumbled over a couple of cool threads that explained why I shouldn’t use that site (and a few others) because they share the malware samples with the AV vendors. Therefore the AV vendors will have detection signatures for the malware out within a few days. That sucks – because I probably just wasted a few dozen cool pieces of Zeus malware. Luckily there were plenty of alternative AV testing portals being recommended and (yet more) tutorials on how to set up your own malware QA testing regimes. Becoming the Six-Million-Dollar Man Blackhat USA 2010 Gunter Ollmann 

I’ve settled on www.virtest.com now. They charge a few dollars for the privilege of testing the malware I submit, but they allow me to upload multiple malware samples simultaneously in bulk format. They also have some other services for checking out the malware delivery websites too – so you can check to see if the exploit packs used by the Zeus kit (and others) are correctly installed and whether the other AV components (e.g. HIPS) detect the infection. Their VIP account is $50 per month. I’ll have to figure out a good way to pay for the service. Something that can’t be traced back to me personally…

July 10, 2009 

I spent the entire morning down at the Starbucks down by the park using their “free” WiFi. Cost me about $26 in coffee for the 4 hours.

Anyway, I set up a handful of free webmail accounts. A couple of Gmail accounts, a couple of Hotmail accounts and a couple of Yahoo accounts. I entered in garbage “personal” information, but gave them all the same password – “Lucky4Me*Unlucky4U”. They’re disposable accounts for trialing out a few new concepts and learning what works.

Next, I created a couple of websites to host the Zeus CnC console pages. I had originally been worried about how I was going to have to pay for the web hosting – but a quick search for “free web hosting” revealed plenty of services – including portals that provide detailed reviews of all the providers. Woohoo.

It took me about an hour to create the sites on 0000free.com. It’s the first website I’ve ever built – and I had to learn some PHP while doing it all. On the job training if you like. The index page is just a copy/paste job from some car-parts website – and the Zeus CnC configuration and bot registration pages are off in a subfolder. They’re accessible if you know the URL, but they’re intentionally not linked to from anywhere. I don’t really want some search engine crawling the sites and flagging the Zeus CnC.

I’ll be spending some time later tonight generating some malware samples that’ll use the two new CnC URLs. That’ll be hard work – should take me all of 10 seconds ?

July 11, 2009 

A botnet is born. I’m a father!

So, this morning I headed off to the Starbucks over by the athletics center to play with my newly minted malware and the CnC services.

I originally set up a VMWare session on the laptop and infected it with the new malware bot agent and watched it reach out to the CnC server. Meanwhile I browsed to the website, logged in to the CnC console, and saw the test victim register itself – so I spent a good half hour testing out all the features of the bot agent. It’s pretty slick. Ugly, but slick. The toughest part of all this was setting up the TOR agent to provide the anonymous web access in reaching the CnC console.

To get the bot malware into play I decided to upload the samples to the Newsgroups – since they don’t require me to host the files directly and also provide anonymous Becoming the Six-Million-Dollar Man Blackhat USA 2010 Gunter Ollmann 

uploading. One file I named “Windows7KeygenCrack.exe” and the other “iTunesDRMRemover.exe”, and included some BS text about how good the tools are. They were both uploaded to a handful of different alt.binaries. groups using different email accounts and source IP addresses.

I hung around Starbuck for another hour, but didn’t see any victims appear on the Zeus console – so paid a visit to Bill & Ted and grabbed lunch with them in town. Ted’s already gotten a new job at some Scottish bank. Chose not to tell them about my botnet research. The ideas may have come from them originally, but I’m not about to share this secret.

Anyhow, I popped in to the McDonalds by the railway station at about 4pm and connected to the Internet to see how my “botnet” was coming along. Surprise, surprise, I had three new members to my botnet. How cool is that! I was well chuffed with that small success and subsequently spent an entire hour connecting to each computer and checking out what I could access on their systems. Just as I was about to pack things up and head off home a fourth computer joined my botnet.

I couldn’t stop smiling on my way home from McDonalds. I think I may have even said “I’ve just fathered my first botnet” somewhere on the walk up the hill. Haha.

Guess where I’ll be tomorrow morning…

July 12, 2009 

Got to Starbucks early this morning and was online with my baby botnet by at least 9:30am. It had swollen over night and the counter had reached 18 computers – but I could only contact 6 of them. The others must have been turned off or something.

For the next hour (and second cup of Java) I created a couple dozen new malware bot agents and configured them to point to the same two Zeus CnC servers I’d set up yesterday. I then went on to use the same Newsgroup tactics – but picking a few other juicy social engineering file names (and descriptions) – e.g. “AcrobatProfessionalKeygen.exe”, “RossettaStoneLanguagePackUnlocker.exe”, etc.

By the time I left the coffee shop the botnet had grown to 23 computers – mostly in the US and the Netherlands, but a couple from Australia and Taiwan.

Went home afterwards to do some more studying and recon, and found some good information on how to automatically pull back account and identity information from Zeus malware clients. There are a number of scripts that you could run automatically on each botnet computer to extract their webmail credentials, anything they’ve told their IE or Firefox web browsers to remember, etc.

I also found some plug-ins for the Zeus CnC console that help to manage the data that comes back from the keylogger and other info-stealer components – which I installed on the web servers later on my return trip to Starbucks – and left CnC commands for the botnet malware to automatically start collecting and uploading the identity information. Becoming the Six-Million-Dollar Man Blackhat USA 2010 Gunter Ollmann 

By 7:30pm my botnet had reached 200 members. It’s no longer a “family unit”; it’s a small village and I’m Pastor of the flock.

July 14, 2009

Had a couple of contract interviews yesterday, and hadn’t managed to check on how my baby was coming along for a couple of days. So, it was with a rather pleasant surprise I noted that the botnet had reached 3,320 computers.

Actually, I’m not so sure about the number and whether it’s a good number to rely upon. The number of computers “active” were about 450 – and I tested that I could control them OK. As for the rest, well, they were “offline” – but I did have files from all 3,000+ computers sitting on the CnC server – so I guess they were successfully compromised with my botnet agent.

I moved all the files off the two CnC servers and copied them to the laptop. When I got home I started doing some analysis.

Brief stats (for posterity)…

942 Facebook accounts

766 Twitter accounts

322 Gmail accounts

318 Hotmail accounts

193 Yahoo accounts

76 Paypal accounts

… and lots of sub-50 accounts – many for services/websites I’ve never heard of before. All told, about 5,500 different accounts.

BTW I’m not sure I like using Starbucks – I’m spending too much money on coffee there ?

July 15, 2009

The botnet’s now reached 4,000 computers.

There was an email from 0000free.com waiting for me from yesterday. Apparently I should be upgrading to a paid account because of all the traffic/hits the site has been receiving. Just as well I moved off all the identity information and files – I was almost over the file quota too!

July 16, 2009

4,300. What’s the population have to be before a village can be called a town?

Created another couple of dozen malware for release on the Newsgroups since the botnet growth appeared to be slowing down.

July 17, 2009 

I think I’m the Mayor of a small town now. I visited the Starbucks down by the strip mall this afternoon and logged in to the botnet. 11,435 computers!

At first I thought it may have been a mistake since the size jump was so large. Introducing a couple new malware downloads didn’t get that much of a leap last time. But I figured it out after about 20 minutes of probing and searching. It would seem that the new file “MichaelJacksonDeath-OfficialAutopsyReport.exe” was more successful. It also managed to make its way on to some Torrent server and plenty of people are downloading it.

New lessons learnt from yesterday’s efforts: Becoming the Six-Million-Dollar Man Blackhat USA 2010 Gunter Ollmann 

1) Tying social engineering to media and entertainment current events results yields more additions to a botnet.

2) Torrent networks can make the botnet malware reach more people faster.

July 18, 2009

Just as well I downloaded all those new files yesterday, because the botnet is dead. I’m no longer the Mayor.

This morning I popped on over at the Library for a bit of their WiFi access and tried to connect to my CnC servers. Nothing – well, more than nothing, the Zeus CnC pages had been deleted and my webserver account had been disabled. There were instructions to phone the helpdesk to discuss reactivation.

Waiting in the inbox of the webmail account I used to register the free websites was an email telling me that my site may have been hacked and was being used for malicious purposes.

A quick Google revealed that both CnC URL’s and configuration files were listed up on ZeusTracker.abuse.ch.

Bugger!

July 19, 2009 

All is not lost. I’ve still got all those identity/account detail files from all my botnet computers. The total – adding the first batch with the batch from the 17th – comes to a little shy of 19,000 unique sets of credentials. I can still access any (if not all) of those stolen accounts anytime in the future.

Better yet – there’s absolutely nothing that can be tracked back to me. Sure, the botnet is now out of my control (and computers are still being compromised with the malware which is still in circulation in the Newsgroups and Torrents), but I’m safe and have learnt a few new lessons.

That said though, it’s about time I started to focus on bringing in the money from the botnets. I’m not going to get that Porsche building botnets for botnets sake. I could easily enough find buyers for the stolen information – the hacker forums are overflowing with buyers and agents. That’s not a problem. The problem lies in converting “Internet money” into cash – and laundering those transactions sufficiently.

With that in mind, I spent all afternoon researching offshore banking and the creation of anonymous accounts. Disappointingly those infamous Swiss Numbered Accounts don’t exist anymore – at least not like they do in the movies.

I managed to narrow it down to three banking accounts and, as my finances grow, I’ll start to bring them on line. I’ve found agents that will allow me to set up Swiss banking accounts online. They require proof of address, but they provide a level of guarantee that personal information will not be supplied to anyone outside of Switzerland. The Cayman Island accounts are easier to set up – and don’t require an agent – but require a higher deposit. They’re a little too rich for my tastes at the moment – but I’ll probably add an account once I break the $100k per month revenue stream (if ever?). Becoming the Six-Million-Dollar Man Blackhat USA 2010 Gunter Ollmann 

No, the account I created online this evening was for a Panama Bearer Share Corporation account. As of an hour ago I’m now CEO of a second company – “Net Wizards LLC.”. I deposited $5,000 into the account. Not only does it provide an anonymous business front and full international banking facilities, but it comes with 4% interest and the credit cards issued against the account should be arriving in 10 days time.

July 20, 2009

I’m back in the botnet business!

I was keeping a couple of my hacker forum accounts live by responding to a few message threads and I stumbled across a couple of reputable botmasters that were in the process of selling off sections of their botnets. They were offering batches of 100 bots with dedicated CnC hosted servers for $200 each.

Most significantly though – there were alternatives to the $200 in Webmoney or PayPal funds – they’d accept hacked webmail accounts, Facebook accounts and Twitter accounts.

After a little back and forth, we agreed on the trade and exchange mode (had to use an agent that was pre-vetted on the forum – one of the administrators – who charges 10% for his time/effort). From X4cker I picked up 600 bots and two CnC servers (in the Ukraine no less) for 3,000 Gmail accounts and 1,000 Hotmail accounts. From Dankar007 I managed to procure 500 bots for the princely sum of 500 PayPal accounts. The site administrator/agent didn’t do too badly out of the deal either. I’m sure that he (or she?) now has his own copies of all those accounts.

After some quick verification and having tested the access to the two botnets, I created a new Zeus botnet agent and pushed it down to all 1,100 bots – and changed the admin credentials on the CnC servers.

Not only am I back in “business” with a brand new botnet, but I’ve still got all those account details from the previous botnet that I can continue trading/reselling to other operators.

– I just realized that this diary is now precisely one month old. In that month I lost my job, founded two companies, become a CEO, built a botnet, lost a botnet, established a reputation in the hacker communities, opened an international banking account, and just purchased my second botnet.

Time to start pulling together the business plan for constructing a profitable money-making botnet! The “march to a million” sounds like a great idea, but I’d prefer to aim for Steve Austin’s The Six Million Dollar Man. I’m pretty confident that I can reach that target over the next 11 months! What would mom say?

Original BlackHat PDF file -

http://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-10/whitepapers/Ollmann/BlackHat-USA-2010-Ollmann-6millionDollarMan-wp.pdf

ZeuS Tracker Statistics – https://zeustracker.abuse.ch/statistic.php

Note: This is a fictitious (and subtly macabre, but hopefully humorous) diary account loosely based upon real investigations of professional botnet operators and the criminal enterprises they created to monetize the data and systems under their control. It does not represent a single botnet operator, rather it represents a concatenation of notable business models, decisions and discussions from a spectrum of criminal operators. Names and places have been deliberately altered. No animals were harmed in the making of this diary.

 

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10/18/12

Tor hidden service secrets

Tor hidden service secrets

gAtO fRiDaY 10-18-2012 update hay you want to see a secret -hidden service -

Creative Hack – http://2kcreatydoneqybu.onion 

on top of this the name is custom – so that took extra time and efforts and the site is real when you have thier secret token — https://ahmia.fi/pagescreenshots/2kcreatydoneqybu.png

here you can take a look at this site anyway – try to extract any information from this secret Tor Website – you can’t see any source code – so you can’t make it error to extract information. I ask a friend that’s a Penn Tester to check this out – If anyone can extract any information please let me know –gAtOoUt

gAtO fRiDaY - sound off! - As i play with my new Tor hidden service – “Ok just apache website running https: a static site -right now” – What we know is that a Tor hidden service stays hidden until you send someone your .onion URL (example:- otwxbdvje5ttplpv.onion ) now once you know the URL your have access to the site. You may have to log in like on most bb sites but at least you reached the hidden service and now you can do stuff. 

While looking at the torrc file setting I found a little secret that with (server side) HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient-tag and the HidServAuth-tag on the (client) side -// your hidden service is now INVISIBLE to only the people that have a secret key installed in their “torrc” client file. In plain talk -

1. I put a special key on my hidden server – torrc file – HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient
2. generate a new key for client side – “what_ever_bcuuw46b3heyy”
3. send keys to the secret agents that can see or access the site HidServAuth
4. Only the people with my KEY can get to the front door of my hidden service – torrc file HidServAuth

This makes it hard to find the hidden service even if you have the URL ///./. it does nothing, no source code like a normal website. I ran into a few of these and had no clue why these sites behaved the way they did. I can pick apart most websites, at least, basics like html, asp, js, java directory you can gleam all kinds of information. But if you hit one of these site in Tor well it a big 0 -zero -///.

With my TDS project (Tor Directory Scan) I am generating an onion URL A-Za-z 2-7 URL and going out to scrape it and get some basic information about the site with a basic web crawler that grabs METADATA and not just links to other pages. If I hit these sites with my basic program I’ll get a dud -zero -///- but I will have a hit of sort. I hope to catch some of these sites – we all know the rcp command works well in Tor sometimes I found and httrack is another tool for sucking up site // be they hidden service or not – these secret hidden services will be very interesting in the scan -gATO oUt

— Tor Syntax

HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient auth-type client-name,client-name,…
If configured, the hidden service is accessible for authorized clients only. The auth-type can either be ‘basic’ for a general-purpose authorization protocol or ‘stealth’ for a less scalable protocol that also hides service activity from unauthorized clients. Only clients that are listed here are authorized to access the hidden service. Valid client names are 1 to 19 characters long and only use characters in A-Za-z0-9+-_ (no spaces). If this option is set, the hidden service is not accessible for clients without authorization any more. Generated authorization data can be found in the hostname file. Clients need to put this authorization data in their configuration file using HidServAuth.


HidServAuth onion-address auth-cookie [service-name]
Client authorization for a hidden service. Valid onion addresses contain 16 characters in a-z2-7 plus “.onion”, and valid auth cookies contain 22 characters in A-Za-z0-9+/. The service name is only used for internal purposes, e.g., for Tor controllers. This option may be used multiple times for different hidden services. If a hidden service uses authorization and this option is not set, the hidden service is not accessible. Hidden services can be configured to require authorization using the HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient option

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10/14/12

Pierluigi Paganini – Cyber Weapons – Cyber Threat Summit 2012

Excellent presentation from Pierluigi at the ICTTF Cyber Threat Summit 2012. Apologies for the microphone problems (some twat in the audience was using a frequency jammer).The rise of Cyber Weapons and relative impact on cyber space. Well worth a watch.

Pierluigi can be found at http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/ He is the co-author of the new book

The Deep Dark Web – coming soon

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09/28/12

Tor Command syntax

gAtO wAnT’s – just the simple command syntax -from the OG-OR Roger Dingledine -Nick Mathewson the Tor gods.

href=”http://manpages.ubuntu.com/manpages/hardy/man8/tor.8.html#contenttoc6″>

 

NAME

       tor - The second-generation onion router

SYNOPSIS

       tor [OPTION value]...

DESCRIPTION

       tor  is  a connection-oriented anonymizing communication service. Users
       choose a source-routed path through a set of  nodes,  and  negotiate  a
       "virtual  circuit"  through  the  network, in which each node knows its
       predecessor and successor, but no  others.  Traffic  flowing  down  the
       circuit is unwrapped by a symmetric key at each node, which reveals the
       downstream node.

       Basically  tor  provides  a  distributed  network  of  servers  ("onion
       routers"). Users bounce their TCP streams -- web traffic, ftp, ssh, etc
       -- around the routers, and recipients, observers, and even the  routers
       themselves have difficulty tracking the source of the stream.

OPTIONS

       -h, -help Display a short help message and exit.

       -f FILE
              FILE   contains   further   "option   value"   pairs.  (Default:
              /etc/tor/torrc)

       --hash-password
              Generates a hashed password for control port access.

       --list-fingerprint
              Generate your keys and output your nickname and fingerprint.

       --verify-config
              Verify the configuration file is valid.

       --nt-service
              --service [install|remove|start|stop]  Manage  the  Tor  Windows
              NT/2000/XP  service.   Current  instructions  can  be  found  at
              http://wiki.noreply.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#WinNTService

       --list-torrc-options
              List all valid options.

       --version
              Display Tor version.

       Other options can be specified either on the command-line (--option
              value),  or  in  the configuration file (option value).  Options
              are case-insensitive.

       BandwidthRate N bytes|KB|MB|GB|TB
              A token bucket limits the average incoming  bandwidth  usage  on
              this  node  to the specified number of bytes per second, and the
              average outgoing bandwidth usage to that same value. (Default: 3
              MB)

       BandwidthBurst N bytes|KB|MB|GB|TB
              Limit the maximum token bucket size (also known as the burst) to
              the given number of bytes in each direction. This  value  should
              be at least twice your BandwidthRate. (Default: 6 MB)

       MaxAdvertisedBandwidth N bytes|KB|MB|GB|TB
              If set, we will not advertise more than this amount of bandwidth
              for our BandwidthRate. Server operators who want to  reduce  the
              number  of clients who ask to build circuits through them (since
              this is proportional to  advertised  bandwidth  rate)  can  thus
              reduce the CPU demands on their server without impacting network
              performance.

       ConnLimit NUM
              The minimum number of file descriptors that must be available to
              the Tor process before it will start. Tor will ask the OS for as
              many file descriptors as the OS will allow (you can find this by
              "ulimit -H -n"). If this number is less than ConnLimit, then Tor
              will refuse to start.

              You probably don’t need to adjust this.  It  has  no  effect  on
              Windows since that platform lacks getrlimit(). (Default: 1000)

       ControlPort Port
              If set, Tor will accept connections on this port and allow those
              connections to control the Tor process  using  the  Tor  Control
              Protocol (described in control-spec.txt).  Note: unless you also
              specify one of  HashedControlPassword  or  CookieAuthentication,
              setting  this  option will cause Tor to allow any process on the
              local host to control it. This option is required for  many  Tor
              controllers; most use the value of 9051.

       ControlListenAddress IP[:PORT]
              Bind  the  controller listener to this address. If you specify a
              port, bind to  this  port  rather  than  the  one  specified  in
              ControlPort.  We  strongly  recommend  that you leave this alone
              unless you know what you’re doing, since giving attackers access
              to   your   control  listener  is  really  dangerous.  (Default:
              127.0.0.1) This directive can be  specified  multiple  times  to
              bind to multiple addresses/ports.

       HashedControlPassword hashed_password
              Don’t  allow any connections on the control port except when the
              other  process  knows  the  password  whose  one-way   hash   is
              hashed_password.   You  can  compute  the  hash of a password by
              running "tor --hash-password password".

       CookieAuthentication 0|1
              If this option is set to 1, don’t allow any connections  on  the
              control  port  except  when  the  connecting  process  knows the
              contents of a file named "control_auth_cookie", which  Tor  will
              create  in  its  data  directory.   This  authentication methods
              should only be used on systems with  good  filesystem  security.
              (Default: 0)

       DataDirectory DIR
              Store working data in DIR (Default: /var/lib/tor)

       DirServer [nickname] [flags] address:port fingerprint
              Use a nonstandard authoritative directory server at the provided
              address and port, with  the  specified  key  fingerprint.   This
              option  can  be  repeated many times, for multiple authoritative
              directory servers.  Flags are separated by spaces, and determine
              what  kind of an authority this directory is.  By default, every
              authority is authoritative for current ("v2")-style directories,
              unless  the  "no-v2"  flag  is  given.   If  the  "v1"  flags is
              provided, Tor will use this server as an authority for old-style
              (v1)  directories  as  well.  (Only directory mirrors care about
              this.)  Tor will use this server  as  an  authority  for  hidden
              service information if the "hs" flag is set, or if the "v1" flag
              is set and the "no-hs" flag is not set.  If a flag "orport=port"
              is  given,  Tor  will  use the given port when opening encrypted
              tunnels to the dirserver.  If no dirserver line  is  given,  Tor
              will  use  the  default directory servers.  NOTE: this option is
              intended for setting up a  private  Tor  network  with  its  own
              directory   authorities.    If   you   use   it,   you  will  be
              distinguishable from other users, because you won’t believe  the
              same authorities they do.

       FetchHidServDescriptors 0|1
              If set to 0, Tor will never fetch any hidden service descriptors
              from the rendezvous directories. This option is only  useful  if
              you’re  using  a Tor controller that handles hidserv fetches for
              you.  (Default: 1)

       FetchServerDescriptors 0|1
              If set to 0, Tor will never fetch any network  status  summaries
              or server descriptors from the directory servers. This option is
              only useful if  you’re  using  a  Tor  controller  that  handles
              directory fetches for you.  (Default: 1)

       FetchUselessDescriptors 0|1
              If  set  to 1, Tor will fetch every non-obsolete descriptor from
              the authorities that it hears about. Otherwise,  it  will  avoid
              fetching  useless  descriptors, for example for routers that are
              not  running.   This  option  is  useful  if  you’re  using  the
              contributed  "exitlist"  script to enumerate Tor nodes that exit
              to certain addresses.  (Default: 0)

       Group GID
              On startup, setgid to this group.

       HttpProxy host[:port]
              Tor will make all its directory requests through this  host:port
              (or  host:80  if  port is not specified), rather than connecting
              directly to any directory servers.

       HttpProxyAuthenticator username:password
              If defined, Tor will use this username:password for  Basic  Http
              proxy authentication, as in RFC 2617. This is currently the only
              form of Http proxy authentication that Tor supports;  feel  free
              to submit a patch if you want it to support others.

       HttpsProxy host[:port]
              Tor  will  make  all  its  OR  (SSL)  connections  through  this
              host:port (or host:443 if  port  is  not  specified),  via  HTTP
              CONNECT  rather  than  connecting  directly to servers.  You may
              want to set FascistFirewall to restrict the  set  of  ports  you
              might  try  to  connect  to,  if  your  Https  proxy only allows
              connecting to certain ports.

       HttpsProxyAuthenticator username:password
              If defined, Tor will use this username:password for Basic  Https
              proxy authentication, as in RFC 2617. This is currently the only
              form of Https proxy authentication that Tor supports; feel  free
              to submit a patch if you want it to support others.

       KeepalivePeriod NUM
              To  keep  firewalls  from  expiring  connections, send a padding
              keepalive cell every NUM seconds on open connections that are in
              use.  If the connection has no open circuits, it will instead be
              closed after NUM seconds of idleness. (Default: 5 minutes)

       Log minSeverity[-maxSeverity] stderr|stdout|syslog
              Send all messages between minSeverity  and  maxSeverity  to  the
              standard  output  stream,  the  standard error stream, or to the
              system log. (The "syslog" value  is  only  supported  on  Unix.)
              Recognized  severity  levels  are debug, info, notice, warn, and
              err.  We advise using "notice" in  most  cases,  since  anything
              more  verbose  may  provide sensitive information to an attacker
              who obtains the logs.  If only one severity level is given,  all
              messages  of  that  level  or  higher will be sent to the listed
              destination.

       Log minSeverity[-maxSeverity] file FILENAME
              As above, but send log messages to  the  listed  filename.   The
              "Log"  option may appear more than once in a configuration file.
              Messages are sent to all the  logs  that  match  their  severity
              level.

       OutboundBindAddress IP
              Make  all  outbound  connections  originate  from the IP address
              specified.  This is only useful when you have  multiple  network
              interfaces,  and  you  want all of Tor’s outgoing connections to
              use a single one.

       PidFile FILE
              On startup, write our PID to FILE.  On  clean  shutdown,  remove
              FILE.

       ProtocolWarnings 0|1
              If  1,  Tor will log with severity ’warn’ various cases of other
              parties not following the Tor specification. Otherwise, they are
              logged with severity ’info’. (Default: 0)

       RunAsDaemon 0|1
              If  1,  Tor  forks and daemonizes to the background. This option
              has no effect on Windows; instead you should use  the  --service
              command-line option. (Default: 0)

       SafeLogging 0|1
              If  1,  Tor  replaces  potentially sensitive strings in the logs
              (e.g. addresses) with the string [scrubbed]. This way  logs  can
              still   be  useful,  but  they  don’t  leave  behind  personally
              identifying information about  what  sites  a  user  might  have
              visited. (Default: 1)

       User UID
              On startup, setuid to this user.

       HardwareAccel 0|1
              If  non-zero,  try  to  use  crypto  hardware  acceleration when
              available. This is untested and probably buggy. (Default: 0)

       AvoidDiskWrites 0|1
              If non-zero, try to write to disk less frequently than we  would
              otherwise.  This is useful when running on flash memory or other
              media that support only a limited number of  writes.   (Default:
              0)

       TunnelDirConns 0|1
              If  non-zero, when a directory server we contact supports it, we
              will build a one-hop circuit and make  an  encrypted  connection
              via its ORPort. (Default: 0)

       PreferTunneledDirConns 0|1
              If  non-zero, we will avoid directory servers that don’t support
              tunneled directory connections, when possible. (Default: 0)

CLIENT OPTIONS

       The following  options  are  useful  only  for  clients  (that  is,  if
       SocksPort is non-zero):

       AllowInvalidNodes entry|exit|middle|introduction|rendezvous|...
              If  some  Tor  servers  are  obviously  not  working  right, the
              directory authorities can manually mark them as invalid, meaning
              that  it’s  not  recommended  you  use  them  for  entry or exit
              positions in your circuits. You can opt  to  use  them  in  some
              circuit  positions,  though. The default is "middle,rendezvous",
              and other choices are not advised.

       CircuitBuildTimeout NUM
              Try for at most NUM  seconds  when  building  circuits.  If  the
              circuit  isn’t  open  in  that time, give up on it.  (Default: 1
              minute.)

       CircuitIdleTimeout NUM
              If we have keept a clean (never used)  circuit  around  for  NUM
              seconds, then close it. This way when the Tor client is entirely
              idle, it can expire all of its circuits, and then expire its TLS
              connections.  Also,  if  we  end up making a circuit that is not
              useful for exiting any of the requests we’re receiving, it won’t
              forever  take up a slot in the circuit list.  (Default: 1 hour.)

       ClientOnly 0|1
              If set to 1, Tor will under no circumstances run  as  a  server.
              The  default  is to run as a client unless ORPort is configured.
              (Usually, you don’t need to set this; Tor  is  pretty  smart  at
              figuring  out whether you are reliable and high-bandwidth enough
              to be a useful server.)  (Default: 0)

       ExcludeNodes nickname,nickname,...
              A list of nodes to never use when building a circuit.

       EntryNodes nickname,nickname,...
              A list of preferred nodes to  use  for  the  first  hop  in  the
              circuit.    These   are   treated  only  as  preferences  unless
              StrictEntryNodes (see below) is also set.

       ExitNodes nickname,nickname,...
              A list of preferred nodes  to  use  for  the  last  hop  in  the
              circuit.    These   are   treated  only  as  preferences  unless
              StrictExitNodes (see below) is also set.

       StrictEntryNodes 0|1
              If 1, Tor will never use  any  nodes  besides  those  listed  in
              "EntryNodes" for the first hop of a circuit.

       StrictExitNodes 0|1
              If  1,  Tor  will  never  use  any nodes besides those listed in
              "ExitNodes" for the last hop of a circuit.

       FascistFirewall 0|1
              If 1, Tor will only create outgoing connections to  ORs  running
              on  ports that your firewall allows (defaults to 80 and 443; see
              FirewallPorts).  This will allow you to  run  Tor  as  a  client
              behind  a firewall with restrictive policies, but will not allow
              you to run as a server behind such a firewall.  This  option  is
              deprecated; use ReachableAddresses instead.

       FirewallPorts PORTS
              A  list  of  ports  that your firewall allows you to connect to.
              Only  used  when  FascistFirewall  is  set.   This   option   is
              deprecated; use ReachableAddresses instead. (Default: 80, 443)

       ReachableAddresses ADDR[/MASK][:PORT]...
              A  comma-separated  list  of  IP  addresses  and ports that your
              firewall allows you to connect to. The  format  is  as  for  the
              addresses  in  ExitPolicy,  except  that  "accept" is understood
              unless  "reject"   is   explicitly   provided.    For   example,
              ’ReachableAddresses  99.0.0.0/8,  reject  18.0.0.0/8:80,  accept
              *:80’ means that your firewall allows connections to  everything
              inside  net  99,  rejects  port  80  connections  to net 18, and
              accepts connections to port  80  otherwise.   (Default:  ’accept
              *:*’.)

       ReachableDirAddresses ADDR[/MASK][:PORT]...
              Like  ReachableAddresses,  a  list  of addresses and ports.  Tor
              will   obey   these   restrictions   when   fetching   directory
              information,  using  standard  HTTP  GET  requests.  If  not set
              explicitly then the value of  ReachableAddresses  is  used.   If
              HttpProxy  is  set  then  these connections will go through that
              proxy.

       ReachableORAddresses ADDR[/MASK][:PORT]...
              Like ReachableAddresses, a list of  addresses  and  ports.   Tor
              will  obey  these restrictions when connecting to Onion Routers,
              using  TLS/SSL.   If  not  set  explicitly  then  the  value  of
              ReachableAddresses  is  used.  If  HttpsProxy  is set then these
              connections will go through that proxy.

              The     separation     between     ReachableORAddresses      and
              ReachableDirAddresses   is   only   interesting   when  you  are
              connecting through proxies (see HttpProxy and HttpsProxy).  Most
              proxies  limit  TLS  connections  (which  Tor uses to connect to
              Onion Routers) to port 443, and some  limit  HTTP  GET  requests
              (which  Tor uses for fetching directory information) to port 80.

       LongLivedPorts PORTS
              A list of ports for services  that  tend  to  have  long-running
              connections  (e.g.  chat  and  interactive shells). Circuits for
              streams that use  these  ports  will  contain  only  high-uptime
              nodes,  to reduce the chance that a node will go down before the
              stream is finished.  (Default: 21, 22, 706,  1863,  5050,  5190,
              5222, 5223, 6667, 6697, 8300)

       MapAddress address newaddress
              When a request for address arrives to Tor, it will rewrite it to
              newaddress before processing it. For example, if you always want
              connections  to  www.indymedia.org  to exit via torserver (where
              torserver is  the  nickname  of  the  server),  use  "MapAddress
              www.indymedia.org www.indymedia.org.torserver.exit".

       NewCircuitPeriod NUM
              Every  NUM  seconds  consider  whether  to  build a new circuit.
              (Default: 30 seconds)

       MaxCircuitDirtiness NUM
              Feel free to reuse a circuit that was first  used  at  most  NUM
              seconds  ago, but never attach a new stream to a circuit that is
              too old.  (Default: 10 minutes)

       EnforceDistinctSubnets 0|1
              If 1, Tor will not put two servers whose IP addresses  are  "too
              close"  on  the same circuit.  Currently, two addresses are "too
              close" if they lie in the same /16 range. (Default: 1)

       RendNodes nickname,nickname,...
              A list of preferred nodes to use for the  rendezvous  point,  if
              possible.

       RendExcludeNodes nickname,nickname,...
              A list of nodes to never use when choosing a rendezvous point.

       SocksPort PORT
              Advertise  this  port  to  listen  for  connections  from Socks-
              speaking applications.  Set this to 0 if you don’t want to allow
              application connections. (Default: 9050)

       SocksListenAddress IP[:PORT]
              Bind  to  this  address  to  listen  for connections from Socks-
              speaking applications. (Default: 127.0.0.1) You can also specify
              a port (e.g. 192.168.0.1:9100).  This directive can be specified
              multiple times to bind to multiple addresses/ports.

       SocksPolicy policy,policy,...
              Set an entrance policy for this server, to limit who can connect
              to  the  Socks  ports.   The policies have the same form as exit
              policies below.

       SocksTimeout NUM
              Let a socks connection wait NUM  seconds  handshaking,  and  NUM
              seconds unattached waiting for an appropriate circuit, before we
              fail it.  (Default: 2 minutes.)

       TestVia nickname,nickname,...
              A list of nodes to prefer for  your  middle  hop  when  building
              testing   circuits.   This   option   is  mainly  for  debugging
              reachability problems.

       TrackHostExits host,.domain,...
              For each value in the  comma  separated  list,  Tor  will  track
              recent connections to hosts that match this value and attempt to
              reuse the same exit node for each. If  the  value  is  prepended
              with  a  ’.’, it is treated as matching an entire domain. If one
              of the values is just a ’.’, it  means  match  everything.  This
              option  is  useful  if you frequently connect to sites that will
              expire all your authentication cookies (ie log you out) if  your
              IP  address  changes.  Note  that  this  option  does  have  the
              disadvantage of making it more clear that  a  given  history  is
              associated  with  a  single user. However, most people who would
              wish to observe this will observe it through  cookies  or  other
              protocol-specific means anyhow.

       TrackHostExitsExpire NUM
              Since exit servers go up and down, it is desirable to expire the
              association between host and exit server after NUM seconds.  The
              default is 1800 seconds (30 minutes).

       UseEntryGuards 0|1
              If  this  option  is  set  to  1,  we pick a few long-term entry
              servers, and try to stick with them.  This is desirable  because
              constantly changing servers increases the odds that an adversary
              who owns some servers will observe a  fraction  of  your  paths.
              (Defaults to 1.)

       NumEntryGuards NUM
              If  UseEntryGuards  is  set to 1, we will try to pick a total of
              NUM routers as long-term entries for our circuits.  (Defaults to
              3.)

       SafeSocks 0|1
              When  this  option  is  enabled,  Tor  will  reject  application
              connections that use unsafe variants of the  socks  protocol  --
              ones that only provide an IP address, meaning the application is
              doing a DNS resolve first.  Specifically, these are  socks4  and
              socks5 when not doing remote DNS.  (Defaults to 0.)

       TestSocks 0|1
              When  this  option  is enabled, Tor will make a notice-level log
              entry for each connection to the Socks port  indicating  whether
              the  request  used  a  safe socks protocol or an unsafe one (see
              above entry on SafeSocks).  This helps to determine  whether  an
              application   using   Tor  is  possibly  leaking  DNS  requests.
              (Default: 0)

       VirtualAddrNetwork Address/bits
              When a controller asks for a virtual (unused) address  with  the
              MAPADDRESS  command,  Tor  picks an unassigned address from this
              range.  (Default: 127.192.0.0/10)

              When providing proxy server service to a  network  of  computers
              using   a  tool  like  dns-proxy-tor,  change  this  address  to
              "10.192.0.0/10"     or     "172.16.0.0/12".      The     default
              VirtualAddrNetwork   address  range  on  a  properly  configured
              machine will route to the loopback interface.  For local use, no
              change to the default VirtualAddrNetwork setting is needed.

       AllowNonRFC953Hostnames 0|1
              When  this  option  is disabled, Tor blocks hostnames containing
              illegal characters (like @ and :)  rather than sending them to an
              exit  node  to be resolved.  This helps trap accidental attempts
              to resolve URLs and so on.  (Default: 0)

       FastFirstHopPK 0|1
              When this option is enabled and we aren’t running as  a  server,
              Tor  skips  the  public  key  step for the first hop of creating
              circuits.  This is safe  since  we  have  already  used  TLS  to
              authenticate  the  server  and to establish forward-secure keys.
              Turning  this  option  off  makes   circuit   building   slower.
              (Default: 1)

       TransPort PORT
              If  non-zero,  enables  transparent  proxy  support  on PORT (by
              convention, 9040).  Requires OS support for transparent proxies,
              such as BSDs’ pf or Linux’s IPTables.  If you’re planning to use
              Tor as a transparent proxy for a network, you’ll want to examine
              and  change  VirtualAddrNetwork from the default setting. You’ll
              also want to set the TransListenAddress option for  the  network
              you’d like to proxy.  (Default: 0).

       TransListenAddress IP[:PORT]
              Bind   to   this   address   to  listen  for  transparent  proxy
              connections.   (Default:  127.0.0.1).   This   is   useful   for
              exporting a transparent proxy server to an entire network.

       NATDPort PORT
              Allow  old  versions  of  ipfw  (as  included in old versions of
              FreeBSD, etc.) to send connections through Tor  using  the  NATD
              protocol.   This  option  is  only  for  people  who  cannot use
              TransPort.

       NATDListenAddress IP[:PORT]
              Bind to this address to listen for NATD connections.   (Default:
              127.0.0.1).

       SERVER OPTIONS

       The  following  options are useful only for servers (that is, if ORPort
       is non-zero):

       Address address
              The IP or fqdn of this  server  (e.g.  moria.mit.edu).  You  can
              leave this unset, and Tor will guess your IP.

       AssumeReachable 0|1
              This option is used when bootstrapping a new Tor network. If set
              to 1, don’t  do  self-reachability  testing;  just  upload  your
              server descriptor immediately. If AuthoritativeDirectory is also
              set, this  option  instructs  the  dirserver  to  bypass  remote
              reachability  testing  too  and  list  all  connected servers as
              running.

       ContactInfo email_address
              Administrative contact information for server. This  line  might
              get picked up by spam harvesters, so you may want to obscure the
              fact that it’s an email address.

       ExitPolicy policy,policy,...
              Set an exit policy for this server. Each policy is of  the  form
              "accept|reject  ADDR[/MASK][:PORT]".   If  /MASK is omitted then
              this policy just applies to the host given.  Instead of giving a
              host  or  network  you  can  also use "*" to denote the universe
              (0.0.0.0/0).  PORT can be a single port number, an  interval  of
              ports  "FROM_PORT-TO_PORT",  or  "*".   If PORT is omitted, that
              means "*".

              For  example,  "accept  18.7.22.69:*,reject  18.0.0.0/8:*,accept
              *:*"  would  reject  any  traffic  destined  for  MIT except for
              web.mit.edu, and accept anything else.

              To specify  all  internal  and  link-local  networks  (including
              0.0.0.0/8,    169.254.0.0/16,    127.0.0.0/8,    192.168.0.0/16,
              10.0.0.0/8, and 172.16.0.0/12), you can use the "private"  alias
              instead  of an address.  These addresses are rejected by default
              (at the beginning of your exit policy), along with  your  public
              IP  address,  unless  you set the ExitPolicyRejectPrivate config
              option to 0. For example, once you’ve done that, you could allow
              HTTP  to  127.0.0.1  and block all other connections to internal
              networks with  "accept  127.0.0.1:80,reject  private:*",  though
              that  may  also  allow connections to your own computer that are
              addressed to its public (external) IP address. See RFC 1918  and
              RFC 3330 for more details about internal and reserved IP address
              space.

              This directive can be specified multiple times so you don’t have
              to put it all on one line.

              Policies are considered first to last, and the first match wins.
              If you want to _replace_ the default exit policy, end your  exit
              policy  with  either  a  reject *:* or an accept *:*. Otherwise,
              you’re _augmenting_ (prepending to) the default exit policy. The
              default exit policy is:
                   reject *:25
                   reject *:119
                   reject *:135-139
                   reject *:445
                   reject *:465
                   reject *:563
                   reject *:587
                   reject *:1214
                   reject *:4661-4666
                   reject *:6346-6429
                   reject *:6699
                   reject *:6881-6999
                   accept *:*

       ExitPolicyRejectPrivate 0|1
              Reject  all private (local) networks, along with your own public
              IP address, at the beginning of  your  exit  policy.  See  above
              entry on ExitPolicy. (Default: 1)

       MaxOnionsPending NUM
              If  you  have  more  than  this  number of onionskins queued for
              decrypt, reject new ones. (Default: 100)

       MyFamily nickname,nickname,...
              Declare that this Tor server is controlled or administered by  a
              group  or organization identical or similar to that of the other
              named servers.  When two servers both declare that they  are  in
              the  same  ’family’,  Tor  clients will not use them in the same
              circuit.  (Each server only needs to list the other  servers  in
              its  family; it doesn’t need to list itself, but it won’t hurt.)

       Nickname name
              Set the server’s nickname to ’name’. Nicknames must be between 1
              and   19   characters  inclusive,  and  must  contain  only  the
              characters [a-zA-Z0-9].

       NumCPUs num
              How many processes to use at  once  for  decrypting  onionskins.
              (Default: 1)

       ORPort PORT
              Advertise  this  port to listen for connections from Tor clients
              and servers.

       ORListenAddress IP[:PORT]
              Bind to this IP address  to  listen  for  connections  from  Tor
              clients  and  servers.  If you specify a port, bind to this port
              rather than the one specified in ORPort. (Default: 0.0.0.0) This
              directive  can  be  specified multiple times to bind to multiple
              addresses/ports.

       PublishServerDescriptor 0|1
              If set to 0, Tor will act as a server  if  you  have  an  ORPort
              defined,   but  it  will  not  publish  its  descriptor  to  the
              dirservers. This option is useful if  you’re  testing  out  your
              server,  or  if  you’re  using  a  Tor  controller  that handles
              directory publishing for you.  (Default: 1)

       RedirectExit pattern target
              Whenever an outgoing connection tries to connect  to  one  of  a
              given set of addresses, connect to target (an address:port pair)
              instead.  The address pattern is given in the same format as for
              an  exit  policy.   The  address  translation applies after exit
              policies are applied.   Multiple  RedirectExit  options  can  be
              used: once any one has matched successfully, no subsequent rules
              are considered.  You can specify that no redirection  is  to  be
              performed  on  a  given  set  of  addresses by using the special
              target string "pass", which prevents subsequent rules from being
              considered.

       ShutdownWaitLength NUM
              When we get a SIGINT and we’re a server, we begin shutting down:
              we close listeners and start refusing new  circuits.  After  NUM
              seconds,   we   exit.  If  we  get  a  second  SIGINT,  we  exit
              immediately.  (Default: 30 seconds)

       AccountingMax N bytes|KB|MB|GB|TB
              Never send more than the specified number of bytes  in  a  given
              accounting  period,  or  receive  more  than  that number in the
              period.  For example, with AccountingMax set to 1 GB,  a  server
              could  send  900  MB and receive 800 MB and continue running. It
              will only hibernate once one of the two reaches 1 GB.  When  the
              number of bytes is exhausted, Tor will hibernate until some time
              in the next accounting period.   To  prevent  all  servers  from
              waking at the same time, Tor will also wait until a random point
              in each period before waking up.  If  you  have  bandwidth  cost
              issues,  enabling  hibernation  is  preferable  to setting a low
              bandwidth, since it provides users with  a  collection  of  fast
              servers  that are up some of the time, which is more useful than
              a set of slow servers that are always "available".

       AccountingStart day|week|month [day] HH:MM
              Specify how long accounting periods last.  If  month  is  given,
              each accounting period runs from the time HH:MM on the dayth day
              of one month to the same day and time of  the  next.   (The  day
              must  be  between  1 and 28.)  If week is given, each accounting
              period runs from the time HH:MM of the dayth day of one week  to
              the same day and time of the next week, with Monday as day 1 and
              Sunday as day 7.  If day is given, each accounting  period  runs
              from  the  time HH:MM each day to the same time on the next day.
              All times are local, and given in 24-hour  time.   (Defaults  to
              "month 1 0:00".)

       ServerDNSResolvConfFile filename
              Overrides  the  default DNS configuration with the configuration
              in filename.  The file format is the same as the  standard  Unix
              "resolv.conf"  file  (7).  This option, like all other ServerDNS
              options, only affects name  lookup  that  your  server  does  on
              behalf  of clients.  Also, it only takes effect if Tor was built
              with  eventdns  support.   (Defaults  to  use  the  system   DNS
              configuration.)

       ServerDNSSearchDomains 0|1
              If  set  to  1,  then  we will search for addresses in the local
              search domain.  For example, if this  system  is  configured  to
              believe it is in "example.com", and a client tries to connect to
              "www", the client will be connected to "www.example.com".   This
              option  only affects name lookup that your server does on behalf
              of clients, and only takes effect if Tor was build with eventdns
              support.  (Defaults to "0".)

       ServerDNSDetectHijacking 0|1
              When  this  option  is  set  to  1, we will test periodically to
              determine whether our local nameservers have been configured  to
              hijack  failing  DNS  requests (usually to an advertising site).
              If they are, we will attempt to correct this.  This option  only
              affects  name lookup that your server does on behalf of clients,
              and only takes effect if Tor was build  with  eventdns  support.
              (Defaults to "1".)

       ServerDNSTestAddresses address,address,...
              When  we’re  detecting DNS hijacking, make sure that these valid
              addresses aren’t getting redirected.  If they are, then our  DNS
              is  completely  useless,  and  we’ll  reset  our  exit policy to
              "reject *:*".  This option only affects name  lookup  that  your
              server  does  on behalf of clients, and only takes effect if Tor
              was build with eventdns support.  (Defaults to  "www.google.com,
              www.mit.edu, www.yahoo.com, www.slashdot.org".)

       ServerDNSAllowNonRFC953Hostnames 0|1
              When  this  option  is  disabled,  Tor  does  not try to resolve
              hostnames containing illegal characters (like @  and  :)   rather
              than  sending  them  to an exit node to be resolved.  This helps
              trap accidental attempts to resolve URLs and so on.  This option
              only  affects  name  lookup  that  your server does on behalf of
              clients, and only takes effect if Tor was  build  with  eventdns
              support.  (Default: 0)

DIRECTORY SERVER OPTIONS

       The  following  options are useful only for directory servers (that is,
       if DirPort is non-zero):

       AuthoritativeDirectory 0|1
              When this option is set to 1, Tor operates as  an  authoritative
              directory   server.    Instead  of  caching  the  directory,  it
              generates its own list of good servers, signs it, and sends that
              to the clients.  Unless the clients already have you listed as a
              trusted directory, you probably do not want to set this  option.
              Please coordinate with the other admins at tor-ops@freehaven.net
              if you think you should be a directory.

       V1AuthoritativeDirectory 0|1
              When this option is set in addition  to  AuthoritativeDirectory,
              Tor  also generates a version 1 directory (for Tor clients up to
              0.1.0.x).   (As  of  Tor  0.1.1.12  every   (v2)   authoritative
              directory still provides most of the v1 directory functionality,
              even without this option set to 1.  This however is expected  to
              change in the future.)

       VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory 0|1
              When  this  option  is  set  to 1, Tor adds information on which
              versions of Tor are still believed safe for use to the published
              directory.    Each   version  1  authority  is  automatically  a
              versioning authority; version 2 authorities provide this service
              optionally.  See RecommendedVersions, RecommendedClientVersions,
              and RecommendedServerVersions.

       NamingAuthoritativeDirectory 0|1
              When this option is set to 1, then the server advertises that it
              has  opinions  about  nickname-to-fingerprint bindings.  It will
              include these opinions in its published network-status pages, by
              listing  servers  with  the  flag  "Named"  if a correct binding
              between that nickname and fingerprint has been  registered  with
              the  dirserver.   Naming  dirservers  will  refuse  to accept or
              publish descriptors that contradict a registered  binding.   See
              approved-routers in the FILES section below.

       HSAuthoritativeDir 0|1
              When  this  option is set in addition to AuthoritativeDirectory,
              Tor  also  accepts  and  serves  hidden   service   descriptors.
              (Default: 0)

       DirPort PORT
              Advertise the directory service on this port.

       DirListenAddress IP[:PORT]
              Bind  the  directory  service  to this address. If you specify a
              port, bind to  this  port  rather  than  the  one  specified  in
              DirPort.  (Default:  0.0.0.0)  This  directive  can be specified
              multiple times to bind to multiple addresses/ports.

       DirPolicy policy,policy,...
              Set an entrance policy for this server, to limit who can connect
              to the directory ports.  The policies have the same form as exit
              policies above.

       RecommendedVersions STRING
              STRING is a  comma-separated  list  of  Tor  versions  currently
              believed to be safe. The list is included in each directory, and
              nodes which pull down the directory learn whether they  need  to
              upgrade.  This option can appear multiple times: the values from
              multiple lines are spliced together.   When  this  is  set  then
              VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory should be set too.

       RecommendedClientVersions STRING
              STRING  is  a  comma-separated  list  of  Tor versions currently
              believed to be safe for clients to  use.   This  information  is
              included  in version 2 directories.  If this is not set then the
              value of RecommendedVersions is used.  When  this  is  set  then
              VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory should be set too.

       RecommendedServerVersions STRING
              STRING  is  a  comma-separated  list  of  Tor versions currently
              believed to be safe for servers to  use.   This  information  is
              included  in version 2 directories.  If this is not set then the
              value of RecommendedVersions is used.  When  this  is  set  then
              VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory should be set too.

       DirAllowPrivateAddresses 0|1
              If  set  to 1, Tor will accept router descriptors with arbitrary
              "Address" elements. Otherwise, if the address is not an IP or is
              a  private IP, it will reject the router descriptor. Defaults to
              0.

       AuthDirBadExit AddressPattern...
              Authoritative directories only.  A set of address  patterns  for
              servers  that  will be listed as bad exits in any network status
              document this authority  publishes,  if  AuthDirListBadExits  is
              set.

       AuthDirInvalid AddressPattern...
              Authoritative  directories  only.  A set of address patterns for
              servers that will never be listed  as  "valid"  in  any  network
              status document that this authority publishes.

       AuthDirReject AddressPattern...
              Authoritative  directories  only.  A set of address patterns for
              servers that will never be listed at all in any  network  status
              document  that  this  authority  publishes, or accepted as an OR
              address in any descriptor  submitted  for  publication  by  this
              authority.

       AuthDirListBadExits 0|1
              Authoritative directories only.  If set to 1, this directory has
              some opinion about which nodes are  unsuitable  as  exit  nodes.
              (Do  not  set  this  to 1 unless you plan to list nonfunctioning
              exits as bad; otherwise, you are effectively voting in favor  of
              every declared exit as an exit.)

       AuthDirRejectUnlisted 0|1
              Authoritative  directories  only.   If  set  to 1, the directory
              server rejects  all  uploaded  server  descriptors  that  aren’t
              explicitly  listed  in  the  fingerprints  file.  This acts as a
              "panic button" if we get Sybiled. (Default: 0)

HIDDEN SERVICE OPTIONS

       The following options are used to configure a hidden service.

       HiddenServiceDir DIRECTORY
              Store data files for  a  hidden  service  in  DIRECTORY.   Every
              hidden service must have a separate directory.  You may use this
              option multiple times to specify multiple services.

       HiddenServicePort VIRTPORT [TARGET]
              Configure a virtual port VIRTPORT for a hidden service.  You may
              use this option multiple times; each time applies to the service
              using the most recent hiddenservicedir.  By default, this option
              maps  the  virtual  port to the same port on 127.0.0.1.  You may
              override the target port,  address,  or  both  by  specifying  a
              target of addr, port, or addr:port.

       HiddenServiceNodes nickname,nickname,...
              If  possible, use the specified nodes as introduction points for
              the hidden service. If this is left unset, Tor will be smart and
              pick some reasonable ones; most people can leave this unset.

       HiddenServiceExcludeNodes nickname,nickname,...
              Do  not  use  the specified nodes as introduction points for the
              hidden service. In normal use there is no reason to set this.

       PublishHidServDescriptors 0|1
              If set to 0, Tor will run any hidden services you configure, but
              it won’t advertise them to the rendezvous directory. This option
              is only useful if you’re using a  Tor  controller  that  handles
              hidserv publishing for you.  (Default: 1)

       RendPostPeriod N seconds|minutes|hours|days|weeks
              Every  time  the  specified  period  elapses,  Tor  uploads  any
              rendezvous service descriptors to the directory  servers.   This
              information  is also uploaded whenever it changes.  (Default: 20
              minutes)

SIGNALS

       Tor catches the following signals:

       SIGTERM
              Tor will catch this, clean up and sync to disk if necessary, and
              exit.

       SIGINT Tor  clients  behave  as with SIGTERM; but Tor servers will do a
              controlled slow  shutdown,  closing  listeners  and  waiting  30
              seconds  before  exiting.  (The delay can be configured with the
              ShutdownWaitLength config option.)

       SIGHUP The signal instructs Tor to reload its configuration  (including
              closing and reopening logs), fetch a new directory, and kill and
              restart its helper processes if applicable.

       SIGUSR1
              Log statistics about current connections, past connections,  and
              throughput.

       SIGUSR2
              Switch  all  logs  to loglevel debug. You can go back to the old
              loglevels by sending a SIGHUP.

       SIGCHLD
              Tor receives this signal when one of its  helper  processes  has
              exited, so it can clean up.

       SIGPIPE
              Tor catches this signal and ignores it.

       SIGXFSZ
              If  this signal exists on your platform, Tor catches and ignores
              it.

FILES

       /etc/tor/torrc
              The configuration file, which contains "option value" pairs.

       /var/lib/tor/
              The tor process stores keys and other data here.

       DataDirectory/cached-status/*
              The most recently downloaded network status  document  for  each
              authority.  Each file holds one such document; the filenames are
              the hexadecimal  identity  key  fingerprints  of  the  directory
              authorities.

       DataDirectory/cached-routers and cached-routers.new
              These  files  hold downloaded router statuses.  Some routers may
              appear more than  once;  if  so,  the  most  recently  published
              descriptor  is used.  The ".new" file is an append-only journal;
              when it gets too large,  all  entries  are  merged  into  a  new
              cached-routers file.

       DataDirectory/state
              A set of persistent key-value mappings.  These are documented in
              the file.  These include:
            - The current entry guards and their status.
            - The current bandwidth accounting  values  (unused  so  far;  see
            below).
            - When the file was last written
            - What version of Tor generated the state file
            - A short history of bandwidth usage, as produced  in  the  router
            descriptors.

       DataDirectory/bw_accounting
              Used to track bandwidth  accounting  values  (when  the  current
              period  starts  and  ends; how much has been read and written so
              far this period).  This file is obsolete, and the  data  is  now
              stored  in  the  ’state’ file as well.  Only used when bandwidth
              accounting is enabled.

       DataDirectory/control_auth_cookie
              Used for cookie authentication with the controller.  Regenerated
              on  startup.   See control-spec.txt for details.  Only used when
              cookie authentication is enabled.

       DataDirectory/keys/*
              Only used by servers.  Holds identity keys and onion keys.

       DataDirectory/fingerprint
              Only used by servers.  Holds the  fingerprint  of  the  server’s
              identity key.

       DataDirectory/approved-routers
              Only   for   naming   authoritative   directory   servers   (see
              NamingAuthoritativeDirectory).   This  file  lists  nickname  to
              identity bindings.  Each line lists a nickname and a fingerprint
              separated by whitespace.   See  your  fingerprint  file  in  the
              DataDirectory  for  an example line.  If the nickname is !reject
              then descriptors  from  the  given  identity  (fingerprint)  are
              rejected  by this server. If it is !invalid then descriptors are
              accepted but marked in the directory as not valid, that is,  not
              recommended.

       HiddenServiceDirectory/hostname
              The  <base32-encoded-fingerprint>.onion  domain  name  for  this
              hidden service.

       HiddenServiceDirectory/private_key
              The private key for this hidden service.

SEE ALSO

       privoxy(1), tsocks(1), torify(1)

       https://www.torproject.org/

BUGS

       Plenty, probably. Tor is still in development. Please report them.

AUTHORS

       Roger Dingledine <arma@mit.edu>, Nick Mathewson <nickm@alum.mit.edu>.
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09/23/12

Free Bot-Nets Anyone

gAtO wAs - looking for code for bot’s to see how they work and I want to tell you it’s been kinda easy to find lots of bots…bots, code and DIY kits./ OK [1] below is the list of the Bots I found downloaded and playing with them to see how they work. Another part of this problem is it’s not just code and DIY kits, but code_mixer is a library that allows you to generate new Virus, undetectable to AV software. I also found different versions of Bots and different type of networks, IRC bots, http_bots, p2p_bots and on top of all this I found all kinds of discussions about how to make them ToR enable which has been going on for a while. Hiding a sophisticated c&c Bot-Master server in ToR ONION NETWORK IS EASY.

gAtOs –/ bot-net collection /–

I also wanted to know if these bot’s and code was not just old code stuff- well some is old by Internet years 2009 – that’s a long time in cyber pirate years but polymorphing code works no matter when it was created and it hides virus and worms really easy from AV systems especially if it’s a new version of the bots . Another thing I wanted to find is STUXNET, DUQU, FLAME SkyWriter and other famous Bots. Well I found samples of these — not just one but hundreds of version of these bot’s- and it was easy I included a list of some of the more newer bot codes.[2]…//

Oh I forgot ToR and Bots including  STUXNET, DUQU, FLAME SkyWriter and others do run in Tor onion network just check out the – insert date – First seen – Last seen – dates on this list . you may also check out —https://zeustracker.abuse.ch/statistic.php  — I found that my builder version showed that I had found Zeus 2.0.8.9 and is the number one version of zeus bot-net.  

One easy bot design is to use Tor2Web as a way to access a c&c server in Tor without running Tor on the infected client. The Tor network is getting more popular and people see that they can’t be caught in Tor so they are building lot’s of new Bots that run all over Tor – p2p and http and they are starting also new places like i2p networks and running bots—/   -gAtO oUt

[1] the list of Bots and code 

  1. _blackShades_4.8 Net -
  2. Black Pro _LostDoor v5.1
  3. BlackShade 4.8
  4. Blackshades NET v4.2
  5. Blackshades NET v3.8.1
  6. Blackshades_Archive
  7. Botnet Packet
  8. dark_Comet_1342319517
  9. ebookskayla-1
  10. G-Bot_1.7
  11. INCREDULiTY – ClientMesh
  12. ISR Stealer 0.4
  13. KnollKeylogger-1
  14. LostDoor Black Pro v5.1
  15. open source Exploit Pack
  16. optima10_ddos
  17. ProRat_v1.9 SE
  18. Spy-Net v2.7 Final
  19. SpyEye 1.3.45 Loader
  20. spyeye_tutorial
  21. Stuxnet_Laurelai-decompile-dump-2e11313
  22. Ultimate_Spy-Net v2.7 Final
  23. x_1ST-SECTION FILE INFECTOR, library+example,
  24. x_007
  25. x_arclib
  26. x_avp_troj
  27. x_code_mixer
  28. x_dscript
  29. x_eicar
  30. x_http ASM
  31. x_infecting *.HLP files (example/description)
  32. x_m1
  33. x_mistfall
  34. x_Mistfall.ZOMBIE-z10d
  35. x_pgpmorf1
  36. x_pgpmorf2
  37. x_tp_com
  38. x_zhello
  39. ZeuS 2.0.8-1.9
  40. Zeus collection
  41. ZBOT
  42. zeus 1.2.7.19
  43. ZeuS 2.0.8.9 – experimental
  44. Zeus Analysis Website

—[2] STUXNET, DUQU, FLAME SkyWriter and a few more bots in the wild check out the last seen date…

 

 

 

 

 

 

Flamer Bots  =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=

 

action md5 insert date First seen Last seen nod32 avast kaspersky bitdefender microsoft f_prot_unpacker peid
d73fe5f9f8dc2fc68aea57ba5c0353f4 2012-07-16 2012-06-07 09:11:15 2012-06-19 20:28:53 Win32/Flamer.A Win32:Skywiper- N [Trj] Worm.Win32.Flam e.a Trojan.Flame.A Trojan:Win32/Fl ame.A!cert
06a84ad28bbc9365eb9e08c697555154 2012-06-26 2012-06-05 11:24:36 2012-06-08 12:08:30 Win32/Flamer.A Win32:Skywiper- K [Trj] Worm.Win32.Flam e.a Trojan.Flame.A Worm:Win32/Flam e.gen!D Armadillo v1.71
0a17040c18a6646d485bde9ce899789f 2012-06-20 2012-05-30 12:45:05 2012-06-29 21:10:27 a variant of Win32/Flamer.A Win32:Skywiper- H [Trj] HEUR:Worm.Win32 .Flame.gen Trojan.Flame.A Worm:Win32/Flam e.gen!A
581f2ef2e3ba164281b562e435882eb5 2012-06-20 2012-06-01 06:09:15 2012-06-08 21:49:22 Win32/Flamer.A Win32:Skywiper- E [Trj] Worm.Win32.Flam e.a Trojan.Flame.A Worm:Win32/Flam e.gen!A
5a002eb0491ff2b5f275a73f43edf19e 2012-06-20 2012-06-01 08:13:39 2012-06-29 21:15:07 Win32/Flamer.A Win32:Skywiper- E [Trj] Worm.Win32.Flam e.a Trojan.Flame.A Worm:Win32/Flam e.gen!A
7551635b101b63b215512b00d60e00f3 2012-06-20 2006-07-18 04:31:57 2012-06-20 04:19:30 probably a variant of Win32/Agent.IGOUUZX Win32:Trojan-ge n Backdoor.Win32. Bifrose.cgfb Trojan.DialUpPa sswordMailer.A Trojan:Win32/Du twiper Aspack ASPack v1.08.03
75de82289ac8c816e27f3215a4613698 2012-06-20 2012-06-01 06:17:01 2012-06-21 06:36:16 Win32/Flamer.A Win32:Skywiper- L [Trj] Worm.Win32.Flam e.a Trojan.Flame.A Worm:Win32/Flam e.gen!A
8ed3846d189c51c6a0d69bdc4e66c1a5 2012-06-20 2010-10-05 03:56:52 2012-06-21 06:21:20 Win32/Flamer.A Win32:Malware-g en Worm.Win32.Flam e.a Trojan.Flame.A Worm:Win32/Flam e.gen!A
bddbc6974eb8279613b833804eda12f9 2012-06-20 2012-06-01 03:37:00 2012-06-21 06:23:32 Win32/Flamer.A Win32:Skywiper- K [Trj] Worm.Win32.Flam e.a Trojan.Flame.A Worm:Win32/Flam e.gen!D Armadillo v1.71
c09306141c326ce96d39532c9388d764 2012-06-20 2012-06-01 08:09:24 2012-06-21 06:43:33 Win32/Flamer.A Win32:Skywiper- L [Trj] Worm.Win32.Flam e.a Trojan.Flame.A Worm:Win32/Flam e.gen!A
cc54006c114d51ec47c173baea51213d 2012-06-20 2012-06-01 08:13:46 2012-06-01 10:05:08 Win32/Flamer.A Win32:Skywiper- E [Trj] Worm.Win32.Flam e.a Trojan.Flame.A Worm:Win32/Flam e.gen!C
e5a49547191e16b0a69f633e16b96560 2012-06-20 2012-05-30 14:22:32 2012-06-28 00:41:49 a variant of Win32/Flamer.A Win32:Skywiper- H [Trj] HEUR:Worm.Win32 .Flame.gen Trojan.Flame.A Worm:Win32/Flam e.gen!A
f0a654f7c485ae195ccf81a72fe083a2 2012-06-20 2012-05-28 14:37:54 2012-06-24 11:31:16 Win32/Flamer.A Win32:Skywiper- A [Trj] Worm.Win32.Flam e.a Trojan.Flame.A Worm:Win32/Flam e.gen!B
cb5 2012-06-19 2010-07-20 13:41:34 2012-06-24 11:30:50 Win32/Flamer.A Win32:Skywiper- I [Trj] Worm.Win32.Flam e.a Trojan.Flame.A Worm:Win32/Flam e.gen!A
0464e1fabcf2ef8b24d6fb63b19f1064 2012-06-18 2012-06-11 08:06:23 2012-06-11 08:06:23 Win32:Skywiper- A [Trj]
09d6740fd9be06cbb5182d02a851807d 2012-06-18 2012-06-11 08:14:24 2012-06-11 08:14:24 Win32:Skywiper- C [Trj]
780c5bc598054a365a75d10ac05a3157 2012-06-18 2012-06-11 07:50:56 2012-06-11 07:50:56 Win32:Skywiper- D [Trj]
cb98cca16865aa2330d2cf93fd6886ff 2012-06-18 2012-06-11 07:41:19 2012-06-11 07:41:19 Win32:Skywiper- E [Trj]
fac96cf0f5a43980635f6a6017a5edb0 2012-06-18 2012-08-04 06:42:23 2012-08-04 06:42:23 Win32:Skywiper- F [Trj]
bb4bf0681a582245bd379e4ace30274b 2012-06-16 2012-05-28 14:37:53 2012-07-25 19:03:03 Win32:Skywiper- D [Trj] Trojan.Generic. KDV.641104
Checked on VT at 2012-07-25 02:22:38

—DUQU Bot  =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-

action md5 insert date First seen Last seen nod32 avast kaspersky bitdefender microsoft f_prot_unpacker peid
2f5a23b67e6928d58df136fb3431c1a2 2012-08-27 2012-06-27 09:06:34 2012-06-27 09:06:34 Win32/Packed.ASProtect.CEC Win32:Duqu-L [Rtk] Trojan.Win32.Ge nome.fxan Backdoor.PCClie nt.1 Armadillo v1.xx – v2.xx
362b306967fa08fa204e968613c48b54 2012-08-27 2012-06-25 19:17:57 2012-06-25 19:17:57 a variant of Win32/PcClient.NDO Win32:Duqu-L [Rtk] Trojan.Win32.Ge nome.cfwz Backdoor.PCClie nt.1 Backdoor:Win32/ PcClient Themida Xtreme-Protecto r v1.05
5a8b8b55e7d12bcaee50af462d70e4f1 2012-08-27 2012-03-23 03:56:59 2012-03-24 06:50:48 a variant of Win32/TrojanDropper.Delf.NXY Win32:Duqu-I [Rtk] Trojan-Dropper. Win32.Agent.wzj Trojan.Generic. 2087186 Backdoor:Win32/ Delf.RAN
71c91c34ef08b0222a7385a9fc91a156 2012-08-27 2010-01-07 16:30:15 2012-08-01 21:30:31 Win32:Duqu-L [Rtk] Trojan.Win32.Ge nome.ptdr Backdoor.PCClie nt.1 NSPack NsPacK V3.7 -> LiuXingPing
78efa3d89fa835c2d841ca021ba04f9a 2012-08-27 2012-06-20 16:29:55 2012-06-20 16:29:55 Win32/PcClient Win32:Duqu-L [Rtk] Backdoor.Win32. PcClient.akqr Backdoor.PCClie nt.1 Backdoor:Win32/ PcClient NSPack
7e995e30b3c752d55708ba70b64c576d 2012-08-27 2012-07-01 03:18:29 2012-07-01 03:18:29 a variant of Win32/PcClient.NEK Win32:Duqu-L [Rtk] Backdoor.Win32. PcClient.eld Backdoor.PCClie nt.1 Backdoor:Win32/ PcClient Malware_Prot.AJ
8fb8994eb25f35d1e4f62ab00871170b 2012-08-27 2011-11-30 06:35:32 2011-11-30 06:35:32 Win32/PcClient.NCD Win32:Duqu-L [Rtk] Backdoor.Win32. PcClient.eld Backdoor.PCClie nt.1 Backdoor:Win32/ PcClient Malware_Prot.AJ
90fc2ddf9985d14d4252b016018852af 2012-08-27 2012-06-27 06:46:46 2012-06-27 06:46:46 a variant of Win32/PcClient Win32:Duqu-L [Rtk] Backdoor.Win32. PcClient.dire Backdoor.PCClie nt.1 Backdoor:Win32/ PcClient
9a9e77d2b7792fbbddcd7ce05a4eb26e 2012-08-27 2011-11-02 03:07:36 2011-11-02 03:16:28 Win32/Duqu.A Win32:Malware-g en Trojan.Win32.In ject.bjyg Trojan.Generic. 6658401 Trojan:Win32/Hi deproc.G UPX_LZMA
9d00bebb4be61eb425ef8adfa05968fd 2012-08-27 2012-05-23 12:23:42 2012-05-27 21:59:18 a variant of Win32/PcClient.NBG Win32:Duqu-L [Rtk] Backdoor.Win32. PcClient.hnp Backdoor.PCClie nt.1 Backdoor:Win32/ PcClient ASPack v2.12
9dc323e0595caf5e5152b6353c6c7b58 2012-08-27 2012-07-01 09:01:29 2012-07-01 09:01:29 a variant of Win32/PcClient.NEK Win32:Duqu-L [Rtk] Backdoor.Win32. PcClient.eld Backdoor.PCClie nt.1 Backdoor:Win32/ PcClient Malware_Prot.AJ
b25cc61de1a0d2086356d7757b26e2ef 2012-08-27 2012-06-23 15:43:36 2012-06-23 15:43:36 Win32/PcClient.NBI Win32:Duqu-L [Rtk] Backdoor.Win32. Hupigon.bxjm Backdoor.PCClie nt.1 Backdoor:Win32/ Hupigon.ZQ.dll Aspack ASPack v2.12
bb9c97fe54b85179f9a83ca4cfdd24f3 2012-08-27 2012-07-02 11:06:55 2012-07-02 11:06:55 a variant of Win32/PcClient.NEK Win32:Duqu-L [Rtk] Backdoor.Win32. PcClient.eld Backdoor.PCClie nt.1 Backdoor:Win32/ PcClient Malware_Prot.AJ
ca7b6963a5b45b67e1bfa1a0f415eb24 2012-08-27 2012-06-29 01:20:37 2012-06-29 01:20:37 Win32/PcClient.NCD Win32:Duqu-L [Rtk] Backdoor.Win32. PcClient.eld Backdoor.PCClie nt.1 Backdoor:Win32/ PcClient Malware_Prot.AJ
5d8932237d14019ae81e97c5b8951ef8 2012-08-15 2012-08-18 11:59:04 2012-08-18 11:59:04 Win32:Duqu-L [Rtk] HEUR:Trojan.Win 32.Generic Backdoor.PCClie nt.1 Backdoor:Win32/ PcClient NSPack
6416039108bd666f073d51db5328f6c9 2012-08-15 2012-08-18 14:07:59 2012-08-18 14:07:59 Win32:Duqu-L [Rtk] HEUR:Backdoor.W in32.Generic Backdoor.PCClie nt.1 Backdoor:Win32/ PcClient ASPack v2.12
774c19f455cff3a443e7f3a58983a12b 2012-08-15 2012-08-18 18:18:21 2012-08-18 18:18:21 Win32:Duqu-I [Rtk] Backdoor.Win32. Hupigon2.ja Trojan.Generic. 826880 Backdoor:Win32/ Delf.RAN
b19fe4b53d01d2746eb83e9fddd1eb67 2012-08-15 2012-07-16 12:33:52 2012-07-16 12:33:52 Win32:Duqu-L [Rtk] HEUR:Backdoor.W in32.Generic Backdoor.PCClie nt.1 Backdoor:Win32/ PcClient ASPack v2.12
f41b0a33d2ca4ba05a95b1a9a40e7e28 2012-08-15 2012-08-19 15:09:26 2012-08-19 15:09:26 Win32:Duqu-L [Rtk] Backdoor.Win32. PcClient.agyu Backdoor.PCClie nt.1 Backdoor:Win32/ PcClient
2f4e30a497ae6183aabfe8ba23068c1b 2012-06-20 2012-06-11 17:02:50 2012-07-15 11:59:26 Win32/Stuxnet.A Win32:Malware-g en Worm.Win32.Stux net.v Win32.Worm.Stux net.E embedded  

 

 

 

 

the

 

—zeus  =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-

 

action md5 insert date First seen Last seen nod32 avast kaspersky bitdefender microsoft f_prot_unpacker peid
0a295bb2cbb44d9ba2e18bbfeb511d1d 2012-08-27 2011-02-24 10:59:09 2012-05-12 09:37:44 WinCE/Zbot.A Win32:Malware-g en Trojan-Spy.WinC E.Zitmo.a Backdoor.Bot.13 4855 Trojan:WinCE/Zi tmo.A
2b2dcecfd882efb2100ce28d09c89f75 2012-08-27 2009-01-30 05:49:27 2009-07-02 06:23:46 a variant of Win32/Spy.Zbot.JF Win32:Zbot-BCW Trojan.Spy.Zeus .C PWS:Win32/Zbot
33a6fef6d2487a95af539e532be424b2 2012-08-27 2011-09-03 03:28:17 2012-02-21 21:41:11 a variant of Win32/Zeus.B Win32:Malware-g en Backdoor.Win32. BotNet.ac Gen:Variant.Kaz y.8986 PWS:Win32/Zbot. TV UPX UPX 2.90 [LZMA] -> Markus Oberhumer, Laszlo Molnar & John Reiser
4153a07347b3bdf74b527e51cc63a843 2012-08-27 2010-05-16 15:01:27 2010-05-18 21:58:47 a variant of Win32/Spy.Agent.PZ Win32:Zbot-gen Trojan-Spy.Win3 2.Zbot.myj Trojan.Spy.Zeus .1.Gen PWS:Win32/Zbot. gen!A
4fe9b3febda0dd9e8f89ed29b1a39560 2012-08-27 2012-03-27 07:25:01 2012-03-28 09:48:26 a variant of Win32/Spy.Agent.PZ Win32:Susn-G [Trj] Trojan-Spy.Win3 2.Zbot.roh Trojan.Spy.Zeus .1.Gen PWS:Win32/Zbot. GA
7b470095ce2887377e6f9e37fd0471dc 2012-08-27 2012-06-30 09:12:53 2012-06-30 09:12:53 a variant of Win32/Spy.Agent.PZ Win32:Zbot-gen [Trj] Trojan-Spy.Win3 2.Zbot.roh Trojan.Spy.Zeus .1.Gen PWS:Win32/Zbot. GA
831d2fdb9ad258f68ce5924b1feac10a 2012-08-27 2011-10-17 02:49:20 2012-04-30 22:09:54 a variant of Win32/Spy.Agent.PZ Win32:Susn-G [Trj] Trojan-Spy.Win3 2.Zbot.roh Trojan.Spy.Zeus .1.Gen PWS:Win32/Zbot. GA
9eb88298f93809ea7d733e29bb3d466b 2012-08-27 2007-11-16 20:51:16 2011-08-09 00:18:04 a variant of Win32/Spy.Agent.PZ Win32:Tibs-BND [Trj] Trojan-Spy.Win3 2.Zbot.adj Trojan.Spy.Zeus .2.Gen PWS:Win32/Zbot. gen!B
9faf0c526795ee01839ecb51074dd7ae 2012-08-27 2012-06-23 06:47:46 2012-06-23 06:47:46 a variant of Win32/Spy.Agent.PZ Win32:Tibs-BNF [Trj] Trojan-Spy.Win3 2.Zbot.adj Trojan.Spy.Zeus .2.Gen PWS:Win32/Zbot. gen!B
a05211df243da8a9e628b4767aafc989 2012-08-27 2007-11-17 13:55:10 2011-08-08 23:43:09 Win32/Spy.Agent.NDY Win32:Zbot-AG [Trj] Trojan-Spy.Win3 2.Zbot.po Trojan.Spy.Zeus .2.Gen PWS:Win32/Zbot. gen!B
aa874f7c37962240569ff35a030c2e71 2012-08-27 2012-06-26 08:59:57 2012-06-26 08:59:57 a variant of Win32/Kryptik.OV Win32:Zbot-FS [Trj] Trojan-Spy.Win3 2.Zbot.xw Trojan.Spy.Zeus .1.Gen PWS:Win32/Zbot. gen!B
b484264bca4286f65d5cb68efefa9dc4 2012-08-27 2008-08-22 19:29:43 2009-01-08 08:22:34 Trojan.Spy.Zeus .1.Gen TrojanSpy:Win32 /Zbot.gen!C
c38412218981ddc0cd93d5d98971a781 2012-08-27 2009-12-19 06:17:33 2009-12-31 15:13:34 a variant of Win32/Spy.Zbot.UN Win32:Zbot-BCW Trojan-Spy.Win3 2.Zbot.aadb Trojan.Spy.Zeus .C PWS:Win32/Zbot. gen!R
c4905c4610b9c2992bc395429b7365ab 2012-08-27 2009-09-04 15:24:05 2009-09-04 15:24:05 Win32:Zbot-BCW Heur.Trojan.Gen eric Trojan.Spy.Zeus .C PWS:Win32/Zbot. gen!R
c70db2b312a23e11b5e671cac70db98f 2012-08-27 2008-02-19 12:29:14 2012-02-19 14:34:25 PS/MPC-Zeus-753 Virus.DOS.PS-MP C-based PS-MPC.0753.DN. Gen Virus:DOS/PSMPC .753
d16a1870603a0f7111c64584e6eb5deb 2012-08-27 2012-02-20 19:36:30 2012-03-02 01:50:10 Win32/PSW.Agent.NTM Win32:Zeus-A [Trj] Trojan.Win32.Ag ent2.fadw Gen:Variant.Zlo b.1 PWS:Win32/Farei t.gen!C
d1db75d0b93b0f1bda856242c8ab1264 2012-08-27 2009-10-15 20:31:08 2009-10-17 14:14:20 a variant of Win32/Spy.Zbot.UN Win32:Zbot-BCW Heur.Trojan.Gen eric Trojan.Spy.Zeus .C PWS:Win32/Zbot. QA
d5a75c535b33fc09f1ab6e181d59fc84 2012-08-27 2011-06-18 10:59:14 2011-12-09 01:49:01 a variant of Win32/Spy.Zbot.XO Win32:Zbot-ATL [Trj] Trojan-Spy.Win3 2.Zbot.roh Trojan.Spy.Zeus .1.Gen PWS:Win32/Zbot. C
e806cfe7d3257bf61f5b95215e3ec23e 2012-08-27 2012-06-23 03:56:28 2012-06-23 03:56:28 a variant of Win32/Spy.Agent.PZ Trojan-Spy.Win3 2.Zbot.adj Trojan.Spy.Zeus .2.Gen PWS:Win32/Zbot. gen!B
078b7684cbc5cd14770fb2c842ece7e4 2012-08-15 2012-08-04 03:55:52 2012-08-09 17:09:00 Win32:Susn-G [Trj] Trojan-Spy.Win3 2.Zbot.roh

—gBot  =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-

 

action md5 insert date First seen Last seen nod32 avast kaspersky bitdefender microsoft f_prot_unpacker peid
0017c17069fcd00a8c13e2e1bb955494 2012-08-27 2011-11-16 12:17:45 2011-12-14 17:33:12 a variant of Win32/Kryptik.VNB Win32:Cybota [Trj] Trojan.Win32.Jo rik.Gbot.rtt Trojan.Generic. 6903230 Backdoor:Win32/ Cycbot.G
0033496f9baa6c05dc709db64a7b8cef 2012-08-27 2011-11-19 12:30:08 2011-12-16 01:08:42 a variant of Win32/Kryptik.VZB Win32:Cybota [Trj] Trojan.Win32.Jo rik.Gbot.rwf Trojan.Generic. 6914846 Backdoor:Win32/ Cycbot.G
00392a6a7919d425e512c4466984f8f3 2012-08-27 2011-10-05 04:29:14 2011-11-29 18:00:26 a variant of Win32/Kryptik.TEV Win32:Cybota [Trj] Backdoor.Win32. Gbot.osk Gen:Variant.Kaz y.38517 Backdoor:Win32/ Cycbot.G
004ed94e35b42f7b76fb4b729573a123 2012-08-27 2012-01-13 03:41:13 2012-02-11 12:53:50 a variant of Win32/Kryptik.YBH Win32:Cybota [Trj] Backdoor.Win32. Gbot.qwk Gen:Variant.Kaz y.50582 Backdoor:Win32/ Cycbot.G
00b66b966778139c0b83721c5e307695 2012-08-27 2011-11-24 01:24:42 2012-01-02 23:04:36 Win32/Cycbot.AF Win32:Cybota [Trj] Trojan.Win32.Jo rik.Gbot.qwn Gen:Heur.Kelios .1 Backdoor:Win32/ Cycbot.G
00c789e5ae793c6be65482d4b472f0f0 2012-08-27 2011-11-18 16:42:21 2011-12-15 14:43:24 Win32/Cycbot.AK Win32:Cybota [Trj] Trojan.Win32.Jo rik.Gbot.rvk Backdoor.Bot.14 6893 Backdoor:Win32/ Cycbot.G
00daf7e9577d84c5949439b02f11af74 2012-08-27 2011-03-23 02:31:51 2011-07-20 22:11:40 Win32/Cycbot.AF Win32:Cybota [Trj] Backdoor.Win32. Gbot.aed Gen:Trojan.Heur .KS.1 Backdoor:Win32/ Cycbot.B
00ddbd4723ec6394f278fd5d3275a952 2012-08-27 2012-02-02 18:46:53 2012-03-29 17:13:40 Win32/Cycbot.AK Win32:Cybota [Trj] Backdoor.Win32. Gbot.qwt Gen:Variant.Kaz y.53272 Backdoor:Win32/ Cycbot.G
00deb18fb207bc020a30ff7b7550f279 2012-08-27 2011-03-19 21:01:29 2011-07-12 08:53:49 a variant of Win32/Kryptik.LOJ Win32:Cybota [Trj] Backdoor.Win32. Gbot.adk Gen:Trojan.Heur .KS.1 Backdoor:Win32/ Cycbot.B
00e762e7fe180b096207c7b72f608cc3 2012-08-27 2012-06-20 11:30:59 2012-06-20 11:30:59 a variant of Win32/AGbot.V Win32:SdBot-FJH [Trj] Backdoor.Win32. SdBot.ozd Gen:Win32.IRC-B ackdoor.fmW@aih z9oj Backdoor:Win32/ Gaertob.A Armadillo v1.71
00f3359898621f36a5251759a3a89495 2012-08-27 2011-11-11 20:35:02 2011-11-16 04:05:08 Win32/Adware.WinAntiVirus.AD Win32:Gbot-M [Trj] Trojan-Download er.Win32.Fdvm.b Application.Gen eric.386031 Trojan:Win32/Si refef.P
00f83d49831dc202e04478f670b96d50 2012-08-27 2011-12-14 07:28:20 2011-12-14 07:28:20 Win32/Cycbot.AF Win32:Cybota [Trj] Backdoor.Win32. Gbot.qmi Backdoor.Gbot.I Backdoor:Win32/ Cycbot.G
00fc1e69ca9031e5c47dfcde78dc0537 2012-08-27 2011-09-09 05:34:05 2012-02-11 20:04:14 a variant of Win32/Kryptik.RWA Win32:Cybota [Trj] Trojan.Win32.Jo rik.Gbot.iag Gen:Variant.Kaz y.34336 Backdoor:Win32/ Cycbot.G
0117b98cb2114c51c4d51831820cc8e4 2012-08-27 2011-04-02 06:56:59 2011-07-21 00:22:16 Win32/Cycbot.AF Win32:Cybota [Trj] Backdoor.Win32. Gbot.ahq Trojan.Generic. KD.163287 Backdoor:Win32/ Cycbot.B
016d69d4cbd779b63bb6927fa9c19730 2012-08-27 2012-03-10 20:03:49 2012-04-30 20:29:18 a variant of Win32/Kryptik.SUP Win32:Cybota [Trj] Backdoor.Win32. Gbot.oep Gen:Heur.Conjar .5 Backdoor:Win32/ Cycbot.G
0189fd7b339df01d4a4be1113520ad46 2012-08-27 2010-02-19 22:20:06 2012-06-09 04:12:35 a variant of MSIL/TrojanDropper.Agent.JF Win32:Malware-g en Trojan-Dropper. MSIL.Agent.fws Trojan.Generic. 3812196 VirTool:Win32/O bfuscator.NC
01e118c11c4145710ff1801f34a44bc7 2012-08-27 2012-07-05 15:25:49 2012-07-05 15:25:49 a variant of Win32/Kryptik.ACYA Win32:MalOb-IF [Cryp] Backdoor.Win32. Gbot.wkt Gen:Variant.Bar ys.3481 TrojanDownloade r:Win32/Carberp .C
021817e91793fa15bee2937fe2befddd 2012-08-27 2011-12-06 03:55:36 2012-01-03 16:39:38 a variant of Win32/Kryptik.VCE Win32:Cybota [Trj] Trojan.Win32.Jo rik.Gbot.qxq Gen:Variant.Kaz y.42337 Backdoor:Win32/ Cycbot.G
0229d3256bd2309f1d581533febdc1e7 2012-08-27 2012-01-31 17:40:43 2012-02-21 13:59:28 a variant of Win32/Kryptik.UVF Win32:KadrBot [Trj] Trojan.Win32.Jo rik.ZAccess.no Gen:Variant.Kaz y.41897 Trojan:Win32/Si refef.J
0296357c2952eafb29b2edeaf776a787 2012-08-27 2011-09-13 21:55:14 2012-02-12 16:34:09 a variant of Win32/Kryptik.RLK Win32:Cybota [Trj] Trojan.Win32.Jo rik.Gbot.epv Gen:Variant.Kaz y.33354 Backdoor:Win32/ Cycbot.G

 

—spyeye  =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-

 

action md5 insert date First seen Last seen nod32 avast kaspersky bitdefender microsoft f_prot_unpacker peid
004df992aa00f6a83388aeb55cf806bb 2012-08-27 2012-03-17 18:33:21 2012-04-25 11:55:35 a variant of Win32/Kryptik.VMB Win32:MalOb-IV [Cryp] HEUR:Trojan.Win 32.Generic Gen:Variant.Kaz y.43891 Trojan:Win32/Dy namer!dtc
0050771f197d912b1fd2767c9b07b0d9 2012-08-27 2012-01-22 05:30:06 2012-01-22 05:30:06 Win32:MalOb-IJ [Cryp] HEUR:Trojan.Win 32.Generic Gen:Variant.Kaz y.46466
0055add5c7c8778b1e97e0bc2cdb34fd 2012-08-27 2011-04-05 09:52:34 2012-08-17 14:32:46 Win32:Karagany- E [Trj] Trojan-Spy.Win3 2.SpyEyes.gaf Gen:Variant.Kaz y.154 TrojanDownloade r:Win32/Karagan y.A
00881bfd664c40bd17f00da4e2b1707e 2012-08-27 2012-01-30 20:45:05 2012-03-25 16:25:27 Win32/Ramnit.A Win32:Vitro HEUR:Trojan.Win 32.Generic Gen:Heur.FKP.1 Trojan:Win32/Ra mnit.A
009f01b994bd6211d8b79775decc5854 2012-08-27 2012-06-25 07:23:14 2012-06-25 07:23:14 Win32/Spy.SpyEye.CA Win32:Regrun-JI [Trj] Trojan.Win32.Me nti.kxpm Trojan.Generic. 6382824 Trojan:Win32/Ey eStye.N Armadillo v1.71
00bbce9dac6dec8f16547da20c09594c 2012-08-27 2011-11-11 04:55:40 2011-11-11 04:55:40 a variant of Win32/AutoRun.Injector.AM Win32:Spyeye-ZL [Trj] HEUR:Trojan.Win 32.Generic Worm.Generic.35 0922 Armadillo v1.71
00db3ed3ba79dcc6627b13f5c0557f46 2012-08-27 2012-06-25 13:26:56 2012-06-25 13:26:56 a variant of Win32/Kryptik.HJW Win32:Zbot-MVW [Trj] Trojan-Download er.Win32.Piker. cqy Gen:Variant.Kaz y.1690 TrojanDownloade r:Win32/Bredola b.AC
00ffd9a941c6fe8d57210bf82c674943 2012-08-27 2011-06-26 15:23:06 2011-07-19 07:46:49 Win32/Bamital.FA Win32:Trojan-ge n Trojan.Win32.Of icla.nbt Trojan.Generic. KD.225389 Trojan:Win32/Me redrop UPX 2.90 [LZMA] -> Markus Oberhumer, Laszlo Molnar & John Reiser
012cca77918ab828662e9b726c97319c 2012-08-27 2011-11-03 13:55:46 2012-01-28 16:05:29 a variant of Win32/Injector.KLZ Win32:Spyeye-YV [Trj] Trojan.Win32.In ject.bpoa Gen:Variant.Gra ftor.3243 VirTool:Win32/D elfInject.gen!C M
01341c165ed887fa134250750b2218c4 2012-08-27 2011-12-15 08:45:54 2012-01-19 04:40:25 Win32/AutoRun.Spy.Banker.M Win32:Spyware-g en [Spy] Trojan-Dropper. Win32.Dapato.sd d Trojan.Generic. KDV.479801 Worm:Win32/Crid ex.B Armadillo v1.71
014e076ae37f2e5e612ae748dd9e4177 2012-08-27 2011-11-11 03:24:24 2011-11-24 20:34:32 a variant of Win32/Injector.JMN Win32:Crypt-KLY [Trj] Trojan.Win32.Bu zus.iofc Trojan.Generic. 6686401 TrojanDropper:W in32/Sirefef.B
01525755f4b3c800560bdc4ac3c80cbd 2012-08-27 2011-03-09 19:58:13 2011-03-19 04:41:56 a variant of Win32/Injector.FBK Win32:Spyware-g en Trojan-Spy.Win3 2.SpyEyes.fqu Trojan.Generic. KDV.152375
019f9a5668d3de770f4c0a741a4f0c4a 2012-08-27 2012-03-28 01:18:38 2012-03-28 05:03:51 a variant of Win32/Injector.KCP Win32:Regrun-JI [Trj] HEUR:Trojan.Win 32.Generic Gen:Variant.Gra ftor.1584 Armadillo v1.71
01b36ef0ca621293f6c74c7b2950946a 2012-08-27 2012-01-06 23:55:08 2012-06-07 08:19:28 Win32/AutoRun.IRCBot.HO Win32:Malware-g en Trojan-Dropper. Win32.Injector. boyd Backdoor.Agent. ABAV Worm:Win32/Phor piex.B
01ceff3646dd40eaa11ed4cf7a75d495 2012-08-27 2012-03-21 00:04:37 2012-03-22 04:53:17 a variant of Win32/Kryptik.ACTR Win32:Spyeye-AC T [Trj] Trojan-FakeAV.W in32.Agent.dks Gen:Variant.Bre do.21 Rogue:Win32/Win websec
01d1d9f8c314a19e9f5cc7dc06693ea5 2012-08-27 2012-06-20 01:29:52 2012-06-20 01:29:52 Win32:Spyeye-WC [Trj] Trojan.Win32.Ge nome.acnzw Gen:Variant.Kaz y.37631 VirTool:Win32/O bfuscator.TT
01ef0b349a8b2c598f24fad77bb7d506 2012-08-27 2012-06-27 04:01:59 2012-06-27 04:01:59 a variant of Win32/Kryptik.HCV Win32:Malware-g en Trojan-Spy.Win3 2.SpyEyes.evw Trojan.Generic. KD.45757 Rogue:Win32/Win websec
02084edaa51e7bd688fc95c0ae86a29a 2012-08-27 2011-11-18 19:01:09 2011-11-21 15:55:16 a variant of Win32/Injector.KTW Win32:Spyeye-ZI [Trj] Trojan-Spy.Win3 2.SpyEyes.qmg Trojan.Generic. KDV.399472 Trojan:Win32/Or sam!rts
022abced09dc8142069c88ce2ee06e55 2012-08-27 2012-06-22 23:18:26 2012-06-22 23:18:26 Win32/Spy.SpyEye.CA Win32:Zbot-NES [Trj] Net-Worm.Win32. Koobface.jcb Gen:Variant.Kaz y.25416
0234f794047645d090a47550cf229bd4 2012-08-27 2012-04-08 05:38:21 2012-06-13 10:50:56 probably a variant of Win32/Injector.KNA Win32:Malware-g en HEUR:Trojan.Win 32.Generic Gen:Trojan.Heur .VP2.eu0baiVzqp ii VirTool:Win32/V BInject.UG ASPack v2.12

 

—AVP  =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-

 

action md5 insert date First seen Last seen nod32 avast kaspersky bitdefender microsoft f_prot_unpacker peid
00ada89f87db0db0f3939271c34f865e 2012-08-27 2008-09-18 18:15:52 2009-04-27 12:34:23 probably a variant of Win32/Adware.RogueApp Win32:Adware-ge n not-a-virus:Fra udTool.Win32.Ag ent.r Adware.AntivirP rotection.A Program:Win32/A ntivirusProtect ion
0106605d11d29384522bfa17164fd943 2012-08-27 2012-03-22 10:32:32 2012-03-22 21:11:40 Win32:Dialer-AV P [Trj] Trojan.Win32.Di aler.qn Trojan.Mezzia.G en Trojan:Win32/Ad ialer.OP
014596c2ff3198b690bf2f3debcb0711 2012-08-27 2011-12-03 03:58:24 2011-12-05 21:04:13 Win32/Spy.Zbot.YW Win32:Trojan-ge n Trojan-Spy.Win3 2.Zbot.coxf Trojan.Spy.Zbot .ETB PWS:Win32/Zbot UPX 2.90 [LZMA] -> Markus Oberhumer, Laszlo Molnar & John Reiser
01b37e56720a5bf5a85c103878100388 2012-08-27 2012-06-11 04:52:22 2012-06-11 04:52:22 Win32/Kryptik.AGSY Win32:Kryptik-I XH [Trj] Trojan-Spy.Win3 2.Zbot.dyuc Trojan.Agent.AV PE
01cd13a561ff5396604b8718e911b49f 2012-08-27 2011-11-17 13:29:53 2012-07-25 21:46:15 Win32:Trojan-ge n Trojan-Spy.Win3 2.Zbot.coxf Trojan.Spy.Zbot .ETB PWS:Win32/Zbot UPX UPX 2.90 [LZMA] -> Markus Oberhumer, Laszlo Molnar & John Reiser
01f699ef8a648642084f7d665c3c265e 2012-08-27 2011-10-15 19:56:04 2011-10-25 08:10:00 Win32/Olmarik.AVP Win32:Alureon-A FI [Trj] HEUR:Trojan.Win 32.Generic Gen:Variant.Kaz y.27650 Trojan:Win32/Al ureon.DX
0267027dd9091a7054ff9c46384c6654 2012-08-27 2012-02-04 10:24:19 2012-03-31 17:43:08 a variant of Win32/Kryptik.YVK Win32:MalOb-JA [Cryp] Gen:Variant.Kaz y.52638 Rogue:Win32/Fak eRean
03ceb31131f1a47c1388e9c8a53feca0 2012-08-27 2010-08-10 20:27:10 2011-02-05 09:10:23 a variant of Win32/Injector.CLG Win32:Malware-g en Trojan-Download er.Win32.Banloa d.bekw Worm.Generic.27 2239 TrojanSpy:Win32 /Swisyn.B
05740edf8ef59dfdcb3660b35e76052c 2012-08-27 2010-06-02 22:16:22 2012-08-01 23:09:46 Win32:Rootkit-g en [Rtk] Trojan.Win32.Sw isyn.avpt Trojan.Generic. KD.14612 Trojan:Win32/Tr ufip!rts Armadillo v1.71
06daf98aa5504f124d1f19bb23d8aa2b 2012-08-27 2012-02-20 01:00:55 2012-02-20 01:00:55 a variant of Win32/Kryptik.YMJ Win32:MalOb-IG [Cryp] Trojan.Win32.Fa keAV.kbsd Gen:Variant.Kaz y.51804 Rogue:Win32/Fak eRean
07837d8689d093ddfb90e0e873a40403 2012-08-27 2012-02-06 12:01:38 2012-08-04 03:14:45 Win32:FakeAlert -EM [Trj] Trojan-FakeAV.W in32.VirusDocto r.v Gen:Variant.Urs nif.2 Rogue:Win32/Fak eVimes
07ca5974da6c583b74870b97ca4418ba 2012-08-27 2011-02-04 10:40:03 2012-05-10 04:07:38 a variant of Win32/Spy.VB.NJM Win32:VB-QXQ [Spy] Trojan.Win32.VB Krypt.bavp Gen:Trojan.Heur .fm0@s5JEYbfih Trojan:Win32/Bu mat!rts
087347abfd1f071bcbd9ed2cd83742c3 2012-08-27 2011-11-15 22:10:35 2011-12-16 17:26:10 a variant of Win32/Agent.TCI Win32:Crypt-KWZ [Trj] HEUR:Trojan.Win 32.Generic Gen:Variant.Buz y.4378 Trojan:Win32/In ject.AL
089204eee8ae33f0301b90c43c55aef4 2012-08-27 2011-11-15 12:43:41 2011-12-06 23:11:43 a variant of Win32/Kryptik.VPK Win32:Gbot-M [Trj] Trojan-FakeAV.W in32.OpenCloud. p Trojan.Generic. 6850089 Rogue:Win32/Fak eScanti
09ee083b59b68fa0807dde46be7938a4 2012-08-27 2011-03-19 05:31:23 2011-03-20 00:07:52 Win32/Sirefef.C Win32:Delf-OHT Trojan.Win32.Fa keAV.avpj Trojan.Generic. KD.138388 Worm:Win32/Sire fef.gen!A
0a58fdc81e8bb0e2be92c805846f082e 2012-08-27 2012-01-28 19:43:01 2012-01-28 19:43:01 a variant of Win32/Kryptik.ZAZ Win32:ZAccess-E F [Trj] HEUR:Trojan.Win 32.Generic Gen:Variant.Kaz y.53282 Rogue:Win32/Fak eRean
0aa08ce7021f950a13167728fe7386a6 2012-08-27 2012-03-24 13:06:08 2012-05-30 19:28:26 a variant of Win32/Injector.PLK Win32:Crypt-MCG [Trj] HEUR:Trojan.Win 32.Generic Trojan.Generic. 7394229 Worm:Win32/Nayr abot.gen!A
0b3daa6dcf816fa34179197d6be16c21 2012-08-27 2012-01-17 00:16:22 2012-02-01 14:32:17 a variant of Win32/Kryptik.ZAZ Win32:ZAccess-E F [Trj] Trojan.Win32.Fa keAV.kmpm Gen:Variant.Kaz y.53282 Rogue:Win32/Fak eRean
0ce67f90dd1a936cbc08a6dea0e4d8ae 2012-08-27 2011-11-17 02:06:29 2012-02-09 06:37:16 a variant of Win32/Agent.TCI Win32:Crypt-KWZ [Trj] HEUR:Trojan.Win 32.Generic Gen:Variant.Buz y.4378 Trojan:Win32/In ject.AL
0cf1f914d2805a4cafa33ba9088424a2 2012-08-27 2012-01-17 13:30:31 2012-01-17 13:30:31 a variant of Win32/Kryptik.YWV Win32:Downloade r-MHD [Trj] Trojan.Win32.Fa keAV.kjsd Gen:Variant.Gra ftor.12856 Rogue:Win32/Fak eRean

 

—EICAR  =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-

 

action md5 insert date First seen Last seen nod32 avast kaspersky bitdefender microsoft f_prot_unpacker peid
14eb13beba07c82ba1851bce503cb034 2012-08-27 2011-09-06 11:15:30 2011-12-17 19:44:11 Eicar test file EICAR Test-NOT virus!!! EICAR-Test-File EICAR-Test-File (not a virus) Virus:DOS/EICAR _Test_File
16f8c3d67250837bc2e400ad19e0b72a 2012-08-27 2012-08-10 18:19:02 2012-08-15 16:50:23 BV:BVCK-gen3 P2P-Worm.BAT.Co pybat.ag UPX, PKLITE
2c64f48e5135fbaa944172202d236c7d 2012-08-27 2006-06-01 07:00:05 2012-08-20 00:47:44 EICAR Test-NOT virus!!! EICAR-Test-File EICAR-Test-File (not a virus) Virus:DOS/EICAR _Test_File
317c6356b04926b4cf107df145289435 2012-08-27 2010-12-14 12:22:14 2012-08-12 02:15:31 AntiAVP-Avbad [Trj] Trojan.DOS.Avba d Trojan.Avbad.A Trojan:DOS/Avba d LZEXE, PKLITE
5c770e1490835247d0a541474ee51c50 2012-08-27 2012-07-26 12:10:50 2012-07-27 20:06:32 EICAR Test-NOT virus!!! EICAR-Test-File
5e67103aa3baadde488fc8a66915610e 2012-08-27 2012-02-07 23:35:55 2012-04-07 06:45:15 EICAR-Test-File Virus:DOS/EICAR _Test_File
613a4ae52be7190a18c340f0ffa78fbd 2012-08-27 2012-07-21 14:15:28 2012-07-24 20:16:28 EICAR Test-NOT virus!!! EICAR-Test-File
67cafd0c5fb22dc93815700230d368c3 2012-08-27 2012-07-26 12:19:57 2012-07-27 20:06:19 EICAR Test-NOT virus!!! EICAR-Test-File
72015abc47f25b8f624a0b1b2eb3ebe0 2012-08-27 2012-01-30 00:23:27 2012-04-18 14:37:09 EICAR Test-NOT virus!!! HEUR:Trojan.Win 32.Generic Trojan.Generic. 7358064 Virus:DOS/EICAR _Test_File
79449529d738e9a3ef5893efaf048da5 2012-08-27 2012-07-26 12:27:02 2012-07-27 20:05:41 EICAR Test-NOT virus!!! EICAR-Test-File
82a83e6e1799f3886123614014ef07f4 2012-08-27 2012-07-21 15:02:40 2012-07-24 19:45:51 EICAR Test-NOT virus!!! EICAR-Test-File
934162a08d4a38711083345ef0b57d14 2012-08-27 2008-03-22 05:39:27 2012-05-16 01:40:33 EICAR-Test-File Virus:DOS/EICAR _Test_File
9590348417ce24e4c1d0e1d8af4c4939 2012-08-27 2012-08-04 04:10:00 2012-08-09 00:43:00 EICAR Test-NOT virus!!! EICAR-Test-File Virus:BAT/Mouse Disable.D
96cb4955ea6bab5f3c8524528401413c 2012-08-27 2009-11-30 16:14:16 2011-09-07 03:48:37 probably a variant of Win32/Agent.XRUNPA Win32:Malware-g en Trojan.Win32.Ge nome.qcad Trojan.Generic. 3199186 Trojan:Win32/Me redrop
a27ee916c22a51179c9e2f1ae67aa7eb 2012-08-27 2012-07-21 16:02:15 2012-07-24 19:45:21 EICAR Test-NOT virus!!! EICAR-Test-File
a911a87a26153abe77c3b25c28615218 2012-08-27 2010-09-02 12:41:52 2010-09-02 23:44:58 Win32:Malware-g en Trojan.Win32.Co smu.dry Dropped:EICAR-T est-File (not a virus)
ac2ff734c993884834c5bb820d21f3f1 2012-08-27 2011-11-19 09:10:49 2012-07-30 18:46:08 EICAR Test-NOT virus!!! EICAR-Test-File
b07e6f95ddf91415897164d7b3eb4736 2012-08-27 2011-10-05 23:16:00 2011-10-05 23:16:00 Trojan.Script.7 133
c29bc4713727d469886ea655115dd177 2012-08-27 2012-08-04 04:28:58 2012-08-08 21:33:18 BV:Malware-gen IRC-Worm.BAT.Ge neric Trojan.Batzz99. A Virus:BAT/Adiou s.A embedded
c9357c00c4da9e9fd8add93e917c57c6 2012-08-27 2012-07-21 17:35:39 2012-07-26 20:06:19 EICAR Test-NOT virus!!!

 

 

—mistfall  =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-

action md5 insert date First seen Last seen nod32 avast kaspersky bitdefender microsoft f_prot_unpacker peid
31484725213be800bc1d69cb0ece77aa 2012-08-27 2012-08-10 18:00:33 2012-08-13 13:48:27 Win32:Mistfall [Tool] VirTool.Win32.M istfall VirTool:Win32/M istfall
50e4913a0d73f61279101d08a6e983a5 1970-01-01 2006-06-11 16:14:34 2012-04-15 22:14:43 Win32/VirTool.Mistfall Win32:Mistfall [Tool] VirTool.Win32.M istfall VirTool:Win32/M istfall

 

 

 

 

 

—rBot =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-

action md5 insert date First seen Last seen nod32 avast kaspersky bitdefender microsoft f_prot_unpacker peid
2af4783aba321f53082085e8937b2567 2012-08-28 2012-07-11 23:52:26 2012-08-26 04:26:41 Win32:Virtob Backdoor.Win32. Rbot.adqd Trojan.Generic. 5333379 Virus:Win32/Vir ut.AC
865915650a85e7c27cdd11850a13f86e 2012-08-28 2006-09-03 07:01:30 2012-06-17 17:26:56 Win32/Rbot Win32:Rbot-GKN [Trj] Net-Worm.Win32. Kolab.aefe IRC-Worm.Generi c.22084 Backdoor:Win32/ Rbot
00157f6de1c95255bb781e45088d9a21 2012-08-27 2012-06-24 18:13:49 2012-06-24 18:13:49 Win32/Rbot.YM Trojan.Win32.Ge nome.dnsq IRC-Worm.Generi c.15028 Backdoor:Win32/ Rbot
0024542e9282e2fe0c0ca9b0c0b6f43a 2012-08-27 2012-02-18 10:11:27 2012-04-16 16:12:13 Win32/Virut.NBP Win32:Rbot-GQG [Trj] Backdoor.Win32. LolBot.xzd Worm.Generic.29 8540 Trojan:Win32/Fa kefolder.B
002984263e0d36042f0a4e613f9b9b46 2012-08-27 2009-02-24 07:24:34 2009-02-24 07:24:34 probably a variant of Win32/Rbot Win32:Trojan-ge n {Other} Backdoor.Win32. Rbot.fat Backdoor.Bot.17 676 ASProtect v1.23 RC1
002d88dc3184ac1cc52018a4a34d02c4 2012-08-27 2011-09-15 04:06:24 2011-09-15 04:06:24 a variant of Win32/Injector.IIQ Win32:Sality Worm.Win32.Ngrb ot.cnh Trojan.Generic. KDV.304762 Worm:Win32/Dork bot.gen!A Armadillo v1.71
00423373be53630ab1ceea85fa574939 2012-08-27 2011-04-02 04:52:43 2012-08-17 14:22:42 Trojan.Generic. 6907346 Backdoor:Win32/ Rbot.gen!G
00492917b6eb3d9c6d62f86f9acc6bce 2012-08-27 2012-06-25 00:19:05 2012-06-25 00:19:05 Backdoor.Win32. Rbot.umw Backdoor.Bot.60 974 Dev-C++ 4.9.9.2 -> Bloodshed Software
0052a28dc60cac68b54ddf8f02d5aa5d 2012-08-27 2010-07-18 23:41:47 2010-07-18 23:41:47 a variant of Win32/Packed.Themida Gen:Trojan.Heur .RqX@5Gy!Zup Backdoor:Win32/ Bifrose.gen!C
0066ad4c5a1206fb6563a285f2ce14a0 2012-08-27 2012-06-22 19:57:07 2012-06-22 19:57:07 a variant of Win32/Packed.Themida Backdoor.Win32. Rbot.akio Trojan.Generic. 7352279 Themida
006e7190f10953306ba5846d272af457 2012-08-27 2011-03-13 17:31:06 2012-02-11 09:09:57 probably a variant of Win32/Agent.COLWWTQ Win32:Spyware-g en [Spy] Backdoor.Win32. Rbot.alyk Gen:Trojan.Heur .GM.0140430082 Backdoor:Win32/ Ursap!rts
006f203bee46359995b68b8f0f95dea1 2012-08-27 2011-12-03 11:22:06 2012-02-11 09:20:43 Win32/TrojanDropper.Delf.NJH Win32:Bifrose-D YN [Trj] Backdoor.Win32. Rbot.hyj Trojan.Keylogge r.ADY TrojanDropper:W in32/Agent.BAD
008e7e1d54316b2f2e6aebd0861a37fe 2012-08-27 2012-06-24 02:14:52 2012-06-24 02:14:52 a variant of Win32/Rbot Win32:EggDrop-A C [Trj] Backdoor.Win32. Rbot.boz Backdoor.Rbot.E UT Backdoor:Win32/ Rbot.gen!F
00a649781cf7d8153bd9af03d0ce5cd9 2012-08-27 2012-06-25 01:54:32 2012-06-25 01:54:32 a variant of Win32/Injector.OI Win32:Rbot-GLC [Trj] Trojan.Win32.Bu zus.bnsz Trojan.Generic. 1809892 VirTool:Win32/I njector.gen!B Armadillo v1.71
00ad7e4470086e1345b017876fd41619 2012-08-27 2011-09-11 16:46:41 2011-11-14 20:47:48 a variant of Win32/Packed.MoleboxUltra Win32:Malware-g en Backdoor.Win32. Rbot.hyj Trojan.Generic. 4200368 TrojanDropper:W in32/Agent.BAD
00d753fcbad0dc47101d3818d491a7e7 2012-08-27 2012-06-21 13:36:05 2012-06-21 13:36:05 Win32/TrojanDownloader.Agent.OST Win32:Trojan-ge n not-a-virus:AdW are.Win32.ZenoS earch.ky Trojan.Generic. 1385769 Trojan:Win32/Vu ndo
00e9816f69922b9c43f89dc0a92a99d1 2012-08-27 2008-12-27 13:34:07 2010-01-22 01:10:12 Backdoor.Bot.89 803 Xtreme-Protecto r v1.05
00eee20b71e92f57ded4b497e5dbdaf1 2012-08-27 2008-05-05 22:13:17 2008-05-05 22:13:17 Win32:Small-BHA Backdoor.Prorat .C Armadillo v1.71
00fc84692d5b22e4ecb3d8022ea86698 2012-08-27 2012-06-27 09:22:01 2012-06-27 09:22:01 a variant of Win32/Spy.Delf.NLM Win32:Agent-ACQ U [Trj] Backdoor.Win32. Rbot.agyp Gen:Trojan.Heur .PT.ei4abKk10V Trojan:Win32/De lf.EZ Malware_Prot.AJ themida 1.0.0.5 -> http://www.orea ns.com
00fc850b10d54e404cc1ff521ad10ea6 2012-08-27 2008-04-28 16:59:58 2008-05-06 12:24:21 Xtreme-Protecto r v1.05
Checked on VT at 2012-09-10 12:39:43
Scanned at 2012-08-26 04:26:41
Fi

 

—proRAT  =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-

action md5 insert date First seen Last seen nod32 avast kaspersky bitdefender microsoft f_prot_unpacker peid
0023b2d76c606328688afa5ade9c0acf 2012-08-27 2009-10-25 02:21:28 2009-10-25 02:21:28 a variant of Win32/Packed.Themida Win32:Bifrose-D RI Gen:Trojan.Heur .dvXarDpNMyoi Backdoor:Win32/ Prorat.AH
0043b0517c628ef897f477e4345fd7a3 2012-08-27 2010-07-02 02:34:55 2012-02-11 12:45:38 a variant of Win32/Packed.Themida Win32:Malware-g en Backdoor.Win32. Prorat.uft Backdoor:Win32/ Ursap!rts
0054c6b833c013f32bced841e1e6739d 2012-08-27 2009-10-19 17:19:55 2009-10-19 17:19:55 probably unknown NewHeur_PE Win32:Trojan-ge n MemScan:Backdoo r.Agent.ZNH Backdoor:Win32/ Prorat.AM
0073d646cf945a4b5b3ba513b87a3c60 2012-08-27 2012-06-20 00:16:55 2012-06-20 00:16:55 a variant of Win32/Prorat.19.NAC Win32:Malware-g en Backdoor.Win32. Prorat.efu MemScan:Backdoo r.Delf.HBZ Backdoor:Win32/ Prorat.AM Obsidium V1.3.0.4 -> Obsidium Software
008e37fd9125255f6a25e19fc7640bea 2012-08-27 2012-06-05 10:42:20 2012-06-05 10:42:20 Win32:Spyware-g en [Spy] Backdoor.Win32. Prorat.het Trojan.Generic. 4484805
0090c0275880256778d156f7b08e8f03 2012-08-27 2011-03-15 10:52:42 2011-04-13 18:37:22 Backdoor.Win32. Prorat.rft Gen:Trojan.Heur .dr3a4ScZqsdi
00a490a8595793e54caa7e9a38768891 2012-08-27 2008-10-01 16:13:23 2008-10-01 16:13:23 probably unknown NewHeur_PE Win32:Agent-ONW MemScan:Backdoo r.Agent.ZNH ASProtect v1.23 RC1
00eee20b71e92f57ded4b497e5dbdaf1 2012-08-27 2008-05-05 22:13:17 2008-05-05 22:13:17 Win32:Small-BHA Backdoor.Prorat .C Armadillo v1.71
00fc839a3e3d2986cceca58ae900ce13 2012-08-27 2010-08-18 21:00:24 2010-08-24 10:54:38 Win32/Packed.Themida.A Win32:Malware-g en Backdoor.Win32. Prorat.19.dht Trojan.Packed.L ibix.Gen.2 VirTool:Win32/O bfuscator.XX
0100ca070eda3acfbdfbf2424612cc5f 2012-08-27 2010-12-14 03:58:20 2012-06-07 07:22:17 a variant of Win32/Injector.BLB Win32:VB-PJN [Drp] Backdoor.Win32. Prorat.hhw Backdoor.Generi c.319260 Trojan:Win32/VB Inject.E
0121a89cb657a11e5dd092883bfd7825 2012-08-27 2010-07-17 07:37:48 2010-07-17 07:37:48 a variant of Win32/TrojanDropper.Delf.NFK Win32:Prorat-JE Gen:Trojan.Heur .GM.0408470024
017d509b8598921ed40744e0ca829db6 2012-08-27 2009-06-22 12:28:25 2009-06-22 12:28:25 Win32:Trojan-ge n {Other} Gen:Trojan.Heur .VB.1025DA9A9A Trojan:Win32/Ma lat
01e7cbd34f8bd3cf5fa608baf2fa6d60 2012-08-27 2011-11-15 13:23:32 2012-02-12 07:10:28 Win32/Prorat.NAH Win32:Prorat-FE [Trj] Backdoor.Win32. Prorat.dz Backdoor.Generi c.21020 Backdoor:Win32/ Prorat.K
01e93b84d7df6bac7cde630ffffd043f 2012-08-27 2010-05-20 13:53:52 2012-06-09 12:47:16 a variant of Win32/RemoteAnything.AA Win32:Trojan-ge n Backdoor.Win32. Prorat.hoj Packer.Malware. NSAnti.1 Backdoor:Win32/ VB.OF
01ea64f575a9f95563ffeef45fb09ca2 2012-08-27 2012-06-27 09:46:59 2012-06-27 09:46:59 Win32/Prorat.19 Win32:Prorat-BH [Trj] Backdoor.Win32. Prorat.kcm Backdoor.Prorat .19.I Backdoor:Win32/ Prorat.Z ASPack v2.12
02119a21b4b339dd367769c2aebd622c 2012-08-27 2008-11-04 18:23:06 2009-12-05 01:59:16 probably a variant of Win32/Agent Win32:Trojan-ge n Backdoor.Win32. ProRat.cqf Trojan.Generic. 1859606
022cb4ec9e03596701cdc5252c09d0e9 2012-08-27 2012-06-25 18:49:03 2012-06-25 18:49:03 a variant of Win32/Injector.EJM Win32:Trojan-ge n Backdoor.Win32. Prorat.efy Gen:Trojan.Heur .Dropper.bm0@aa gNUVni VirTool:Win32/V BInject.AZ
0247d8561b2a3b8338aa2eff5632f212 2012-08-27 2009-10-13 11:06:04 2009-11-08 22:05:55 Win32:Prorat-IR Backdoor.Win32. ProRat.fns MemScan:Backdoo r.Agent.ZNH Backdoor:Win32/ Prorat
0248b3729a47c970cbd5c43e7298d3dc 2012-08-27 2012-06-21 15:25:52 2012-06-21 15:25:52 a variant of Win32/GameHack.AL Win32:Trojan-ge n Backdoor.Win32. Prorat.fwr Backdoor.Turkoj an.AF Backdoor:Win32/ Turkojan.AI
024c8882871ba3921c2f243ad96e3956 2012-08-27 2012-06-19 17:50:01 2012-06-19 17:50:01 probably a variant of Win32/Agent.LTWPXFW Win32:Trojan-ge n Backdoor.Win32. Prorat.evo MemScan:Backdoo r.ProRat.TG Backdoor:Win32/ Prorat.U

—lostDoor – proRAT kinda  =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-

 

action md5 insert date First seen Last seen nod32 avast kaspersky bitdefender microsoft f_prot_unpacker peid
cb5c84f6f7e682d9cba2ecba677336c4 1970-01-01 2010-12-04 10:25:27 2012-04-04 22:06:55 a variant of Win32/Spy.KeyLogger.NHM Win32:Agent-ABM I [Trj] Trojan-Spy.Win3 2.VBChuchelo.ah Trojan.Generic. 161562 TrojanSpy:Win32 /Choochie.K

 

 

—Ultimate_Spy-Net  =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-

action md5 insert date First seen Last seen nod32 avast kaspersky bitdefender microsoft f_prot_unpacker peid
0058368c1856f88556e881d203441805 2012-08-27 2012-06-24 11:10:36 2012-06-24 11:10:36 a variant of Win32/TrojanDownloader.FakeAlert.NQ Win32:Lighty-B [Cryp] Trojan.Win32.Vi lsel.mfb Packer.Malware. Lighty.I TrojanDownloade r:Win32/Renos
00adc990cbf1e4733fdf3afbdf54938a 2012-08-27 2012-06-23 11:17:18 2012-06-23 11:17:18 a variant of Win32/TrojanDownloader.FakeAlert.NQ Win32:Lighty-B [Cryp] Backdoor.Win32. UltimateDefende r.hiw Packer.Malware. Lighty.I Trojan:Win32/Wa ntvi.I
00c547fb1918bcef0a864161b33f0ead 2012-08-27 2010-12-30 22:38:00 2012-02-11 06:34:55 a variant of Win32/Adware.Antivirus2008 Win32:FakeAV-M [Trj] Trojan-FakeAV.W in32.UltimateAn tivirus.g Trojan.Generic. 365345 Rogue:Win32/Fak eSecSen ASPack v2.12
00cbcdff13e5c710341393a19d260da6 2012-08-27 2008-07-28 12:42:05 2009-10-16 10:45:20 probably a variant of Win32/Adware.Antivirus2008 Win32:Trojan-ge n not-a-virus:Fra udTool.Win32.Ul timateAntivirus .ag Trojan.Generic. 669380 Trojan:Win32/Fa keSecSen ASProtect v1.23 RC1
0279f3e2593cb0130e2616de1e4ebb76 2012-08-27 2008-06-18 11:50:19 2012-02-12 23:45:25 Win32/Adware.WinAntiVirus Win32:FakeAV-M [Trj] Trojan-FakeAV.W in32.UltimateAn tivirus.cl Adware.Rogue.Ad vancedAntivirus .A Rogue:Win32/Fak eSecSen Armadillo v1.xx – v2.xx
029eea83722c549f099d423418b8a54a 2012-08-27 2008-10-17 23:58:48 2011-02-26 10:22:25 a variant of Win32/TrojanDownloader.FakeAlert.NQ Win32:Lighty-B Trojan-Dropper. Win32.Wlord.ahu Packer.Malware. Lighty.I TrojanDropper:W in32/Rooter.B
0305fbcff971eabd81d5ddadd29e6ec1 2012-08-27 2008-08-22 16:42:43 2011-07-18 05:11:41 probably a variant of Win32/Adware.Antivirus2008 Win32:Neptunia- AGB [Trj] not-a-virus:Fra udTool.Win32.Ul timateAntivirus .bi Trojan.Fakeav.B C Rogue:Win32/Fak eSecSen ASPack v2.12
0358ecdc802150626cec39052e43132b 2012-08-27 2008-11-03 08:08:58 2011-08-26 21:27:41 Win32/TrojanDownloader.FakeAlert.PL.Gen Win32:Lighty-D [Cryp] Backdoor.Win32. UltimateDefende r.gsv Trojan.FakeAler t.ANE TrojanDownloade r:Win32/Renos.F J
0452ca3a273127a940c491a87806b047 2012-08-27 2008-08-28 06:23:10 2008-10-22 05:12:57 not-a-virus:Fra udTool.Win32.Ul timateAntivirus .bu Program:Win32/A ntivirus2008 ASPack v2.12
057abdd8f6d1f61eef9434b5e7daa4c6 2012-08-27 2011-07-27 19:30:35 2011-10-20 22:26:38 Win32/Adware.UltimateDefender Win32:FraudTool -GY [Tool] Backdoor.Win32. UltimateDefende r.pq Trojan.Generic. 6410781 Trojan:Win32/An omaly.gen!A UPX UPX 2.90 [LZMA] -> Markus Oberhumer, Laszlo Molnar & John Reiser
06fbf01caa783f46421a0bbedf97719e 2012-08-27 2012-06-19 23:11:45 2012-06-19 23:11:45 probably a variant of Win32/Kryptik.FD Win32:Lighty-E [Cryp] Backdoor.Win32. UltimateDefende r.hwp Trojan.FakeAler t.ANE Trojan:Win32/Wa ntvi.I
08226ab7f48461cb78d33b985ec2fa4f 2012-08-27 2008-08-25 12:55:04 2009-05-01 22:36:49 Win32/Adware.Antivirus2008 Win32:Neptunia- AGB not-a-virus:Fra udTool.Win32.Ul timateAntivirus .bq Trojan.Fakealer t.ALL Trojan:Win32/Fa keSecSen ASPack v2.12
085381cd16ef4f9c6cf03ce79f77b35f 2012-08-27 2009-04-16 21:00:47 2009-04-16 21:00:47 probably a variant of Win32/Adware.Antivirus2008 Win32:Neptunia- AGB not-a-virus:Fra udTool.Win32.Ul timateAntivirus .by Trojan.Fakeav.B C Trojan:Win32/Fa keSecSen ASPack v2.12
09cb0a224418027c40f9552c56180750 2012-08-27 2008-12-02 10:46:37 2009-09-12 07:57:49 a variant of Win32/Kryptik.CH Win32:Lighty-H Backdoor.Win32. UltimateDefende r.hki Trojan.Generic. 1730997 TrojanDownloade r:Win32/Renos.F J
0b55b43d8ec5898f408707ac069300b6 2012-08-27 2008-07-10 12:31:24 2011-08-15 04:38:12 Win32/Adware.Antivirus2008 Win32:FakeAlert -S [Trj] Trojan-FakeAV.W in32.UltimateAn tivirus.dp Trojan.FakeAv.B U Rogue:Win32/Fak eSecSen ASProtect v1.23 RC1
0c243bffc29aab2ea6e4abb65319f33c 2012-08-27 2008-09-19 14:03:15 2012-02-09 08:34:42 Win32/Adware.Antivirus2008 Win32:Neptunia- AGB [Trj] Trojan-FakeAV.W in32.UltimateAn tivirus.cp Trojan.Fakeav.B C Rogue:Win32/Fak eSecSen ASPack v2.12
0e4eaff4a610c160e9cfbe4b01463295 2012-08-27 2009-07-21 00:34:56 2009-11-15 11:49:01 probably a variant of Win32/UltimateDefender.A Win32:Agent-QNI Backdoor.Win32. UltimateDefende r.ieq Generic.Malware .P!.6473D4B8 VirTool:WinNT/X antvi.gen!A
0f27d07f89550dcae7050f3c100137f3 2012-08-27 2008-03-29 22:49:29 2008-10-29 15:07:04 not-a-virus:Fra udTool.Win32.Ul timateDefender. cm Trojan.Crypt.AN Trojan:Win32/Ti bs.gen!H
0f388783e9960156399c343ea7a70e24 2012-08-27 2008-11-03 20:53:28 2009-05-26 21:41:40 Win32/TrojanDownloader.FakeAlert.PL.Gen Win32:Lighty-D Backdoor.Win32. UltimateDefende r.gky Trojan.FakeAler t.ANE TrojanClicker:W in32/Klik
102009d4b848bd264753f877dae939a4 2012-08-27 2008-08-27 07:34:09 2012-01-24 08:11:37 probably a variant of Win32/Adware.Antivirus2008 Win32:Neptunia- AGB [Trj] Trojan-FakeAV.W in32.UltimateAn tivirus.bw Trojan.Fakeav.B C Rogue:Win32/Fak eSecSen ASPack v2.12

 

 

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09/19/12

Tor Network Directory Project

Lately we all heard of Silk Road the underground cyber marketplace were you can buy illegal drugs and guns and people say all the bad guy’s are using the dark web for crime stuff – yeah DuDe:—:. It’s is just the Tor onion network, if you want to visit the onion network just go to torproject.org and download their bundle software and go surfing in the onion network. Since there is no bing, google or yahoo in the onion network, if you want a directory of what’s out in onion land just go to the hidden wiki. “Cleaned Hidden Wiki”- http://3suaolltfj2xjksb.onion/hiddenwiki/index.php/Main_Page.

The wiki is built by one of the founders of the onion netowk the administrator of MyHiddenBlog in – (- “http://utup22qsb6ebeejs.onion/” — ) and volunteers built The “Cleaned Hidden Wiki” .It is one of the few places were you can find some of the hidden services (websites) in Tor, in other words the only websites in Tor that want to be found. You see in the Tor onion network your site is your secret, your site is hidden because there is no google or yahoo to send web crawler out into the onion network. The USCyberlabs Tor Network Directory Project will be the first time that we go out actively and collect all the websites (hidden services) that are hiding in the Tor onion network.

When I started to write about Tor and our new (“The Deep Dark Web”) -book, I was contacted by the FBI about what I was writing about Tor and the hidden services and attack vectors in Tor. They wanted to be gAtO’s bff. I must admit I was intimidated and walked a very careful line with my blog postings and my tweets. Why because the FBI want to fuck with lawful security researchers that come to close to the truth about Tor.

They do not want this mapping of the Tor onion network. Why? The mapping of the Tor onion network will show all sites even the ones that want to stay hidden. Like government sites? Like Spy sites? I mentioned Bots with Tor c&c yeah government stuff. You of course have your corporate presence in the hidden services of Tor what will these Tor website show. Maybe it’s not just the bad guy using Tor, maybe.

There are currently only 9 directory servers in the Tor infrastructure that know all the sites on Tor and getting this list is kind of hard. Tor is design not to give out directory information to just anyone. We also want more than a URL of a live site, we will gather all meta-data so we can understand what these sites are all about. Google’s web crawlers do it every second of the day so we will send out crawlers into the Tor onion network to generate our directory of Tor.

The ToR Directory Scan Project (TDS) 

The uscyberlabs TDS Project- is to scan every address possibility and to generate a directory of every single live hidden service in the ToR-.onion network.

Figuring out the rendezvous for a hidden service is complicated, we attack the problem from the side —>> so the onion URL is 16 digits 2-7 a-z  plus the .onion after the url address. It’s easy to have a simple web crawler program count and a,b,c and generate a sequential-alphabetized URL list. Now due to the ToR network things work slow – old style modem speed that you young kids are not used to. Now we feed a URL wait up to 25-35 seconds then list a positive or no-go. Once we have a live hit list of possible live hidden services then we visit manually. And build a working verified w/login and password list of every hidden service on ToR.

with 100 VM we can scan Tor in weeks with 1000 machines we can scan the Tor network within days.

I tested the unix “curl command” in Tor with sock5 and it’s very good at extracting information from a website. So a simple script in will feed all the machines and they will start the scan. Once finish we take all the results and we will have a directory of every single hidden service in Tor land.

gAtO needs your help!

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09/17/12

Tor setup- torrc file configuration

gAtO bEen- working on Tor stuff and wanted to find the right torrc commands and configuration for Tor. So I started to look around and found these files. I guess if we look at these we could come up with maybe all the configurations keywords for Tor. gAtO is working on Tor and maybe some bot’s woking in Tor-land. The word is out and many are working on Tor botnets the good thing is most all are beginners, but the interest of people not wanting to rent a bot but build a bot is getting stronger. People wanting to learn code. Script kiddies with code this is not going to be pretty folks – hope you enjoy the torrc stuff- gAtO oUt

File 1

## Configuration file for a typical Tor user

## Last updated 17 September 2012 @gAtOmAlO2 .

## (May or may not work for much older or much newer versions of Tor.)

##

## Lines that begin with “## ” try to explain what’s going on. Lines

## that begin with just “#” are disabled commands: you can enable them

## by removing the “#” symbol.

##

## See the man page, or https://svn.torproject.org/svn/tor/tags/tor-0_0_9_5/src/config/torrc.sample.in ,

## for more options you can use in this file.

##

## Tor will look for this file in various places based on your platform:

## http://wiki.noreply.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#torrc

## Replace this with “SocksPort 0″ if you plan to run Tor only as a

## server, and not make any local application connections yourself.

SocksPort 9050 # what port to open for local application connections

SocksListenAddress 127.0.0.1 # accept connections only from localhost

#SocksListenAddress 192.168.0.1:9100 # listen on this IP:port also

 

## Entry policies to allow/deny SOCKS requests based on IP address.

## First entry that matches wins. If no SocksPolicy is set, we accept

## all (and only) requests from SocksListenAddress.

#SocksPolicy accept 192.168.0.0/16

#SocksPolicy reject *

 

## Logs go to stdout at level “notice” unless redirected by something

## else, like one of the below lines. You can have as many Log lines as

## you want.

##

## We advise using “notice” in most cases, since anything more verbose

## may provide sensitive information to an attacker who obtains the logs.

##

## Send all messages of level ‘notice’ or higher to /var/log/tor/notices.log

#Log notice file /var/log/tor/notices.log

## Send every possible message to /var/log/tor/debug.log

#Log debug file /var/log/tor/debug.log

## Use the system log instead of Tor’s logfiles

#Log notice syslog

## To send all messages to stderr:

#Log debug stderr

 

## Uncomment this to start the process in the background… or use

## –runasdaemon 1 on the command line. This is ignored on Windows;

## see the FAQ entry if you want Tor to run as an NT service.

#RunAsDaemon 1

 

## Tor only trusts directories signed with one of these keys, and

## uses the given addresses to connect to the trusted directory

## servers. If no DirServer lines are specified, Tor uses the built-in

## defaults (moria1, moria2, tor26), so you can leave this alone unless

## you need to change it.

#DirServer 18.244.0.188:9031 FFCB 46DB 1339 DA84 674C 70D7 CB58 6434 C437 0441

#DirServer 18.244.0.114:80 719B E45D E224 B607 C537 07D0 E214 3E2D 423E 74CF

#DirServer 62.116.124.106:9030 847B 1F85 0344 D787 6491 A548 92F9 0493 4E4E B85D

 

## The directory for keeping all the keys/etc. By default, we store

## things in $HOME/.tor on Unix, and in Application Data\tor on Windows.

#DataDirectory @LOCALSTATEDIR@/lib/tor

 

## The directory for keeping all the keys/etc. By default, we store

## things in $HOME/.tor on Unix, and in Application Data\tor on Windows.

#DataDirectory /var/lib/tor

 

## The port on which Tor will listen for local connections from Tor

## controller applications, as documented in control-spec.txt.

#ControlPort 9051

 

############### bypass open DNS ###############

##

## ACRYLIC DNS PROXY ==
## http://sourceforge.net/projects/acrylic/
##
## Step 1 INSTALL TOR
## Step 2 INSTALL ACRYLIC DNS PROXY

##

Acrylic is a local DNS proxy which improves the performance of your computer by caching the responses coming from your DNS servers. When you browse a Web page a portion of the loading time is dedicated to name resolution (usually from a few milliseconds to 1 second or even more) while the rest is dedicated to the transfer of the page contents to your browser. What Acrylic does is to reduce the time dedicated to name resolution for frequently visited addresses as close to zero as possible. With Acrylic you can also gracefully overcome short downtimes of your DNS servers without disrupting your work, because in this case you will at least be able to connect to your favourite sites and to your email server. In addition Acrylic can help you to effectively block unwanted ads prior to their download through the use of a custom HOSTS files, optimizing your navigation experience even further.

## Copy the following and paste it in TOR BROWSER\Data\TOR\torrc

## DNSPort 9053
## AutomapHostsOnResolve 1
## AutomapHostsSuffixes .exit,.onion

##

##

##

############### bypass open DNS ###############

############### This section is just for location-hidden services ###

## Look in …/hidden_service/hostname for the address to tell people.

## HiddenServicePort x y:z says to redirect a port x request from the

## client to y:z.

 

#HiddenServiceDir @LOCALSTATEDIR@/lib/tor/hidden_service/

#HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:80

 

#HiddenServiceDir @LOCALSTATEDIR@/lib/tor/other_hidden_service/

#HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:80

#HiddenServicePort 22 127.0.0.1:22

#HiddenServiceNodes moria1,moria2

#HiddenServiceExcludeNodes bad,otherbad

## Once you have configured a hidden service, you can look at the

## contents of the file “…/hidden_service/hostname” for the address

## to tell people.

##

## HiddenServicePort x y:z says to redirect requests on port x to the

## address y:z.

 

#HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/hidden_service/

#HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:80

 

#HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/other_hidden_service/

#HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:80

#HiddenServicePort 22 127.0.0.1:22

 

################ This section is just for relays ###################

## See https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-doc-relay for details.

 

## A unique handle for your server.

 

#Nickname ididnteditheconfig

 

## The IP or FQDN for your server. Leave commented out and Tor will guess.

 

#Address noname.example.com

 

## Define these to limit the bandwidth usage of relayed (server)

## traffic. Your own traffic is still unthrottled.

## Note that RelayBandwidthRate must be at least 20 KB.

 

#RelayBandwidthRate 100 KBytes  # Throttle traffic to 100KB/s (800Kbps)

#RelayBandwidthBurst 200 KBytes # But allow bursts up to 200KB/s (1600Kbps)

 

## Contact info to be published in the directory, so we can contact you

## if your server is misconfigured or something else goes wrong.

#ContactInfo Random Person <nobody AT example dot com>

## You might also include your PGP or GPG fingerprint if you have one:

 

#ContactInfo 1234D/FFFFFFFF Random Person <nobody AT example dot com>

 

## Required: what port to advertise for Tor connections.

#ORPort 9001

## If you need to listen on a port other than the one advertised

## in ORPort (e.g. to advertise 443 but bind to 9090), uncomment the

## line below too. You’ll need to do ipchains or other port forwarding

## yourself to make this work.

 

#ORListenAddress 0.0.0.0:9090

 

## Uncomment this to mirror directory information for others. Please do

## if you have enough bandwidth.

#DirPort 9030 # what port to advertise for directory connections

## If you need to listen on a port other than the one advertised

## in DirPort (e.g. to advertise 80 but bind to 9091), uncomment the line

## below too. You’ll need to do ipchains or other port forwarding yourself

## to make this work.

 

#DirListenAddress 0.0.0.0:9091

 

## Uncomment this if you run more than one Tor server, and add the

## nickname of each Tor server you control, even if they’re on different

## networks. You declare it here so Tor clients can avoid using more than

## one of your servers in a single circuit. See

## http://wiki.noreply.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#MultipleServers

 

#MyFamily nickname1,nickname2,…

 

## A comma-separated list of exit policies. They’re considered first

## to last, and the first match wins. If you want to _replace_

## the default exit policy, end this with either a reject *:* or an

## accept *:*. Otherwise, you’re _augmenting_ (prepending to) the

## default exit policy. Leave commented to just use the default, which is

## available in the man page or at https://www.torproject.org/documentation.html

##

## Look at https://www.torproject.org/faq-abuse.html#TypicalAbuses

## for issues you might encounter if you use the default exit policy.

##

## If certain IPs and ports are blocked externally, e.g. by your firewall,

## you should update your exit policy to reflect this — otherwise Tor

## users will be told that those destinations are down.

##

#ExitPolicy accept *:6660-6667,reject *:* # allow irc ports but no more

#ExitPolicy accept *:119 # accept nntp as well as default exit policy

#ExitPolicy reject *:* # no exits allowed

#

################ This section is just for bridge relays ##############

#

## Bridge relays (or “bridges” ) are Tor relays that aren’t listed in the

## main directory. Since there is no complete public list of them, even if an

## ISP is filtering connections to all the known Tor relays, they probably

## won’t be able to block all the bridges. Unlike running an exit relay,

## running a bridge relay just passes data to and from the Tor network –

## so it shouldn’t expose the operator to abuse complaints.

 

#ORPort 443

#BridgeRelay 1

#RelayBandwidthRate 50KBytes

#ExitPolicy reject *:*

 

File 2

################ This section is just for servers #####################

 

## NOTE: If you enable these, you should consider mailing your identity

## key fingerprint to the tor-ops, so we can add you to the list of

## servers that clients will trust. See the README for details.

 

## Required: A unique handle for this server

#Nickname ididnteditheconfig

 

## The IP or fqdn for this server. Leave blank and Tor will guess.

#Address noname.example.com

 

#ContactInfo 1234D/FFFFFFFF Random Person <nobody@example.com>

 

## Required: what port to advertise for tor connections

#ORPort 9001

## If you want to listen on a port other than the one advertised

## in ORPort, uncomment the line below. You’ll need to do ipchains

## or other port forwarding yourself to make this work.

#ORBindAddress 0.0.0.0:9090

 

## Uncomment this to mirror the directory for others (please do)

#DirPort 9030 # what port to advertise for directory connections

## If you want to listen on a port other than the one advertised

## in DirPort, uncomment the line below. You’ll need to do ipchains

## or other port forwarding yourself to make this work.

#DirBindAddress 0.0.0.0:9091

 

## A comma-separated list of exit policies. They’re considered first

## to last, and the first match wins. If you want to *replace*

## the default exit policy, end this with either a reject *:* or an

## accept *:*. Otherwise, you’re *augmenting* (prepending to) the

## default exit policy. Leave commented to just use the default.

#ExitPolicy accept *:6660-6667

#ExitPolicy reject 192.168.0.1:*

#ExitPolicy reject *:*

 

#BridgeRelay 1

#ExitPolicy reject *:*

 

File 3

Index: torrc.sample.in

===================================================================

RCS file: /home/or/cvsroot/src/config/torrc.sample.in,v

retrieving revision 1.31

retrieving revision 1.32

diff -u -d -r1.31 -r1.32

— torrc.sample.in 10 Nov 2004 00:14:02 -0000 1.31

+++ torrc.sample.in 12 Nov 2004 04:00:07 -0000 1.32

@@ -1,73 +1,76 @@

-# Configuration file for a typical tor user

+## Configuration file for a typical tor user

 

-# Replace this with “SocksPort 0″ if you don’t want clients to connect.

+## Replace this with “SocksPort 0″ if you don’t want clients to connect.

SocksPort 9050 # what port to advertise for application connections

SocksBindAddress 127.0.0.1 # accept connections only from localhost

#SocksBindAddress 192.168.0.1:9100 # listen on a chosen IP/port

 

-# Entry policies to allow/deny SOCKS requests based on IP address.

-# First entry that matches wins. If no SocksPolicy is set, we accept

-# all (and only) requests from SocksBindAddress.

-#

+## Entry policies to allow/deny SOCKS requests based on IP address.

+## First entry that matches wins. If no SocksPolicy is set, we accept

+## all (and only) requests from SocksBindAddress.

#SocksPolicy accept 192.168.0.1/16

#SocksPolicy reject *

 

-# Allow no-name routers (ones that the dirserver operators don’t

-# know anything about) in only these positions in your circuits.

-# Other choices (not advised) are entry,exit,introduction.

+## Allow no-name routers (ones that the dirserver operators don’t

+## know anything about) in only these positions in your circuits.

+## Other choices (not advised) are entry,exit,introduction.

AllowUnverifiedNodes middle,rendezvous

 

-# Logs go to stdout unless redirected by something else, like one of

-# the below lines, or –logfile on the command line.

-### Send all messages of level ‘warn’ or higher to @LOCALSTATEDIR@/log/tor/warnings

-#Log warn file @LOCALSTATEDIR@/log/tor/warnings

-### Send all debug and info messages to @LOCALSTATEDIR@/log/tor/debug

-#Log debug-info file @LOCALSTATEDIR@/log/tor/debug

-### Send all debug messages ONLY to @LOCALSTATEDIR@/log/tor/debug

-#Log debug-debug file @LOCALSTATEDIR@/log/tor/debug

-### To use the system log instead of Tor’s logfiles, uncomment these lines:

+## Logs go to stdout unless redirected by something else, like one of

+## the below lines.

+## Send all messages of level ‘warn’ or higher to @LOCALSTATEDIR@/log/tor/warnings

+#Log warn file @LOCALSTATEDIR@/log/tor/warnings.log

+## Send all debug and info messages to @LOCALSTATEDIR@/log/tor/debug

+#Log debug-info file @LOCALSTATEDIR@/log/tor/debug.log

+## Send all debug messages ONLY to @LOCALSTATEDIR@/log/tor/debug

+#Log debug-debug file @LOCALSTATEDIR@/log/tor/debug.log

+## To use the system log instead of Tor’s logfiles, uncomment these lines:

#Log notice syslog

-### To send all messages to stderr:

+## To send all messages to stderr:

#Log debug-err stderr

 

-# Uncomment this to start the process in the background… or use

-# –runasdaemon 1 on the command line.

+## Uncomment this to start the process in the background… or use

+## –runasdaemon 1 on the command line.

#RunAsDaemon 1

 

-# Tor only trusts directories signed with one of these keys, and

-# uses the given addresses to connect to the trusted directory

-# servers. If no DirServer lines are specified, Tor uses the built-in

-# defaults (moria1, moria2, tor26), so you can leave this alone unless

-# you need to change it.

+## Tor only trusts directories signed with one of these keys, and

+## uses the given addresses to connect to the trusted directory

+## servers. If no DirServer lines are specified, Tor uses the built-in

+## defaults (moria1, moria2, tor26), so you can leave this alone unless

+## you need to change it.

#DirServer 18.244.0.188:9031 FFCB 46DB 1339 DA84 674C 70D7 CB58 6434 C437 0441

#DirServer 18.244.0.114:80 719B E45D E224 B607 C537 07D0 E214 3E2D 423E 74CF

#DirServer 62.116.124.106:9030 847B 1F85 0344 D787 6491 A548 92F9 0493 4E4E B85D

 

-# The directory for keeping all the keys/etc. By default, we store

-# things in $HOME/.tor on Unix, and in Application Data\tor on Windows.

+## The directory for keeping all the keys/etc. By default, we store

+## things in $HOME/.tor on Unix, and in Application Data\tor on Windows.

#DataDirectory @LOCALSTATEDIR@/lib/tor

 

##################### Below is just for servers #####################

 

-## NOTE: If you enable these, you should consider mailing your

-## identity key fingerprint to the tor-ops, so we can verify

-## your configuration. See the README for details.

+## NOTE: If you enable these, you should consider mailing your identity

+## key fingerprint to the tor-ops, so we can add you to the list of

+## servers that clients will trust. See the README for details.

+

+## A unique handle for this server

+#Nickname ididnteditheconfig

+

+## The IP or fqdn for this server. Leave blank and Tor will guess.

+#Address noname.example.com

 

-#Nickname ididnteditheconfig       # A unique handle for this server

-#Address noname.example.com        # The IP or fqdn for this server

#ContactInfo 1234D/FFFFFFFF Random Person <nobody@example.com>

 

#ORPort 9001 # what port to advertise for tor connections

-# If you want to listen on a port other than the one advertised

-# in ORPort, uncomment the line below. You’ll need to do ipchains

-# or other port forwarding yourself to make this work.

+## If you want to listen on a port other than the one advertised

+## in ORPort, uncomment the line below. You’ll need to do ipchains

+## or other port forwarding yourself to make this work.

#ORBindAddress 0.0.0.0:9090

-# Uncomment this to mirror the directory for others (please do)

+## Uncomment this to mirror the directory for others (please do)

#DirPort 9030 # what port to advertise for directory connections

-# If you want to listen on a port other than the one advertised

-# in DirPort, uncomment the line below. You’ll need to do ipchains

-# or other port forwarding yourself to make this work.

+## If you want to listen on a port other than the one advertised

+## in DirPort, uncomment the line below. You’ll need to do ipchains

+## or other port forwarding yourself to make this work.

#DirBindAddress 0.0.0.0:9091

## A comma-separated list of exit policies. They’re considered first

File 4

############### This section is just for location-hidden services ###
64
65 ## Look in …/hidden_service/hostname for the address to tell people.
66 ## HiddenServicePort x y:z says to redirect a port x request from the
67 ## client to y:z.
68
69 #HiddenServiceDir /data/Data/projekte/DilloTor/tor-0.1.1.23/binary/var/lib/tor/hidden_service/
70 #HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:80
71
72 #HiddenServiceDir /data/Data/projekte/DilloTor/tor-0.1.1.23/binary/var/lib/tor/other_hidden_service/
73 #HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:80
74 #HiddenServicePort 22 127.0.0.1:22
75 #HiddenServiceNodes moria1,moria2
76 #HiddenServiceExcludeNodes bad,otherbad
77

File 5

— src/config/torrc.sample.in.orig 2007-01-27 23:41:23.000000000 +0000
+++ src/config/torrc.sample.in 2007-01-27 23:43:47.000000000 +0000
@@ -18,6 +18,11 @@
 ## With the default Mac OS X installer, Tor will look in ~/.tor/torrc or
 ## /Library/Tor/torrc
+## Default username and group the server will run as
+User tor
+Group tor
+
+PIDFile /var/run/tor/tor.pid
 ## Replace this with “SocksPort 0″ if you plan to run Tor only as a
 ## server, and not make any local application connections yourself.
@@ -46,6 +51,7 @@
 #Log notice syslog
 ## To send all messages to stderr:
 #Log debug stderr
+Log notice file /var/log/tor/tor.log
 ## Uncomment this to start the process in the background… or use
 ## –runasdaemon 1 on the command line. This is ignored on Windows;
@@ -55,6 +61,7 @@
 ## The directory for keeping all the keys/etc. By default, we store
 ## things in $HOME/.tor on Unix, and in Application Data\tor on Windows.
 #DataDirectory @LOCALSTATEDIR@/lib/tor
+DataDirectory   /var/lib/tor/data
 ## The port on which Tor will listen for local connections from Tor
 ## controller applications, as documented in control-spec.txt.

 

— a/src/config/torrc.sample.in
2 +++ b/src/config/torrc.sample.in
3 @@ -44,11 +44,11 @@ SocksListenAddress 127.0.0.1 # accept co
4  ## Uncomment this to start the process in the background… or use
5  ## –runasdaemon 1 on the command line. This is ignored on Windows;
6  ## see the FAQ entry if you want Tor to run as an NT service.
7 -#RunAsDaemon 1
8 +RunAsDaemon 1
9
10  ## The directory for keeping all the keys/etc. By default, we store
11  ## things in $HOME/.tor on Unix, and in Application Data\tor on Windows.
12 -#DataDirectory @LOCALSTATEDIR@/lib/tor
13 +DataDirectory @LOCALSTATEDIR@/lib/tor
14
15  ## The port on which Tor will listen for local connections from Tor
16  ## controller applications, as documented in control-spec.txt.
17 @@ -168,3 +168,5 @@ SocksListenAddress 127.0.0.1 # accept co
18  #BridgeRelay 1
19  #ExitPolicy reject *:*
20
21 +User tor
22 +PidFile @LOCALSTATEDIR@/run/tor/tor.pid

File 6

Configuration tips

Using the same exit for persistant connections

Some websites will log you out if you re-visit (while loggined in using a cookie to identify you) from a different IP. Tor has a feature called long lived ports. You could add the following to torrc to make connections to given ports use the same circut for a long period of time:

LongLivedPorts 80,23,21,22,706,1863,5050,5190,5222,5223,6667,8300,8888

A good alternative to LongLivedPorts is to use MapAddress for given sites. It allows you to make sure every connection to a given site goes through the same connection. This is also a good option if you need given sites to be visited from a given country.

For example,

MapAddress www.nsa.gov www.nsa.gov.nadia.exit

will make all visits to www.nsa.gov always use the edit node nadia, which is located in the US. There are anonymity issues with this; if you’re the only one using it then www.nsa.gov can at least figure out that it’s the same guy who’s visiting when connections are coming from that exit node.

=== Make Tor act faster ====

It is also possible to make Tor connections seem faster by setting CircuitBuildTimeout. Setting this number lower than the default (60 seconds) makes Tor give up and try other paths if it takes longer than the limit to build a circut. A circut which takes 50 seconds to build will be slower than a circut that takes 15 seconds to build. For example, you could set:

CircuitBuildTimeout 10

However, it must be mentioned that you will be using a whole lot more different servers if you allow circuts who take 50 seconds to build than if you set the limit to 10 seconds. There isn’t much solid research on exactly how this impacts traffic analysis resistance, but you’re – generally speaking – better off using a lot of slow servers than a few fast ones.

File 7

https://svn.torproject.org/svn/tor/tags/tor-0_0_9_5/src/config/torrc.sample.in

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08/31/12

p2p Bot-net architecture in Tor -unstoppable

gAtO been doing some research in botnets and found out some cool things. The basics IRC- http – p2p and twitter botnets architecture and bots are becoming easier to find and use, tutorials and videos are all over the place and in any language. So the task of becoming a bot-master is easy.  Bot’s can be used for good also but nobody want’s to hear about that…Imagine bot’s being used with Amber alerts to or other emergencies tools were thousands of computers are needed, bot’s can be used for good things too.

Botnets are a big problem they allow anyone to have thousand, millions  of computers at their beck and call, a kid in a basement, or an enemy of the state these bot’s are a real danger. These bot’s have 4 different attack vector: 

Kenetic – Distribution – Information – cyberTools 

kinetic -zombie computer are used to Ddos attack a site or Click-fraud advertisement scams.

distributors – sending spam email- (Adware/ Spyware) – infecting other computers – co-workers, friends and families

information Keylogger, data exfiltration, key stealing from games -for sale $$ – email, social network — friends — banking – payPal – Work -Corporate spying and IP (intellectual property) plus emails of co-workers, friends and family.

cyberTools – we see bot’s become DNS servers, c&c servers, infection distribution servers, proxies, Tor (exit/entry) nodes or just a ftp site for storage.

I have seen lot’s of different bot’s but only four (4) basic types of botnet Command and Control (C&C) architecture: IRC (Internet Relay Chat) based, HTTP (or Web) based and P2P (Peer-to-peer) based – and Now Twitter controlled botnet’s.

Todays bot’s can be used in Intelligence Gathering, Monitoring and surveillance with the ability to turn on WebCam and Microphone without the victim knowing and recording it makes them even more dangerous and any digital cell device is hackable.

Here is a new one for me a private Twitter account is being used as the (C&C) command and control for bots. Once the bots are installed in the machine they go out and friend their botMaster they accept the friend and now send coded messages that are the commands for the bot’s. This is pretty cool and since it’s Twitter is kinda normal communication tool even in business machines, groups use twitter all the time to communicate.

In my research I found bots and video, tutorials and everything I need. On top of that we have Tor and other anonymized (custom Tor network) for these bot’s to communicate untraceable and cannot be found.

Here is were the metal hit’s the road because in this environment the p2p Botnet Architecture used with Tor would be an unstoppable solution and it’s becoming reality today: I included a thread from a hacker site in Tor discussing this very subject //.

these are some of the bot’s I found free source code to play -

G-Bot 1.7 Ddos-Bot – Zues 2.0.8.9 – ClientMesh 4.0 – DarkComet 5.3.1 – BlackShades 4.8 – SpyEye 1.3.45

Below are some of my notes on this I hope they may help - gAtO oUt 

botnet basics

There are basically 3 types of Bot net technologies. The first botnets started back about a decade ago with IRC bots

it’s more a continual connection at all times

IRC – HTTP – P2P – note p2p is the best meshed no central C&C

With HTTP botnets you can communicate async – things can be schedule a meeting and then log of and do the work then at a pre arrange time you call home (C&C) and check in with mamma.

Then you have p2p botnet’s they have no central C&C so are much harder to find the source and kill it.

Here we see were some of the bot’s may become proxies or some units may be used to cascade out spam interactions, one may also become a download location, one a dns server. The key thing to take away from a Peer to Peer networks is it’s very difficult to take them down because of their mesh network. There is no central point of failure, it’’s a simple file sharing protocol

=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=  p2p Tor Bot -message hacking board in Tor-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-

http://clsvtzwzdgzkjda7.onion/viewtopic.php?f=17&t=7657

Hey guys, just thought I would leave a thread here to announce a new bot that I am working on at the moment, Kronos.

Kronos is an http bot that runs through tor, each bot will launch its own tor process and then connect to your panel (which is a hidden service) using tor.

Current Features

  • The bot will act as a hidden service on the tor network
  • Socks5 proxy. Because of the above feature you are able to connect to the bot and use it as a proxy through tor, this removes the need for the bot to use upnp to open a port for you to connect through as tor handles NAT traversal by having the server connect out to the network itself, meaning there are no incoming connections. You can read here for more if you don’t already know how this works https://www.torproject.org/docs/hidden-services.html.en
  • Torrent seeder, not a shitty seeder that adds torrent files to the users torrent client, bots will work as real torrent clients.
  • Various flooding abilities (useless in my opinion)
  • Form grabber
  • Possibly mailing capabilities

I am also playing with some p2p code

=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-hacking board in Tor=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-

// So now that we know a bit about botnets let’s look at how they can make a profit for the criminal, below I listed of some of the stuff that you can harvest from your botnet empire.

Revenue Generated

Spam

Adware/ Spyware Scare-ware

Crimeware – Keylogger, data exfiltration, key stealing from games -for sale $$ – email, social network — friends — banking – payPal – Work -Corporate spying and IP plus emails of friends and work buddies..

Clickfraud

Phishing

Proxies

Ddos

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RsDtlqT4Zd4 Zeus BotNet Tutorial 2012

 http://www.xylibox.com/2011/08/cracking-spyeye-13x.html  SpyEye Tutorial 2011

 

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08/28/12

Black Market in Tor Growing

gAtO been down sIcK so I had to slow down so I’ve been reading underground looking around and the .onion network is beginning to take shape as more users explore it. Let’s just say it’s growing. In the Black Market things are looking up per say, more newbies and more scams with money mules, shipping mules, bot’s rentals and creation and trade. Here are two different crime recruitment points one the physical/ one code / and they are taking advantage of the economics of the situation.

People are losing their homes and eviction is coming “well I can do this for these guys online and I can make a little money and pay a few bills buy some food”. Grooming these new cyber shipping mules is a full time job, but they select and groom some for more and more /—then hit’s them with money mules transactions and they’re hooked. Greed / Pay the rent/ Now these guy know that as the money mule get’s more and more orders right the amount will go up and when they will bail with the criminals money is anyones guess, but by this time they have funneled so much money or goods thru these mules that they are throw away at the end of the life cycle of use. You also have the new code warriors watching and trading in botware working in Tor. Why because it works -/ and other have seen the .onion network as a new area were if they keep quite nobody can find them. If you keep quite nobody will know what your doing and that’s why Tor is working for the bad guys – Why can’t it work for the good guy’s when are we going to start using the best technology for the best job and leave all this other politics alone.

Cyber crime is working in the .onion but when will the law catch up, never I guess 2 many lost opportunities when they treat everyone like shit, just like the ugNazi CC bust- do they have a clue how many other CC sites are out there working in Tor and/or the surface web… . Silk road is all the rage while Black Market Reload sells explosives and drugs but come on the school boys in Cornell and other places are putting their finger into Tor to defeat Tor-attack the Tor Network Yeah – Yeah- “What If- What If -does not work in Tor students”, as they go for Silk Road the hundred of other places were real commercial cyber crooks get away with everything they can is working hard for the money boy’s and girls…. One service takes stolen credit cards to buy goods and directly ship products to the Ebay customer who purchase it and they pay them clean money while their new iPad was purchased with a stolen CC. It’s just these newbies in Tor think they are hip and cool in the surface but in the Tor network the good old boy’s that were there in the beginning are watching with a grim silly smile, knowing but not telling… gATO oUT 

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